# Advanced Placement Comparative Government Unit I

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## Introduction to Comparative Government

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| Thursday | 8/13 | Introduction to AP Comparative Government. Assign Textbooks and Readings Books (if time allows), hand out Course Outline and Unit 1 syllabus for Chapters 1 and supplements. Assign reading: Selection from *Anti-Intellectualism killing* |

*America?*

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| Friday | 8/14 | same as Thursday, if we have shortened periods. **Reminder: AP Pre-Test will be given on 8/17 and 8/18. 55 Multiple Choice and 1 Free-response question.** |
| Monday | 8/17 | AP Pre-Test -- Multiple Choice Section 55 Questions. |
| Tuesday | 8/18 | AP Pre-Test- Free Response Section |
| Wednesday | 8/19 | AP Roundtable- Article introduced, discuss seminar format and **Explanation of critical review guideline sheet (in unit packet)** Work on thesis statements in article/defense. |
| Thursday | 8/20 | Begin Unit 1 Reading in Kesselman Text: pp 2-4 Introduce Cornell Note-taking system. **Video-TBA** |
| Friday | 8/21 | Read Kesselman 5-11 Practice Quiz on Monday. **Video- TBA** |
| Monday | 8/24 | **Quiz over Ch1. pp. 5-11** Group activity: Writing an AP essay thesis (in unit packet) **Article** |

provided

Group activity: Writing an AP essay conclusion - packet) **Article provided.**
**Read 11-21   Kesselman**                    **Video to finish! I hope**☺

Tuesday      8/25   Quiz 11-21 Kesselman. / Conceptual Resources in class.

Wednesday 8/26   Quiz 21-25 Kesselman     Conceptual resources in class

Thursday 8/27     Chart Activity 26-35 in Kesselman.   Conceptual resources if time allows.

Friday 8/28       **Critical Review Due: What Democracy is and what it isn't.**

**Monday 8/31**      **Class Discussion: Democracy Article.**  Read Wood pages 73-80

**Tuesday 9/1**      **Quiz: Wood 73-80.  Discuss AP Test topics- Essay Questions and Multiple choice test tips.**

**Wednesday 9/2**      **Testing: Kesselman and Wood.  Ch.1 and Wood Text.  Up to 55 Questions but more likely to be less.   45 Minutes**

**Thursday 9/3**      **AP Style Free Response Test – 2 questions covering text and/or readings/activities in class.    45 Minutes.**

# Somali Piracy: A Nasty Problem, a Web of Responses

"In a surprising way, piracy provides an opportunity to harness the collective strength of states. . . ."

JAMES KRASKA AND BRIAN WILSON

On April 12, U.S. Navy Seals staged a dramatic rescue of an American cargo ship captain who had been held hostage during a five-day standoff in the Indian Ocean. The episode highlighted a problem that has drawn increasing international attention over the past year: piracy off the Somali coast. Approximately 125 ships carrying cargo that included oil, weapons, and chemicals were attacked in 2008. In the first two months of 2009, another 30 ships were attacked near Somalia.

To be sure, armed gangs demanding ransom have successfully boarded only a small fraction of the 33,000 vessels that annually ply the region's strategically important waters—waters that include the Gulf of Aden, the key gateway to trade between the East and West. Still, several seamen have been killed or injured, and the global merchant shipping supply chain has been adversely affected (for instance through increased insurance premiums). Some vessels, especially slower ships with low free-boards, have opted to avoid the area altogether.

In response to the crisis, an unprecedented combination of national commitment, naval force, and international action has emerged. Impressive diplomatic collaboration is unfolding in various venues, including the United Nations Security Council and the International Maritime Organization. Collectively, these developments represent a unity of effort that presages yet more partnering; utilization of the rule of law to address regional instability at sea; "out-of-area" employment of naval forces; and integration of international organizations to facilitate repression of maritime piracy. Capitalizing on this transformational synergy is key to effectively battling maritime crime throughout the world.

## Fire Hoses and Razor Wire

The Somalia piracy problem has been simmering for years. The country has lacked a functioning government since the early 1990s. Adversity and hardship permeate the area. Somalia's security and political environment has long been volatile, in part because of endemic poverty and an unemployment rate greater than 50 percent. These problems have been compounded by foreign poaching of Somali fisheries and a drought that has obliterated the country's agriculture.

Because piracy is a phenomenon that tends to surge when poverty, lack of economic growth, and crime are not addressed at the national and regional level, the result has been a proliferation of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Somali pirates are not terrorists pursuing a political cause—they are armed robbers at sea. As the leader of one pirate gang remarked, "What we need is money."

Toward that end, pirates successfully boarded more than 40 ships in 2008 and took nearly 900 seafarers and vessel passengers hostage. Currently, more than 120 people are being held prisoner in the vicinity of Harardhere, Somalia, the headquarters of most of the region's maritime piracy. The pirates last year secured from ship, cargo, and insurance companies $150 million in ransom payments for crews and vessels.

> Somali pirates are not terrorists pursuing a political cause. As the leader of one gang remarked, "What we need is money."

Last November, for example, Somali pirates seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi-owned supertanker with a cargo of crude oil valued at $100 million. The 25-member crew was held hostage, the pirates demanded a ransom, and a two-month standoff ensued. Finally on January 9, 2009, a package said to contain $3.2 million was photographed floating in a parachute down to the tanker. Later that day, five of the pirates drowned with their share of the ransom when their small boat capsized as they sped toward the Somali shore.

The situation has grown so dire that, after the seizure of the Sirius Star, the leading Norwegian shipping group Odfjell suspended transits through the area. And Danish shipper Maersk, one of the world's largest, is considering forgoing

the Suez Canal and routing ships around southern Africa in order to avoid piracy-prone Somalia. Such decisions increase the cost of shipping: The route around the Cape of Good Hope entails an additional 10 to 14 days of transit time.

Private industry naturally is engaged in the fight against piracy. Firms offer vessel security services for crew protection and have developed new technologies to repel boarders. Ships have ramped up their defensive capabilities by employing a variety of passive and nonlethal methods, which include ringing lifelines with razor concertina wire, employing evasive rudder handling tactics, and repelling boarders with fire hoses.

But more importantly, remarkable coordination has recently unfolded in the fight against piracy. This includes partnering among countries to expand communication, intelligence, legal capabilities, and maritime security. Over the past few years, a spontaneous and loosely linked armada of warships from China, Iran, Russia, Britain, France, India, the United States, and other countries has deployed to the Horn of Africa to protect sea lines of communication.

This coordinated effort already is producing results. In the first two months of 2009, while approximately 30 ships were attacked off the Somali coast, only 4 were boarded and hijacked—a significantly reduced success rate for the pirates. Internationally deployed warships have successfully disrupted piracy attacks in the region, destroyed pirate skiffs, and captured dozens of Somali pirates.

The campaign has been backed, moreover, by impressive diplomacy. In 2008 the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions to repress piracy. These resolutions are unprecedented in the scope and authority that they provide the international community to counter threats in the maritime domain. The resolutions prevent pirates from using the territorial waters of Somalia to avoid capture, increase the number of states deploying naval forces to the area, strengthen legal authorities' ability to prosecute pirates, and improve international cooperation, particularly with regard to the disposition of captured pirates. The resolutions, furthermore, are legally binding on all states.

In addition to making breakthroughs in multilateral diplomacy, nations are also working bilaterally and regionally. The United Kingdom and Kenya in late 2008 signed an agreement that enables Britain to transfer piracy suspects to Kenya for prosecution. The United States and Kenya finalized a similar accord in January 2009. Washington also was instrumental in establishing a UN "contact group" to help states in the region and international maritime powers better coordinate efforts.

These collaborative and innovative endeavors, which have required overcoming logistical, military, legal, and diplomatic challenges, will likely turn out to be the enduring legacy of the Somali piracy crisis. So, in a surprising way, piracy provides an opportunity to harness the collective strength of states in securing the maritime domain.

## The Long Arm

As a matter of law, piracy is considered an illegal act of committed for private (rather than political) ends by the crew or passengers of a ship against another ship outside of a state's

territorial waters. Inside territorial waters, such crimes constitute "armed robbery at sea," and they are the responsibility of the coastal state. But if armed robbery at sea occurs just a few meters seaward from the 12-nautical mile limit of the territorial waters that all coastal states have, it may be considered "maritime piracy."

This definition of piracy is codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Yet, despite the convention's detailed provisions regarding many matters, issues of legal jurisdiction at sea are a complex affair, and this complicates international efforts to combat piracy. For example, the convention assigns primary jurisdiction for law enforcement at sea to the flag state—a vessel's nation of registry—and lays out specific circumstances under which a vessel suspected of piracy may be boarded. Yet, because the seas are a combination of flag, port, and coastal-state juridical authorities, determining which state will assume jurisdiction is not always clear.

Moreover, criminal offenses on the oceans frequently involve suspects, victims, and witnesses who are nationals of various countries. Ensuring criminal accountability is further complicated if a state does not have domestic criminal codes proscribing the conduct in question, because that state will most likely not have jurisdiction to initiate a prosecution, nor have an interest in detaining the suspects. What all this means is that international cooperation is particularly vital with regard to piracy—no single nation in any case has the naval capability to patrol the vast areas affected by these maritime crimes.

The definition of piracy codified in the Law of the Sea developed from centuries of customary international law, but in recent years other definitions of piracy have emerged that cover armed robbery at sea and other maritime crimes such as murder at sea. So far, such supplementary definitions are mainly used for shipping industry statistics. Still, it has been suggested that the political and legal focus on protecting ocean shipping would be sharpened if piracy were combined with marine cargo theft, maritime drug smuggling and human trafficking, and maritime terrorism under the single category of maritime crime.

## No single nation has the naval capability to patrol the vast areas affected by maritime crimes.

Historically, piracy has been considered a subset of violent maritime predation that is not part of a widely recognized or declared war. In the West, maritime piracy was a feature of life in the Mediterranean from the ancient world to the age of steam. Throughout two millennia the threat of piracy was brought under control only by powerful navies, such as the imperial Roman fleet during the reign of Augustus Caesar. With the rise of nation states, piracy was kept in check by powerful Dutch and English fleets composed of fast sailing ships and, eventually, steam-powered vessels. During the cold war, large and active superpower navies, making routine port visits throughout the world, helped to contain piracy.

# No Eye Patches, Many Vessels

Since the end of the cold war, however, problems of failed states and ungoverned areas, of weak governments and tribalism—problems that affect stability and prosperity on land—have also promoted piracy at sea. After an upswing in piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore earlier this decade, the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore began cooperating closely to suppress piracy. Their efforts have led to a dramatic reduction in the number of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia. Yet, just as piracy in Asia was declining, regional instability and a declining naval presence in the Horn of Africa fueled a rapid increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Today warships from various countries are on station in the Horn of Africa conducting piracy repression missions. But this arena is a vast swath of water, as long as the U.S. Atlantic seaboard—the operating area comprises more than 2 million square miles. Preventing an attack in an area this big is made even more difficult when the criminals plying the waters disguise their purpose by appearing to engage in legitimate activities, such as fishing. As chief NATO spokesman James Appathurai has said, pirates do not typically identify themselves "with eye patches and hook hands," so it is not immediately obvious that they are pirates. And in some instances, pirates feign distress at sea, attracting mariners who are bound by international law to render assistance.

Further compounding the piracy problem is a lack of capacity within Somalia and neighboring states to patrol the regional seas. Indeed, pirates routinely seize ships or hostages in international waters and then flee into Somalia's territorial waters to avoid capture. As a result, even with the large number of warships currently deployed to the area, maritime piracy continues to be a daily occurrence off the coast of East Africa.

Still, the international naval presence in the region has prevented maritime security from deteriorating even further. For example, a current European Union mission against piracy off the coast of East Africa, Operation Atalanta, represents the EU's first deployment as a maritime security force. The undertaking has benefited shipping immediately: A German frigate thwarted an attack on an Egyptian ship in December 2008. In January 2009, EU naval forces successfully intervened to stop hijackings of the Panamanian-flagged S. Venus and the Greek-flagged tanker Kriti Episkopi. A French warship, a Corvette-class naval patrol vessel, responded to the S. Venus and captured eight pirates, who were turned over to Somali authorities for prosecution.

A cooperative naval operation known as Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) is also at work in the region conducting operations against piracy. Membership in CTF 150 has varied, with warships being provided by Pakistan, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany, among others. In 2008, CTF 150 operations thwarted more than two dozen pirate attacks.

In January 2009, the U.S. Fifth Fleet created a task force dedicated solely to confronting maritime piracy—Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151). The new task force was created because some navies in CTF 150 were operating under counterterrorism authority, and did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy missions within that framework. CTF 151 accommodates such legal concerns by establishing a staff that is focused on maritime constabulary issues such as maritime piracy, drug smuggling, and weapons trafficking. Australia is considering sending a warship to CTF 151; Turkey, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have already done so. The U.S. Navy has contributed approximately 1,000 sailors, along with surface warship and naval aviation assets, to CTF 151.

The infusion of naval assets has materially altered the operational landscape. However, given that attacks are still occurring with disturbing frequency, albeit with a reduced success rate, a maritime presence alone is not a long-term solution. Furthermore, it is unlikely that many of the nations that have sent naval forces to the region can sustain their deployments indefinitely. Perhaps additional means of addressing the problem may be borrowed from diplomatic precedents in regions outside the Horn of Africa.

# Strength in Numbers

In Southeast Asia and West Africa, in particular, states have invested considerable effort in securing sea lines of communication, protecting navigational freedoms, and reducing both crime and regional instability. This international focus has been elevated in recent years—but some such initiatives have existed for decades.

In Southeast Asia, approximately 50,000 ships annually transit the Malacca straits, carrying one-third of the globe's trade. Pirates in the area sometimes wear military uniforms to imitate legitimate maritime security forces. After they strip fishing of their equipment, typically pirates demand "protection money" that varies from $3,000 to more than $12,000. These criminal acts are occurring in one of the world's busiest waterways, making effective patrolling especially challenging.

Yet piracy in the area has declined significantly over the past five years because of decisive state action, collaboration, and multiple regional initiatives. In 2004 Asia produced a "Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia," or ReCAAP, the first treaty dedicated solely to combating piracy. This Japan-led accord has 16 state parties and operates a state-of-the-art information sharing center in Singapore that fuses and disseminates among member states time-critical piracy-related information.

One year after the introduction of ReCAAP, more than 30 nations and international and nongovernmental organizations met in Jakarta, Indonesia, to develop a framework to improve maritime safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The discussions continued in Kuala Lumpur in 2006 and Singapore in 2007. The meetings resulted in adoption of a "Cooperative Mechanism" that is proving effective at increasing the number of maritime patrols by the straits states, and in attracting donors from outside the littoral region to build maritime security capacity in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The Cooperative Mechanism is an example of unprecedented partnering among littoral states to provide for the safety and security of an international strait.

In 2008, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Malaysia's foreign affairs minister called on members of that body to confront piracy more aggressively. The Royal Malaysian Navy is expected to place a greater emphasis on maritime security in the straits, and Indonesia has enhanced its maritime ship patrols and airborne surveillance. Such a focus could

prove beneficial for counter-piracy efforts in the straits in 2009, as piracy may intensify because of the global economic crisis.

Africa has its own substantial history of multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In 1975 the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) was formed—though only recently has the organization realized its potential to create a regional maritime security network. Headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, MOWCA exercises an influential role in port security and shipping coordination. The forum supports member states in cooperatively managing all maritime issues—vessel security and littoral security, maritime constabulary functions, safety of navigation, and environmental protection. Several programs have been launched under the network to enhance collaboration in the international shipping transport sector, including an effort to establish a regional coast guard network. Of the 25 MOWCA states, five are landlocked, a fact that underscores the widespread support for regional maritime stability.

In the Red Sea area, cooperation is not nearly as developed or structured as in the regions covered by MOWCA and ReCAAP. Nevertheless, associations are emerging that, although they are relatively informal, could prove a vitally important component in piracy repression and regional stability. Red Sea states are of course affected by piracy near Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden. The problem is particularly pernicious for Egypt, since the Suez Canal generates more than 1 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product and some vessels are already avoiding it because of the threat in the neighboring Gulf.

In November 2008, Egypt hosted a meeting in Cairo for the Red Sea states to discuss the problem of maritime piracy. Representatives from Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, as well as Somalia, participated in the closed-door sessions. During a later UN Security Council debate, Egypt's representative discussed the deliberations at the Cairo meeting. He noted that there had been no recent pirate attacks in the Red Sea because of the capacity of coastal countries to secure their shores—and because of coordination among the Arab countries bordering the Red Sea.

Multilateral efforts are crucial for combating piracy off the Somali coast, but bilateral efforts are important as well. A 2006 agreement between India and the United States might underpin one such bilateral effort—but the agreement has been under-utilized. Washington and Delhi developed the pact to promote maritime security cooperation and coordination. The accord calls for the two states to conduct bilateral maritime exercises, cooperate in search and rescue operations at sea, exchange information, and enhance cooperative capabilities.

In October 2008, 8,500 naval personnel from India and the United States participated in "Malabar," a week-long naval exercise in the Arabian Gulf. The exercise was designed to help both countries' naval forces better understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the other force, thereby promoting interoperability. The Indian navy chief of staff credited such confidence-building partnership activities between the United States and India with improving coordination and making naval forces more effective in fighting piracy off the Somali coast.

This sentiment takes on added significance when one considers the Indian navy's prominent role in Gulf of Aden repression operations—Indian warships escort many vessels through the Gulf of Aden and have thwarted several piracy attacks.

Unfortunately, years after the presidential-level maritime accord was reached between India and the United States, the agreement has not yet been fully implemented. The two nations still have to define and structure protocols for staff-level meetings and informal discussions, as well as increase training, exchanges, and combined maritime exercises.

## Dispose of Properly

Another area in which greater international cooperation is needed is "disposition," or the component of piracy repression efforts that deals with investigation, trial, and punishment. Disposition poses enormous legal and political challenges for the states involved. The U.S. and UK prosecution agreements with Kenya are exactly the sort of thing that is required to ensure that pirates are held accountable. Previously, maritime powers such as Denmark and France had in several instances released captured pirates because of the evidentiary and logistical difficulties in conducting trials originating in the Horn of Africa.

Kenya has been a regional leader for disposition and legal action, having prosecuted pirates in 2006 after a U.S. ship disrupted a vessel hijacking. Kenya has since held piracy trials, with trial judges denying defense motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.

In the short term, it is critical to ensure that those caught hijacking a vessel be brought to criminal trial. But to meaningfully reduce piracy in the long term, the crushing, sustained poverty and lack of governance in Somalia must be addressed. In the meantime, as piracy continues off the Somali coast, effectively repressing this threat to national security interests, shipping, and global commerce requires collaboration. We have seen how, in Asia, ReCAAP has had a remarkable impact in reducing piracy. In West Africa, MOWCA has been reenergized and is now a force for regional stability. Also in West Africa, a pioneering new coast guard network is promising.

What this tells us is that—although warships, UN Security Council resolutions, and legal authority are all part of the solution to piracy—any political commitment to repressing piracy and safeguarding a region's waters must, for lasting effectiveness, emanate from coastal and affected states.

## Critical Thinking

1. Why are Somali's politics and government a problem?
2. What are the ways to combat piracy?
3. Why does combating piracy require collaboration between nations?

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**The New York Times** | http://nyti.ms/1FnkaoN

EUROPE

# Americans and Turks Discuss ISIS Threat

By **MICHAEL R. GORDON**    JUNE 1, 2015

WASHINGTON — American and Turkish officials are discussing a joint effort to clear Islamic State fighters away from Turkey's southern border, a senior State Department official said on Monday.

The official did not provide details or explain what role American air power might play, but he said that discussions with Turkish officials had progressed after several rocky months. "We are looking for things we can do in a very material and tangible way," the official said. "We want to get those extremists off their border. We want to look at a way that we can do that cooperatively with them."

Senior officials from the United States-led coalition that is fighting the Islamic State group are scheduled to meet in Paris on Tuesday to coordinate their campaign. The meeting has taken on added importance since the Islamic State took Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province in Iraq, last month, and the group has continued to make gains in Syria.

While Obama administration officials have cast the loss of Ramadi as a temporary reversal, the defeat was widely seen as a major setback for the administration's campaign to degrade and eventually defeat the extremist group, which has proclaimed a caliphate in much of Syria and Iraq.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi of Iraq, who will attend Tuesday's meeting, is expected to ask for additional support for his plan to retake Ramadi, which includes mobilizing more Sunni tribal fighters and recruiting new soldiers.

Laurent Fabius, France's foreign minister, said last week that in Iraq and

Syria "international mobilization must be strengthened very quickly, or else we are heading toward the division of one or the other country, if not both, with new massacres and dangerous consequences."

But it is not yet clear how far the United States and its partners are prepared to go to help the Iraqis. The Obama administration has not indicated, for example, that it is willing to send small American teams onto the battlefield to call in airstrikes.

In a briefing for reporters, given on the condition of anonymity, the State Department official said that the United States would support Mr. Abadi's efforts to recruit more tribal fighters. "They need help, and we're ready to help," he said. "We have about 5,000 now enrolled in Anbar Province, and that number is going to keep going up."

The United States has sent 2,000 antitank weapons to help the Iraqis defend themselves against suicide vehicles. The coalition has already trained 7,000 Iraqi soldiers and is in the process of training 4,000 more, the State Department official said.

The coalition is also expected to support Mr. Abadi's plan to bring new recruits into the Iraqi Army and rebuild the Iraqi police. After the Islamic State took Ramadi, Mr. Abadi fired the head of the Anbar police. Those officers are supposed to help secure towns and cities that the Iraqi government hopes to free from the control of the Islamic State.

Secretary of State John Kerry had planned to address the session, but after breaking his leg in a cycling accident on Sunday in France, Deputy Secretary Antony J. Blinken will attend in his place. (Mr. Kerry flew on Monday with his personal physician to Boston, where he will receive additional medical care.)

The meeting will include more than 20 nations and organization of the 62-member coalition.

Even as the diplomats gathered in Paris, the Islamic State stepped up its attacks. On Monday, three of its suicide bombers attacked a police base north of Ramadi in captured Humvees filled with explosives, reportedly killing more than 40 officers and Shiite militiamen.

Though both members of the coalition against the Islamic State, the United States and Turkey have been at odds on some important issues on how to deal

with the conflict in Syria. Turkey, which is contending with a flood of Syrian refugees and wants to topple Bashar al-Assad, called last year for establishing a large buffer zone within Syria.

Mr. Kerry said in October that the idea was "worth looking at very, very closely." But Josh Earnest, the White House spokesman, insisted at the time that the idea was not under consideration.

With no agreement on Syria, the United States has not been able to conduct airstrikes from its air base at Incirlik, Turkey. Efforts to stem the flow of volunteers and supplies for extremist groups that are fighting the Assad government, much of which has entered Syria from Turkish territory, have also fallen short.

Though the State Department official declined to provide details, he appeared to be alluding to a much more modest approach than the establishment of a large buffer zone or an extensive no-fly zone.

Any agreement on a plan, he said, would not come before the June 7 parliamentary elections in Turkey.

A version of this article appears in print on June 2, 2015, on page A6 of the New York edition with the headline: Americans and Turks Discuss ISIS Threat .

# North Korea on the Edge

## *If the Regime Collapses, Will the Rest of the World Be Ready?*

B. R. MYERS

Kim Jong Il may be increasingly wizened and frail, with fingernails white from kidney disease, but his propaganda apparatus is as vigorous as ever. On a current wall poster a worker gestures toward the slogan, "A strong and prosperous nation is coming into view!" In the background, fireworks explode over brightly-lit buildings, a pile of rice and potatoes, three-spanking new missiles, and a bulldozer.

To North Koreans the weaponry must be the only part of the picture that doesn't look ridiculously optimistic. United Nations sanctions continue to take their toll on imports and exports alike. By most accounts, last autumn's currency reform did nothing but worsen an already rampant inflation. Over half the factories in the country remain idle. The food shortage is worsening; there are accounts of starvation even in major urban centers like Pyongyang.

As for tensions with the south, they rose again Friday with the sinking of a South Korean naval ship near a disputed maritime border with North Korea, although it wasn't immediately clear what had caused the sinking or if North Korean vessels were involved.

The latest incident comes days after a conference in which some experts described the Kim dictatorship as being in the first stage of collapse. Americans should be paying attention: If North Korea decides to go out in a blaze of nuclear glory—and its current penchant for kamikaze rhetoric suggests it might—the enormous number of casualties would likely include many of the U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. But even a less-apocalyptic form of collapse could destabilize the entire region. Those South Korean experts might be wrong in their predictions, but the regime seems increasingly unlikely to last out the decade, even if the planned hand-off of power to the Dear Leader's son Kim Jong Eun goes off without a hitch.

The economy is only part of the problem. North Koreans endured far worse deprivation during the 1990s famine without flagging in their support for the regime. This brings us back to that wall poster, and to the regime's real crisis, which is more ideological in nature than economic.

The information cordon that once encircled North Korea is in tatters. Police in the northern provinces try in vain to crack down on the use of Chinese cellphones; citizens circumvent tracking devices by making brief calls from mountains and forests—sometimes to defectors as far away as the U.S. In provinces along the demilitarized zone, many citizens watch South Korean television. Even in Pyongyang, people listen to BBC or Voice of America radio, or view online news surreptitiously at companies with Internet access.

What the masses are learning is incompatible with their decades-old sense of a sacred racial mission. They've known since the 1990s that their living standard is much lower than South Korea's. The gap was explained away with reference to the sacrifices needed to build up the military. What the North Koreans are only now realizing, however—and this is more important—is that their brethren in the "Yankee colony" have no desire to live under Kim Jong Il. In 2007, after all, they elected the pro-American candidate to the South Korean presidency. Why, then, should the northerners go on sacrificing in order to liberate people who don't want to be liberated? Unable to answer this question, the regime in desperation has resorted to the most reckless propaganda campaign in its history.

This "strong and prosperous country" campaign is nothing less than an effort to persuade the masses that economic life will change drastically by 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Great Leader Kim Il Sung, the father of Kim Jong Il. The official media have dubbed 2010 a "year of radical transformation" that will "open the gate to a thriving nation without fail in 2012." On TV news shows, uniformed students smile into just-delivered computers, and housewives tearfully thank the Leader for new apartments. The media predict even greater triumphs "without fail" for next year. The Juche calendar—which starts with Kim Il Sung's birth year of 1912, from one and not zero—numbers 2011 as year 100, and thus hugely significant.

Yet while posters show soldiers and workers arm in arm, refugees describe a sharp rise in public resentment of an army that often steals from farms and factories to feed itself. Refugees are just as credible when they report a severe fertilizer shortage. The party has responded by demanding that apartment blocks deliver ever more human waste. Alas, the residents don't eat enough to meet the demand.

Such misery prevailed in the mid-1990s too, but at least then the regime admitted an economic crisis, even as it mostly blamed the Yankees. Now it talks of a country transforming itself from one year to the next. No dictatorship can afford to lie so stupidly to its people, or to raise public expectations that will be dashed in a matter of months.

Unlike the East Germany of old, North Korea lacks the high walls, incorruptible border guards and surveillance technology needed to keep an entire populace in lockdown. Reports of demonstrations against the currency reform may have been exaggerated, but the belated decision to increase the amount of exchangeable currency shows there must have been unrest of some sort. It also indicates that the regime lacks the will to crush it in Tiananmen-style fashion. Kim Jong Il must either find new ways to inspire his people or watch ever more of them cross into China.

But this isn't the only domestic crisis facing the Dear Leader. An increasingly infirm 68 years old (69 according to some outside experts) he's already way behind schedule in preparing his son's takeover. It was hard enough for the masses to accept the last hereditary succession in 1994; the official media must still hammer home the message that the Dear Leader was his father's only choice for the post. It will be infinitely harder to install Kim Jong Eun, who even now could walk down a Pyongyang street without being recognized. So the succession process will have to start in earnest by 2012, just as the "strong and prosperous country" campaign is falling on its face.

How will the regime try to survive this looming "perfect storm" of ideological crises? Likely by seeking to ratchet up some diversionary tension with the outside world. Making this especially probable is the nascent glorification of Kim Jong Eun as a general in his father's image. He thus needs a perceived military triumph of his own. (Kim Jong Il came to power in 1994 as the hero whose show of nuclear resolve had brought Jimmy Carter on a surrender mission to Pyongyang.) Last year's nuclear and ballistic provocations have set the bar higher for the regime, perhaps too high. This is the problem with deriving national pride almost exclusively from a nuclear program: The saber can only be rattled, and rattling gets old.

Whether the leadership opts for a bigger military provocation, and pushes its luck too far, or just tries to muddle through, with an inexorable decline of public support, the outlook for the country's survival has never been bleaker. Regime change? Out of the question. The Kim clan is inextricable with North Korean identity. A homegrown Gorbachev would find it impossible to shift focus from the military to the economy. Why should people toil under the North Korean flag in the hope of attaining a lifestyle that South Koreans enjoyed a quarter-century ago? Why not unify at once, and live in the system that has already proven itself?

In view of all this, one can only hope that the region's main powers are making more serious and thorough preparations for a North Korean regime collapse than they have so far let on. The effort to downplay the relevant contingency planning is of course understandable. It's hard enough for the Americans to get North Korea back to nuclear arms talks without admitting that they are readying for its demise. (Kim Jong Il can't have forgotten that Washington once promised him light-water reactors in the confidence that he wouldn't be around long enough to get them.)

As for the South Korean government, it doesn't want to frighten its own people, who seem reluctant even to discuss the possibility of German-style unification. Leaks about official contingency plans—refugee camps safely removed from Seoul, for example—seem intended to reassure everyone that unification will proceed almost imperceptibly slowly. The Chinese, for their part, have no choice but to deny that the thought of regime collapse in Pyongyang has even crossed their mind.

And yet if Western press reports are any indication, it's Beijing's future role that most troubles American planners. In 2007, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the U.S. Institute of Peace warned that "if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability." The possibility has Seoul worried too.

In reading about these contingency plans, one senses a general optimism that North Korea will not go down fighting. Here too, as so often in the world's dealings with Pyongyang, there is a strong tendency to extrapolate from late Cold War history—to presume that these "hardline Stalinists" will be rational enough not to do anything suicidal. But this has never been a Stalinist state. The orthodox worldview is a paranoid, race-based nationalism with intellectual roots in fascist Japan.

Since the East Bloc crumbled away in the early 1990s, North Korea has shown its true ideological colors ever more clearly. Last year it even deleted the word communism from the national constitution, elevating "military first" socialism to the country's guiding principle instead. At the same time it has made ever more extensive use of kamikaze terms and slogans ("Let us become human bombs in defense of the leader") taken almost verbatim from Pacific War propaganda. The official media routinely mock the leaders of the old East Bloc for giving up "without firing a shot," and vow that "there can be no world without [North] Korea."

The possibility of a violent, potentially apocalyptic regime collapse in North Korea within the decade is one that all countries with an interest in the region should keep in mind. They should also be more conscious of the internal ideological contradictions that make the country's long-term survival impossible. If North Korea must collapse anyway, it makes no sense for China to prolong things; the leadership will only go out with a bigger bang when the day finally comes. As for Americans, we should focus our contingency planning on a worst-case nuclear scenario instead of fretting about Beijing's role on a post-Kim peninsula. A Chinese occupation of North Korea should be the least of our worries.

# Critical Thinking

1. Describe the dangers of the North Korean regime.

2. Is the collapse of regimes like North Korea better? What are the potential problems from its collapse?

3. Which is more dangerous: the maintenance or the collapse of regimes such as North Korea? Explain your answer.

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# Corruption You Can Count On

## Crooked Governments Don't Inevitably Kill an Economy; Trouble Emerges When the Rules of the Game Are Unpredictable.

RAYMOND FISMAN

In 1967, a young army general named Suharto became president of Indonesia, and ruled for the next three decades with an iron fist. He presided over a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy that enriched Suharto's friends and family. His wife was commonly known as Madame Ten Percent, playing off her name of Ibu Tien, and an indication of her demands from profitable businesses. Yet in the midst of this endemic corruption, the country thrived economically.

China took its turn in the corruption spotlight recently with admissions of bribe-taking by Rio Tinto executives on trial in Shanghai. It was the second time in a week that corruption in China made headlines, along with Daimler's admission of paying bribes to officials in 22 countries—China included—to secure government contracts. It would seem that corruption in China, one of the fastest growing countries on the planet, is alive and well—providing another counterexample to conventional wisdom that corruption kills economic development.

Many countries that populate the lower rungs of Transparency International's annual corruption perception rankings—Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Haiti, to name a few—are dismal economic failures. But to the discomfort of development economists and anti-corruption crusaders, some of the great economic success stories of the past half-century have taken place in the most corrupt economies on earth. In Transparency's first corruption ranking in 1995, the two countries that ranked as the most corrupt were Indonesia and China. Yet these ratings came amid decades-long economic booms. Indonesia grew at 6% per year under Suharto, and since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the Chinese economy has grown at 9% annually, a rate unprecedented in modern history.

As far as economic development is concerned, apparently not all corruption is created equal. Volatile, unpredictable and uncoordinated corruption is what has proven to be most damaging to investment and growth. And China, if the Rio Tinto affair is any indication, could be entering a new era of uncertain corruption.

To understand why some corruption is so much more destructive than others, you first need to understand why countries grow, and how different types of corruption affect the underlying causes of development.

By and large, countries become rich because they save and invest, leading to higher productivity and output in future years. Investors look for low risk and high returns, and corruption can affect an investment's prospects through each of these channels. Most obviously, the excessively grasping hands of some dictators—the Robert Mugabes of the world—demand too large a cut from would-be investors. Imagine what would happen to investment if profits were taxed at 100% (or more) and you have some idea of the situation faced by Zimbabwe's businessmen.

Why do some leaders steal from the till in a measured way while others empty the cash register daily? It's the difference between stationary and roving bandits, as distinguished by the economist Mancur Olson. Thieving dictators who expect to be around year after year won't follow a scorched-earth approach to ruling their subjects, since they want to be sure that there's a crop next season from which to extract their tribute. By contrast, a precariously positioned dictator who fears that tomorrow he may find himself in exile or with his head in the guillotine will take what he can. So if we're stuck with corrupt dictators, we can at least hope for stable, forward-looking ones like Suharto.

A good, solid dictator also helps to ensure that rogue bureaucrats in individual ministries aren't charging businesses too much for permits and contracts. Consider the situation faced by a company that needs to interact with many government agencies (environmental, labor and so forth) to conduct its business. Under a dictatorship, the central government can dictate to ministries and officials what their individual takes will be. In effect, the president dictates a single bribe price, which is then distributed among lower-level officials.

How should a dictator set the amount to extract from each company? A higher bribe brings in more cash, but also risks driving the whole scheme out of business—at some point the extortion payment gets so high that companies may simply pack up and move elsewhere. If a dictator is doing things right, he'll pick an intermediate price that doesn't scare off too many investors.

Suharto resigned from office amid public protests and rioting in 1998, leaving behind a weak and fractured government. Suharto denied that his family ever profited from government dealings.

With no one to coordinate the bribe-taking of bureaucrats after a dictator leaves, an environment official may still show up to demand payment. But if he's freed up to pick his own price, he too will think about the trade-off between a higher bribe and the loss of income if a company leaves or goes out of business. What he fails to consider, however, is that if he sets his price too high he'll also be taking away some of the labor official's business when he stops by for his tribute. In fact, by not raising his rates after a dictator's grip is loosened, he may think he's a chump for leaving more money on the table for others. A labor official goes through the same exercise, and as a result the uncoordinated shakedown ends up killing off more business relative to earlier days.

This insight on the evils of decentralized corruption was first made by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, who noted that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian bureaucracy splintered into an assortment of bureaucracies. Starting a business required bribing the local legislature, the central ministry, the local executive branch, the fire authorities, the water authorities and myriad others, none of whom seemed to communicate with one another.

If the lack of predictability of an unstable regime pushes leaders to steal more, it also makes businesses invest less. If your partner in crime has a tenuous hold on power, who knows whom you'll be dealing with tomorrow? And why should leaders honor the corrupt agreements of their predecessors? Similarly, a fresh set of faces generates uncertainty over how these new officials—with no track record or reputation for honoring deals—will keep their ends of the bargain after bribes are paid.

The dangers of disorganized corruption can be seen in the chaos that ensued with the end of Suharto's rule in 1998. One glimpse into the challenges faced by companies in the new Indonesia comes from a court case settled by Monsanto in 2005 in which it was accused of paying bribes to a government official in 2005. The company made its $50,000 payoff in an attempt to buy the repeal of profit-reducing regulation, in clear violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that prohibits U.S. companies from paying bribes abroad. At the time of the settlement, Monsanto's then General Counsel Charles W. Burson said the company "accepts full responsibility for these improper activities." The government official denied taking any bribes. U.S. investigators also discovered that the unfavorable decree was never revoked.

Even the bribe amount may remain clouded in ambiguity. This lack of clarity over the required tribute is to some extent what distinguishes bribery from taxation. Taxes are at least in theory codified in law. In some countries, bribe payments are similarly codified through social norms and whisper networks: a Moscow magazine, for example, published the going rates for everything from buying a court verdict ($50,000 to $100,000) to instigating a police raid ($100,000) in 2008. In others, however, the requisite payment remains ambiguous, with grasping politicians or bureaucrats trying to squeeze as much out of each individual business as possible.

In addition to reducing the overall level of business activity, uncertain corruption will also shift the type of investments that entrepreneurs make toward those that generate a quick buck rather than a long-term payoff—paying bribes to an unstable or unpredictable government requires both a leap of faith and a quick exit strategy. This may account at least in part for the floating power barges, ready to be towed off at a moment's notice, supplying power to cities in Nigeria, Pakistan and elsewhere in the developing world. The alternative is breaking ground on an immoveable land-based power plant that leaves investors vulnerable to escalating demands from local officials.

Uncertainty may also shift the projects favored by leaders themselves. Forward-looking stationary bandits may choose to throw their support behind investors who build infrastructure that will help the country grow and thrive (and hence create further opportunities for bribe-taking). Roving ones will instead sell off rights to chop down forests or strip-mine mineral resources. In 19th-century America, for example, the robber barons—for all their financial shenanigans—at least left the country with a nationwide railroad network. This stands in tragic contrast to the systematic destruction of Haiti's economic resources that took place under Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who sold off the rail link from Port-au-Prince to Verrettes to an investment consortium that carefully packed up the tracks and shipped them out of the country.

Probably none of this should change our overall stance on reducing corruption. Some have argued that corruption can actually be better than no corruption at all, since it greases the wheels of commerce in economies otherwise paralyzed by bureaucracy. Yet few highly corrupt countries have had the economic successes of Indonesia, China or 19th-century America, and perhaps these countries would have grown even faster if unburdened by corruption. And this view ignores the matter of where all those regulations come from—probably corrupt bureaucrats who have figured out that the best way of extracting tributes is by tacking on more burdensome regulations.

But it does muddy the waters on what we have to say about the benefits of rooting out corruption, given that we may not like what replaces it. Investment and growth suffer most from erratic corruption practiced by weak and fractured governments. Yet regime change and reform naturally carry with them the upheaval and turmoil that at least in the short run may result in this less-desirable form of corruption. Even if corruption declines, what is left may be more pernicious. Businesses shouldn't pay bribes and government officials shouldn't take them, but we need to be careful in tinkering with economies where corruption is organized and its impact limited—we never know what may appear in its place.

This brings us back to China's secretive handling of the Rio Tinto case. Perhaps the most troubling aspect may be the signal it sends to foreign investors that they are entering a new era of uncertainty over the rules that govern their interactions with Chinese bureaucrats. It may be that Rio Tinto executives crossed

an invisible trip wire that protects domestic Chinese interests. If market participants understand this, then the long-term impact on investment may not be so great: Those that break the rules in a well-enforced and predictable system should be punished.

But this line may not always be visible to the foreign investors whose dollars and expertise have helped to fuel China's explosive growth. The only thing more dangerous to investors than a corrupt market is one in which the rules of corruption are unclear. If Chinese leaders wish to keep the dollars coming in, they might do well to stamp out the corruption and bribery that keeps some investors away. But, failing that, they should at least make sure that greedy bureaucrats take their share in an orderly and predictable manner.

# Critical Thinking

1. Describe the types of corruption in this article and the previous article.
2. What are the problems of corruption?
3. Should we try to eradicate corruption? What are the advantages of eradicating corruption?
4. Are there disadvantages to eradicating corruption? Give an example to illustrate.

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# What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not

PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER AND TERRY LYNN KARL

For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a debased currency in the political marketplace. Politicians with a wide range of convictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and attach it to their actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it—without adding qualifying adjectives—because of the ambiguity that surrounds it. The distinguished American political theorist Robert Dahl even tried to introduce a new term, "polyarchy," in its stead in the (vain) hope of gaining a greater measure of conceptual precision. But for better or worse, we are "stuck" with democracy as the catchword of contemporary political discourse. It is the word that resonates in people's minds and springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and a better way of life; it is the word whose meaning we must discern if it is to be of any use in guiding political analysis and practice.

The wave of transitions away from autocratic rule that began with Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations" in 1974 and seems to have crested with the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989 has produced a welcome convergence toward [a] common definition of democracy.[1] Everywhere there has been a silent abandonment of dubious adjectives like "popular," "guided," "bourgeois," and "formal" to modify "democracy." At the same time, a remarkable consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions that polities must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of "democratic." Moreover, a number of international organizations now monitor how well these standards are met; indeed, some countries even consider them when formulating foreign policy.[2]

## What Democracy Is

Let us begin by broadly defining democracy and the generic *concepts* that distinguish it as a unique system for organizing relations between rulers and the ruled. We will then briefly review *procedures*, the rules and arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure. Finally, we will discuss two operative *principles* that make democracy work. They are not expressly included among the generic concepts or formal procedures, but the prospect for democracy is grim if their underlying conditioning effects are not present.

One of the major themes of this essay is that democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices.

*Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.*[3]

A *regime or system of governance* is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions. To work properly, the ensemble must be institutionalized—that is to say, the various patterns must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if not all, actors. Increasingly, the preferred mechanism of institutionalization is a written body of laws undergirded by a written constitution, though many enduring political norms can have an informal, prudential, or traditional basis.[4]

For the sake of economy and comparison, these forms, characteristics, and rules are usually bundled together and given a generic label. Democratic is one; others are autocratic, authoritarian, despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic, oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic.[5] Each of these regime forms may in turn be broken down into subtypes.

Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence of *rulers*, persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimate commands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.

The *public realm* encompasses the making of collective norms and choices that are binding on the society and backed by state coercion. Its content can vary a great deal across democracies, depending upon preexisting distinctions between the public and the private, state and society, legitimate coercion and voluntary exchange, and collective needs and individual preferences. The liberal conception of democracy advocates circumscribing the public realm as narrowly as possible, while the socialist or social-democratic approach would extend that realm through regulation, subsidization, and, in some cases, collective ownership of property. Neither is intrinsically more democratic than the other—just *differently* democratic. This implies that measures aimed at "developing the private sector"

are no more democratic than those aimed at "developing the public sector." Both, if carried to extremes, could undermine the practice of democracy, the former by destroying the basis for satisfying collective needs and exercising legitimate authority; the latter by destroying the basis for satisfying individual preferences and controlling illegitimate government actions. Differences of opinion over the optimal mix of the two provide much of the substantive content of political conflict within established democracies.

*Citizens* are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democratic do they have citizens. Historically, severe restrictions on citizenship were imposed in most emerging or partial democracies according to criteria of age, gender, class, race, literacy, property ownership, tax-paying status, and so on. Only a small part of the total population was eligible to vote or run for office. Only restricted social categories were allowed to form, join, or support political associations. After protracted struggle—in some cases involving violent domestic upheaval or international war—most of these restrictions were lifted. Today, the criteria for inclusion are fairly standard. All native-born adults are eligible, although somewhat higher age limits may still be imposed upon candidates for certain offices. Unlike the early American and European democracies of the nineteenth century, none of the recent democracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europe has even attempted to impose formal restrictions on the franchise or eligibility to office. When it comes to informal restrictions on the effective exercise of citizenship rights, however, the story can be quite different. This explains the central importance (discussed below) of procedures.

*Competition* has not always been considered an essential defining condition of democracy. "Classic" democracies presumed decision making based on direct participation leading to consensus. The assembled citizenry was expected to agree on a common course of action after listening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits and demerits. A tradition of hostility to "faction," and "particular interests" persists in democratic thought, but at least since *The Federalist Papers* it has become widely accepted that competition among factions is a necessary evil in democracies that operate on a more-than-local scale. Since, as James Madison argued, "the latent causes of faction are sown into the nature of man," and the possible remedies for "the mischief of faction" are worse than the disease, the best course is to recognize them and to attempt to control their effects. Yet while democrats may agree on the inevitability of factions, they tend to disagree about the best forms and rules for governing factional competition. Indeed, differences over the preferred modes and boundaries of competition contribute most to distinguishing one subtype of democracy from another.

The most popular definition of democracy equates it with regular *elections*, fairly conducted and honestly counted. Some even consider the mere fact of elections—even ones from which specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial portions of the population cannot freely participate—as a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy. This fallacy has been called "electoralism" or "the faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners"—no matter how they are conducted or what else constrains those who win them. However central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can, especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in a bewildering variety. During the intervals between elections, citizens can seek to influence public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings, clientelistic arrangements, and so forth. *Modern democracy, in other words, offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values—associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral to its practice.*

## However central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties . . .

Another commonly accepted image of democracy identifies it with *majority rule*. Any governing body that makes decisions by combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to be democratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a parliament, a committee, a city council, or a party caucus. For exceptional purposes (e.g., amending the constitution or expelling a member), "qualified majorities" of more than 50 percent may be required, but few would deny that democracy must involve some means of aggregating the equal preferences of individuals.

A problem arises, however, when *numbers* meet *intensities*. What happens when a properly assembled majority (especially a stable, self-perpetuating one) regularly makes decisions that harm some minority (especially a threatened cultural or ethnic group)? In these circumstances, successful democracies tend to qualify the central principle of majority rule in order to protect minority rights. Such qualifications can take the form of constitutional provisions that place certain matters beyond the reach of majorities (bills of rights); requirements for concurrent majorities in several different constituencies (confederalism); guarantees securing the autonomy of local or regional governments against the demands of the central authority (federalism); grand coalition governments that incorporate all parties (consociationalism); or the negotiation of social pacts between major social groups like business and labor (neocorporatism). The most common and effective way of protecting minorities, however, lies in the everyday operation of interest associations and social movements. These reflect (some would say, amplify) the different intensities of preference that exist in the population and bring them to bear on democratically elected decision makers. Another way of putting this intrinsic tension between numbers

29

and intensities would be to say that "in modern democracies, votes may be counted, but influences alone are weighted."

*Cooperation* has always been a central feature of democracy. Actors must voluntarily make collective decisions binding on the polity as a whole. They must cooperate in order to compete. They must be capable of acting collectively through parties, associations, and movements in order to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, and influence policies.

But democracy's freedoms should also encourage citizens to deliberate among themselves, to discover their common needs, and to resolve their differences without relying on some supreme central authority. Classical democracy emphasized these qualities, and they are by no means extinct, despite repeated efforts by contemporary theorists to stress the analogy with behavior in the economic marketplace and to reduce all of democracy's operations to competitive interest maximization. Alexis de Tocqueville best described the importance of independent groups for democracy in his *Democracy in America*, a work which remains a major source of inspiration for all those who persist in viewing democracy as something more than a struggle for election and re-election among competing candidates.[8]

In contemporary political discourse, this phenomenon of cooperation and deliberation via autonomous group activity goes under the rubric of "civil society." The diverse units of social identity and interest, by remaining independent of the state (and perhaps even of parties), not only can restrain the arbitrary actions of rulers, but can also contribute to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of others, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in their willingness to sacrifice for the common good. At its best, civil society provides an intermediate layer of governance between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and controlling the behavior of members without public coercion. Rather than overloading decision makers with increased demands and making the system ungovernable,[9] a viable civil society can mitigate conflicts and improve the quality of citizenship—without relying exclusively on the privatism of the marketplace.

*Representatives*—whether directly or indirectly elected—do most of the real work in modern democracies. Most are professional politicians who orient their careers around the desire to fill key offices. It is doubtful that any democracy could survive without such people. The central question, therefore, is not whether or not there will be a political elite or even a professional political class, but how these representatives are chosen and then held accountable for their actions.

As noted above, there are many channels of representation in modern democracy. The electoral one, based on territorial constituencies, is the most visible and public. It culminates in a parliament or a presidency that is periodically accountable to the citizenry as a whole. Yet the sheer growth of government (in large part as a byproduct of popular demand) has increased the number, variety, and power of agencies charged with making public decisions and not subject to elections. Around these agencies there has developed a vast apparatus of specialized representation based largely on functional interests, not territorial constituencies. These interest associations, and not political parties, have become the primary expression of civil society in most stable democracies, supplemented by the more sporadic interventions of social movements.

The new and fragile democracies that have sprung up since 1974 must live in "compressed time." They will not resemble the European democracies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and they cannot expect to acquire the multiple channels of representation in gradual historical progression as did most of their predecessors. A bewildering array of parties, interests, and movements will all simultaneously seek political influence in them, creating challenges to the polity that did not exist in earlier processes of democratization.

# Procedures That Make Democracy Possible

The defining components of democracy are necessarily abstract, and may give rise to a considerable variety of institutions and subtypes of democracy. For democracy to thrive, however, specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights must be respected. Any polity that fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the "rule of law" with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered democratic. These procedures alone do not define democracy, but their presence is indispensable to its persistence. In essence, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for its existence.

Robert Dahl has offered the most generally accepted listing of what he terms the "procedural minimal" conditions that must be present for modern political democracy (or as he puts it, "polyarchy") to exist:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices.
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined. . . .
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
7. . . . . Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.[10]

These seven conditions seem to capture the essence of procedural democracy for many theorists, but we propose to add two others. The first might be thought of as a further refinement

of item (1), while the second might be called an implicit prior condition to all seven of the above.

1. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials. Democracy is in jeopardy if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions made by the people's representatives. Without this additional caveat, the militarized polities of contemporary Central America, where civilian control over the military does not exist, might be classified by many scholars as democracies, just as they have been (with the exception of Sandinista Nicaragua) by U.S. policy makers. The caveat thus guards against what we earlier called "electoralism"—the tendency to focus on the holding of elections while ignoring other political realities.

2. The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system. Dahl and other contemporary democratic theorists probably took this condition for granted since they referred to formally sovereign nation-states. However, with the development of blocs, alliances, spheres of influence, and a variety of "neocolonial" arrangements, the question of autonomy has been a salient one. Is a system really democratic if its elected officials are unable to make binding decisions without the approval of actors outside their territorial domain? This is significant even if the outsiders are relatively free to alter or even end the encompassing arrangement (as in Puerto Rico), but it becomes especially critical if neither condition obtains (as in the Baltic states).

## Principles That Make Democracy Feasible

Lists of component processes and procedural norms help us to specify what democracy is, but they do not tell us much about how it actually functions. The simplest answer is "by the consent of the people"; the more complex one is "by the contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded uncertainty."

In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity to keep competing for power and place, momentary losers will respect the winners' right to make binding decisions. Citizens are expected to obey the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, provided its outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences as expressed through fair and regular elections or open and repeated negotiations.

The challenge is not so much to find a set of goals that command widespread consensus as to find a set of rules that embody contingent consent. The precise shape of this "democratic bargain," to use Dahl's expression,[11] can vary a good deal from society to society. It depends on social cleavages and such subjective factors as mutual trust, the standard of fairness, and the willingness to compromise. It may even be compatible with a great deal of dissensus on substantive policy issues.

All democracies involve a degree of uncertainty about who will be elected and what policies they will pursue. Even in those polities where one party persists in winning elections or one policy is consistently implemented, the possibility of change through independent collective action still exists, as in Italy, Japan, and the Scandinavian social democracies. If it does not, the system is not democratic, as in Mexico, Senegal, or Indonesia.

But the uncertainty embedded in the core of all democracies is bounded. Not just any actor can get into the competition and raise any issue he or she pleases—there are previously established rules that must be respected. Not just any policy can be adopted—there are conditions that must be met. Democracy institutionalizes "normal," limited political uncertainty. These boundaries vary from country to country. Constitutional guarantees of property, privacy, expression, and other rights are a part of this, but the most effective boundaries are generated by competition among interest groups and cooperation within civil society. Whatever the rhetoric (and some polities appear to offer their citizens more dramatic alternatives than others), once the rules of contingent consent have been agreed upon, the actual variation is likely to stay within a predictable and generally accepted range.

This emphasis on operative guidelines contrasts with a highly persistent, but misleading theme in recent literature on democracy—namely, the emphasis upon "civic culture." The principles we have suggested here rest on rules of prudence, not on deeply ingrained habits of tolerance, moderation, mutual respect, fair play, readiness to compromise, or trust in public authorities. Waiting for such habits to sink deep and lasting roots implies a very slow process of regime consolidation—one that takes generations—and it would probably condemn most contemporary experiences *ex hypothesi* to failure. Our assertion is that contingent consent and bounded uncertainty can emerge from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a civic culture are better thought of as a *product* and not a producer of democracy.

## How Democracies Differ

Several concepts have been deliberately excluded from our generic definition of democracy, despite the fact that they have been frequently associated with it in both everyday practice and scholarly work. They are, nevertheless, especially important when it comes to distinguishing subtypes of democracy. Since no single set of actual institutions, practices, or values embodies democracy, polities moving away from authoritarian rule can

mix different components to produce different democracies. It is important to recognize that these do not define points along a single continuum of improving performance, but a matrix of potential combinations that are *differently* democratic.

1. *Consensus*: All citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it would certainly make governing democracies much easier).

2. *Participation*: All citizens may not take an active and equal part in politics, although it must be legally possible for them to do so.

3. *Access*: Rulers may not weigh equally the preferences of all who come before them, although citizenship implies that individuals and groups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences if they choose to do so.

4. *Responsiveness*: Rulers may not always follow the course of action preferred by the citizenry. But when they deviate from such a policy, say on grounds of "reason of state" or "overriding national interest," they must ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular and fair processes.

5. *Majority rule*: Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be decided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and previously approved.

6. *Parliamentary sovereignty*: The legislature may not be the only body that can make rules or even the one with final authority in deciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, or other public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must be accountable for their actions.

7. *Party government*: Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove more difficult to form an effective government.

8. *Pluralism*: The political process may not be based on a multiplicity of overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However, where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association, and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved will be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public and private spheres of action will be much less distinct.

9. *Federalism*: The territorial division of authority may not involve multiple levels and local autonomies, least of all ones enshrined in a constitutional document, although some dispersal of power across territorial and/or functional units is characteristic of all democracies.

10. *Presidentialism*: The chief executive officer may not be a single person and he or she may not be directly elected by the citizenry as a whole, although some concentration of authority is present in all democracies, even if it is exercised collectively and only held indirectly accountable to the electorate.

11. *Checks and Balances*: It is not necessary that the different branches of government be systematically pitted against one another, although governments by assembly, by executive concentrations, by judicial command, or even by dictatorial fiat (as in time of war) must be ultimately accountable to the citizenry as a whole.

While each of the above has been named as an essential component of democracy, they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or that type of democracy, or else as useful standards for evaluating the performance of particular regimes. To include them as part of the generic definition of democracy itself would be to mistake the American polity for the universal model of democratic governance. Indeed, the parliamentary, consociational, unitary, corporatist, and concentrated arrangements of continental Europe may have some unique virtues for guiding polities through the uncertain transition from autocratic to democratic rule.[12]

## What Democracy Is Not

We have attempted to convey the general meaning of modern democracy without identifying it with some particular set of rules and institutions or restricting it to some specific culture or level of development. We have also argued that it cannot be reduced to the regular holding of elections or equated with a particular notion of the role of the state, but we have not said much more about what democracy is not or about what democracy may not be capable of producing.

There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectations on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a society will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative, and cultural problems. Unfortunately, "all good things do not necessarily go together."

First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than other forms of government. Their rates of aggregate growth, savings, and investment may be no better than those of nondemocracies. This is especially likely during the transition, when propertied groups and administrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the "rights" they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initiating capital flight, disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the type of democracy, benevolent long-term effects upon income distribution, aggregate demand, education, productivity, and creativity may eventually combine to improve economic and social performance, but it is certainly too much to expect that these improvements will occur immediately—much less that they will be defining characteristics of democratization.

Second, democracies are not necessarily more efficient administratively. Their capacity to make decisions may even be slower than that of the regimes they replace, if only because more actors must be consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if only because "payoffs" have to be made to a wider and more resourceful set of clients (although one should

never underestimate the degree of corruption to be found within autocracies). Popular satisfaction with the new democratic government's performance may not even seem greater, if only because necessary compromises often please no one completely, and because the losers are free to complain.

Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable, or governable than the autocracies they replace. This is partly a byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and institutions. These products of imposition or compromise are often initially quite ambiguous in nature and uncertain in effect until actors have learned how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftermath of serious struggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals with recently acquired autonomy will test certain rules, protest against the actions of certain institutions, and insist on renegotiating their part of the bargain. Thus the presence of antisystem parties should be neither surprising nor seen as a failure of democratic consolidation. What counts is whether such parties are willing, however reluctantly, to play by the general rules of bounded uncertainty and contingent consent.

Governability is a challenge for all regimes, not just democratic ones. Given the political exhaustion and loss of legitimacy that have befallen autocracies from sultanistic Paraguay to totalitarian Albania, it may seem that only democracies can now be expected to govern effectively and legitimately. Experience has shown, however, that democracies too can lose the ability to govern. Mass publics can become disenchanted with their performance. Even more threatening is the temptation for leaders to fiddle with procedures and ultimately undermine the principles of contingent consent and bounded uncertainty. Perhaps the most critical moment comes once the politicians begin to settle into the more predictable roles and relations of a consolidated democracy. Many will find their expectations frustrated; some will discover that the new rules of competition put them at a disadvantage; a few may even feel that their vital interests are threatened by popular majorities.

Finally, democracies will have more open societies and polities than the autocracies they replace, but not necessarily more open economies. Many of today's most successful and well-established democracies have historically resorted to protectionism and closed borders, and have relied extensively upon public institutions to promote economic development. While the long-term compatibility between democracy and capitalism does not seem to be in doubt, despite their continuous tension, it is not clear whether the promotion of such liberal economic goals as the right of individuals to own property and retain profits, the clearing function of markets, the private settlement of disputes, the freedom to produce without government regulation, or the privatization of state-owned enterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy. After all, democracies do need to levy taxes and regulate certain transactions, especially where private monopolies and oligopolies exist. Citizens or their representatives may decide that it is desirable to protect the rights of collectivities from encroachment by individuals, especially propertied ones, and

they may choose to set aside certain forms of property for public or cooperative ownership. In short, notions of economic liberty that are currently put forward in neoliberal economic models are not synonymous with political freedom—and may even impede it.

Democratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or "the end of ideology." Least of all will it bring about "the end of history." No doubt some of these qualities could make the consolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither prerequisites for it nor immediate products of it. Instead, what we should be hoping for is the emergence of political institutions that can peacefully compete to form governments and influence public policy, that can channel social and economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that have sufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies and commit them to collective courses of action. Some types of democracies, especially in developing countries, have been unable to fulfill this promise, perhaps due to the circumstances of their transition from authoritarian rule.[13] The democratic wager is that such a regime, once established, will not only persist by reproducing itself within its initial confining conditions, but will eventually expand beyond them.[14] Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances. They may not immediately produce all the goods mentioned above, but they stand a better chance of eventually doing so than do autocracies.

# Notes

1. For a comparative analysis of the recent regime changes in southern Europe and Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For another compilation that adopts a more structural approach see Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

2. Numerous attempts have been made to codify and quantify the existence of democracy across political systems. The best known is probably Freedom House's *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, published since 1973 by Greenwood Press and since 1988 by University Press of America. Also see Charles Humana, *World Human Rights Guide* (New York: Facts on File, 1986).

3. The definition most commonly used by American social scientists is that of Joseph Schumpeter: "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), 269. We accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modern democracy, but differ primarily in our emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and the relevance of mechanisms of competition other than elections.

4   Not only do some countries practice a stable form of democracy without a formal constitution (e.g., Great Britain and Israel), but even more countries have constitutions and legal codes that offer no guarantee of reliable practice. On paper, Stalin's 1936 constitution for the USSR was a virtual model of democratic rights and entitlements.

5.  For the most valiant attempt to make some sense out of this thicket of distinctions, see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in *Handbook of Political Science*, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), 175–411.

6.  "Publius" (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison), *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). The quote is from Number 10.

7.  See Terry Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador," in *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985*, eds. Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), 9–36.

8.  Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1945).

9.  This fear of overloaded government and the imminent collapse of democracy is well reflected in the work of Samuel P. Huntington during the 1970s. See especially Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975). For Huntington's (revised) thoughts about the prospects for democracy, see his "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984): 193–218.

10. Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 11.

11. Robert Dahl, *After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

12. See Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51–69, and the "ensuing" discussion was published prior to first (winter/fall, 1990) by Donald Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz in *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990): 73–91.

13. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America" *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–23.

14. Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1965): 964–974.

## Critical Thinking

1.  List the conditions that Robert Dahl identifies as "minimal" for democracy.
2.  What does it mean that "no single set of actual institutions, practices, or values embodies democracy"?
3.  What do the authors say democracy is not?

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Name _____

## Kesslman Chapter 1 – Introduction to Comparative Politics

1. Outline/describe three **critical junctures** in world politics:


2. How has globalization impacted comparative politics?
3. What are the four themes of *Introduction to Comparative Politics?*
4. What is **comparative politics**?

5. What is the best way to begin the study of comparative politics? _____ How are comparisons made?
   Key terms
   - **State –**
   - "Government"
   - **Nation-state –**
   - Regime
   - 

6. Describe the following Comparative Methods:
       Qualitative analysis-

       Quantitative analysis -

       Rational choice theory

       Middle level theory

        Democratic transitions

7. What are the themes for Comparative analysis?

8. **Typology –**

9. Outline the minimum feature needed for a country to be a democracy?

**Name** _____

Directions (1) Take this pretest without help, providing your best guess.

(2) Look up your answers and correct your pretest, providing specific information. Use the CIA world factbook, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

(3) Bring this to our next class be prepared to discuss your answers.


Use the AP Comparative Government Case Studies to answer the questions:
United Kingdom ; Russia; China; Mexico; Nigeria; Iran


## Pretest Questions
1. Rank the nations we will study (include the US) from most to least populous. Indicate the population size according to the world fact book:



2.     Rank the nations we will study (include the US) from highest to lowest life expectancy. Indicate the overall life expectancy.



3. Rank the nations we will study (include the US) with the highest percentage of its population under 15 years of age to the one with the lowest percentage under 15. Indicate the percentage.



4 . Rank the nations from largest to smallest in area and indicate the sq km.



5.  Rank these nations from highest to lowest in the number of nations they border and indicate the number for each.

6. Rank these nations from most to least densely populated (people per square kilometer)

7. Rank these nations from the one with the highest percentage of arable land to the lowest

8.      Rank these nations from highest to lowest per capita GDP and indicate the GDP per capita.

9.      Rank these nations (include the US) in highest to lowest debt. Indicate the amount of debt.

10. Rank these nations from lowest to highest people per telephone (note you must add cell phones +land lines and divide by person). Indicate the ratio.

10.      Which country has the most recently written constitution and what was the year it was written?

11.      Who is the head of state in each nation and what is that person's title? Bonus points if you can name the political party each represents.

12.      Who is the head of government in each nation and what is that person's title? Bonus points if you can name the political party each represents.

13. What is the term of office for each head of state?

14.      What is the term of office for each head of government?

15.      Is the legislature in each country unicameral or bicameral?

16.      What is the name of the largest division of the legislature and how many seats does it have?

17. Is the political system in each of these countries federal or unitary?

18. How many ethnic groups in each nation?

Name _____

**AP Comparative Government & Politics**
**Mr. Brady**

## Using Data to Study Development
## Introduction

  The four lessons that follow are designed to give students a better understanding of the concept of development, and for students to have some hands on practice comparing the level of development in countries covered in the Comparative Government & Politics curriculum. Development is a complicated concept for students to grasp because it is multifaceted in nature. There are many variables that can impact the level of development within a country. Moreover there are many variables that can be used to measure development. These variables include life expectancy, infant mortality, death rates, literacy, education levels, and population distribution. Countries can be developed in one area but not another. Additionally, students may find themselves surprised that countries that are considered developed may not have data to support that they are developed in all areas, and countries considered not as developed may have data to suggest that they are developed in other areas. In sum, these lessons will ask students to use data to test commonly held assumptions about the level of development within countries, and will inevitably lead to surprises. Ideally, these surprises will provoke useful classroom discussion and analysis.

  Before beginning each lesson, make sure students have been introduced to and can give basic definitions of the key terms below. I would suggest introducing these terms formally in the classroom after students have read and/or defined them from their textbooks. Additionally, you may use the Democratization Briefing Paper (available on AP Central as a reference for you and your students). I would also suggest verbally testing students to be sure they are familiar with the key socioeconomic measurements of development before beginning. You can test for student understanding of these measurements by simply asking students what they would expect of each measurement in countries with certain socioeconomic conditions. For example, ask students, is life expectancy generally high or low in a developed country? What about in an underdeveloped country? Is infant mortality generally high or low in a developed country? What about in an underdeveloped country? Obviously, students should respond that they expect developing countries to have low life expectancy and high infant mortality.

  You can also ask them to make correlations between variables. For example, ask them what correlations they might expect to see between wealth and inequality. Students might conclude, inaccurately, that rich countries are unequal while poor countries are less so. Students can also consider causation. For example, how do these variables relate to the preconditions for democracy? Ask them to speculate about how a high literacy rate, GDP, or Gini Index might cause a country to become more democratic. This is a good way to reinforce the key concepts of correlation and causation. As you go through the list with your class verbally you should be able to get a sense of whether or not your students grasp

the idea of development or if more review is necessary.

The definitions of the key terms on the pages three and four can be found in many Comparative Politics textbooks, but it is likely that you will have to consult a variety of sources, as no one textbook includes definitions of all of the key terms. Keep in mind that the definitions of these concepts may be slightly different in different textbooks, as political scientists tend to disagree on all elements of a key concept or term. Additional sources such as the CIA World Fact Book may also provide appropriate definitions of many of the key terms. This is available on line at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htmlAP

## Using Data to Study Development
### Key Terms:

**Political Measures of Development:**
1) Developing country-
2) Third World Country-
3) Democratization-
4) Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)-
5) Import substitution-
6) Structural Adjustment-
7) Industrialization-
8) Neoliberalism-
9) Rule of Law (rule of law index)-

**Socioeconomic Measurements of Development:**
10) World Bank -
11) IMF -
12) Microcredit -
13) GDP (agriculture, industry, service)-
14) GNP-
15) Gini Index-
16) Life expectancy-
17) Death rate-
18) Literacy rate (male/female)-
19) Infant mortality rate-
20) Civil liberties and rights-
21) Women's rights-
22) Education levels (male/female)-
23) Population distribution (urban/rural)-
24) UN Human Development Index-
25) Transparency International data on corruption-

Name _____

## Democratization Briefing Paper
## Available on AP Central
### (Students Access this on my wnhs.com web site)

Read the paper (it is long!) and define the key terms:
**Democratic regime** –

**Procedural democracy** –

**Substantive democracy** –

**Democratization** –

**Three waves of democracy** –

**Identify/describe two preconditions of democracy** –
      1)
      2)
**democratization from above** –

**democratization from below** –

**military dictatorships** –

**personalistic authoritarian regimes** –

**single party authoritarian regimes** –

**democratic consolidation** –

**democratic responsiveness** –

*How does the author classify each of the following countries and what reasons does he give?*
**United Kingdom** -

**Russia** -

**China** -

**Mexico** -

**Nigeria-**

Iran-

## Exercise 1: Gini Coefficients

**Gini Coefficient (or gini index)** – *measures the relative degree of socioeconomic inequality within a country.* **Perfect equality** *equals zero: all individuals (or households) receive the same annual income; there is zero inequality.* **Maximum inequality** *equals 100: only one individual (or household) monopolizes all (100 percent) of society's income and everybody else gets nothing. Any number between 0 and 100 represents the degree to which society's income distribution pattern deviates from perfect equality.*

*The quintiles indicated in the table below demonstrate the amount of total wealth the owned by the citizens in each quintile.*

| Country | Year | Gini Coefficient | Lowest 20% | Second 20% | Third 20% | Fourth 20% | Highest 20% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People's Republic of China | 1995 | 41.5 | 5.5 | 9.8 | 14.9 | 22.3 | 47.5 |
| Islamic Republic of Iran | 1998 | 43 | 5.1 | 9.4 | 14.1 | 21.5 | 41.9 |
| Mexico | 1995 | 53.7 | 3.6 | 7.2 | 11.8 | 19.2 | 58.2 |
| Nigeria | 1992-93 | 45 | 4.0 | 8.9 | 14.4 | 23.4 | 49.3 |
| Russia | 1996 | 48 | 4.2 | 8.8 | 13.6 | 20.7 | 52.8 |
| United Kingdom | 1995 | 34.6 | 7.1 | 12.8 | 17.2 | 23.1 | 39.8 |

## Income Distribution in Developing Countries
## Student Instructions

**Country assignment:** _____

### Directions
1. Turn your newsprint to a landscape alignment.
2. Use your markers and write the name of your country clearly at the top of the page.
3. Write the Gini Index number of your country in the corner and circle it (see attached table)
4. Create a graph with an X and Y axis. Your graph will eventually look like the one below.
5. On the Y axis, you will create five bars and each bar will represent each of the quintiles on the table attached. Use your ruler to measure, and make each inch worth a value of <u>five and one</u> inch in height on your graph. The bars should also be approximately four inches in width, and be spaced apart one inch.

3

6. Underneath each bar that you created, label the appropriate quintile (first, second, third, etc.)
7. Color in the bars.
8. On the back of the page, answer the following questions:
   - Is the level of income distribution in this country relatively high or low?
   - Use country specific information from your reading and class discussion to explain the level of income distribution. Reasons should be drawn from the history of the country, government policies, and other factors discussed in the course. This information is commonly found in public policy sections of country specific chapters.
9. Tape your newsprint on the board.
(10) Return to your seat and with your teacher; compare each of the graphs created and the reasons for the income distribution in each country.

Name _____

<div align="center">

**Exercise 2: Web Quest & Jigsaw**
**Assessing the level of Development**
**Chart (1) to be Completed By Students**

</div>

**Web Sites to Access:**
1) www.freedomhouse.org
2) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/Index.html
3) http://www.humanrightsdata.com/ (click on "data & documentation") (then click on "CIRI data"
4) http://www.undp.org/
5) http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2005/cpi2005_infocus.html

Country Assignment: _____

**Political Development**
1. Go to the first Web Site (Freedom House). What is Freedom House?

2. Describe the measurements of freedom applied to countries.

3. What is your country's score on Political Rights? _____ Civil Liberties _____?

4. Why do you think your country was given each of these scores?
5. What does this score tell you about the level of development in your country?

**Social and Economic Development**
6. Go to the second Web Site (CIA World Fact Book). Write down information about your country:
   a) GDP per capita _____

   Agriculture _____

   Industry _____

   Service _____

   c) Life expectancy _____

   d) Death rate _____

   e) Literacy _____ (male _____ female _____ )

   f) Infant mortality _____

**Women's Rights**

5

7) Go to the third Web Site (The CIRI Human Rights Data Project). This Web Site contains research based information on a variety of countries. According to the site, "It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations."

Check the column for women's rights, columns Z, Y and AA, which correspond with women's political, economic and social rights.

The coding given is as follows: (0) =there are no rights for women. (1) there are some rights for women under the law but the government does not enforce the laws consistently (2) there are some rights for women under the law, and the government enforces some of the laws but tolerates a low level of discrimination against women (3) All or nearly all of women's rights are guaranteed by law, and the government enforces these rights and tolerates almost no discrimination against women. (-999 no data)

What is the level of women's economic rights?

What is the level of women's political rights?

What is the level of women's social rights?

**Human Development**

7. Go to the fourth Web Site, (The UN Human Development Index).

What does the index measure?

What is your country's HDI? (Find this by clicking "human development data" and searching for your assigned country. Then click "Human Development Report Country Fact Sheet).)

What is the relationship between geographic location and HDI?

How do you account for this?

What does the education index measure?
What is the education index for your country (the highest score is .99)?

Corruption

8. Go to the fifth Web Site, (Transparency International Data on Corruption).

What is your country's corruption index?

What is the relationship between corruption and poverty?
Name _____

## Assessing the Level of Development
## Chart (2) To be Completed by Students

Directions for students: Now that you have completed research on your country, you will be asked to compare the data you gathered with data gathered from the other countries. Your teacher will divide your country group and ask that you join a new group with at least one student per country. Complete the chart and answer the

| | Freedom House Score | GDP | Life Expectancy | Death Rate | Literacy (M/F) | Infant Mortality Rate | Education Index | W | HDI | Transparency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| nited Kingdom | | | | | | | | | | |
| ussia | | | | | | | | | | |
| hina | | | | | | | | | | |
| lexico | | | | | | | | | | |
| igeria | | | | | | | | | | |
| an | | | | | | | | | | |

## Web Quest - Analysis Questions

Directions Review the table you created and answer the following questions:

1. Which two countries appear to be most developed overall?

2. What variables caused you to choose these two countries?

3. Which two countries appear to be the least developed overall?

4. What variables caused you to choose these two countries?

5. Make a list of all countries starting with <u>least developed</u> and moving to <u>most developed.</u> Be ready to defend your choices.

6. Compare Russia to China.
   a. In what areas is Russia more developed than China?

   b. What are reasons for what you observed above?

   c. In what areas is China more developed than Russia?

   d. What are reasons for what you observed above?

7. Compare Mexico to Iran.
   (a) In what areas is Mexico more developed than Iran?

   (b) What are reasons this?

   (c) In what areas is Iran more developed than Mexico?

   (d) What are reasons for this?

8. What country was most democratized, according to the Democratization Briefing paper? _____ Is this the same country as is most developed? _____ What about least democratized, according to the briefing paper? _____

9. What is the relationship between development and democracy? Identify the two development-related factors that are most important in causing a country to democratize.

<u>Exercise 3:</u> **Rule of Law In Depth Analysis**
http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law

How does your textbook define <u>rule of law?</u>

How does the Web Site above define rule of law?

## China vs. Mexico on the WJP Index

| Factors | China (Provide ranking percentage from WJP Index) | Mexico (Provide ranking percentage from WJP Index) | What does this ranking mean? * |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Limited Government Powers | | | |
| 2. Absence of Corruption | | | |
| 3. Order and Security | | | |
| 4. Fundamental Rights | | | |
| 5. Open Government | | | |
| 6. Regulatory Enforcement | | | |
| 7. Civil Justice | | | |
| 8. Criminal Justice | | | |

*Please take note of the sub-factors under each factor to get an in-depth understanding of what each factor is measuring.*

## Rule of Law Analysis Questions

*In what areas is China's rule of law higher than Mexico's?*

*In what areas is Mexico's rule of law higher than China's?*

9

*What conclusions can you draw from this data? Why is it important to address the rule of law?*

*After seeing the results of China and Mexico's ranking, which country would you rather live in?*

*Are there any recent legal reforms happening in China or Mexico that may change either country's ranking on the Index? (Tie in current events here).*

*Why is it important to address the rule of law?*

Name _____

Directions Read article/answer questions on your own paper.

1. What is globalization?
2. "Historical perspective" – paraphrase. How do some countries integrate themselves, and how do some attempt to isolate themselves?
3. What is "economic globalization"?
4. What are Multinational corporations? How have they impacted globalization?

5. How has globalization impacted inequality?  Give examples from 2-3 of the countries we will study.

6. What has globalization done to the urban/rural living patterns and what are the consequences?

7. How has globalization harmed women more than men?

8. How does globalization effect the local markets?

9. How are developed countries left out of the global market?

10. Why has globalization had negative impacts on the environment?

11. Give examples of the above in Nigeria.

12. Identify/describe three transnational organizations that work on regional problems.

13. How has globalization impacted the **sovereignty** (ability to make decisions internally)?

14. Give an example of the above using the role of the EU (European Union) on Britain's sovereignty.  and EU.

15. Give another example of the above using the role of the WTO (World Trade Organization) on China's sovereignty.

16. How has globalization impacted the spreading of democracy?

17. What are some cultural consequences of globalization?

18. How has the power of states decreased and the power of non states increased?
19. Global citizenship – what is the role of Non Governmental Organizations?
20. What are some of the costs of globalization?

21. What are some of the benefits of globalization?