


Advanced Placement Comparative Government Unit III: European Union



Monday	11/07	Finish "The Choice" Preview EU Unit.
Tuesday	11/08	No school: Teacher Professional Day
Wednesday	11/09	Debrief British Parliament/Post Assessment/U.S. Elections and impact on Europe. Start reading 126-131 Making of European Union.
Thursday	11/10	126-131 Quiz: Open book. Start EU Notes in class.
Friday	11/11	Begin Fifth Estate Movie. Movie Review Assigned in packet. Continue European Union Notes.
Monday	11/14	In class annotations: EU and its "Constitution." Fifth Estate.
Tuesday	11/15	Critical Review Due: EU and its "Constitution" Class Discussion of Article. Fifth Estate.
Wednesday	11/16	Quiz: pp.131-139 Open book. Fifth Estate.
Thursday	11/17	Fifth Estate: Finish and assign movie review.
Friday	11/18	Quiz: pp. 140-149 Quiz: Open Book
Monday	11/21	Collect Movie Review for Fifth Estate.
Tuesday	11/22	Quiz 149-158 Open Note
Wednesday	11/23-11/25	No School: Thanksgiving Break.
Monday	11/28	Examining E.U. policies and its layers of bureaucracy,

Reading provided in packet. (Democratic Deficits and complaints about EU)

- | | | |
|-----------|-------|---|
| Tuesday | 11/29 | Quiz: pp. 159-166: Open Note. Jeopardy Review Britain /EU |
| Wednesday | 11/30 | Jeopardy Review Britain/EU. |
| Thursday | 12/1 | Unit Test: Great Britain and EU. Chapter(s) 2 and 4. 45 Questions:35 Multiple Choice, 10 T/F. |
| Friday | 12/2 | Free Response Test: 2 Questions: GB/EU. One question on each. |
| Monday: | 12/5 | Finalize Semester project or book reviews. Due on Exam day. Class roundtable at Panera? Details to follow. |

- While some of the welfare state was privatized under Thatcher's leadership, the UK still has an extensive welfare state which includes the National Health Service, generous maternity/paternity leave guarantees, and low college tuition prices.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/>

13 **The British Constitution**

- Often referred to as an "unwritten" constitution, the British Constitution consists of a set of acts of parliament.

14 **The Constitutional Change Movement**

See Reading. Be able to describe each of the following.

- Reform of the House of Lords
- Establishment of a Bill of Rights
- Change to Proportional Representation
- Greater integration into the European Union
- Devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales
- Elected Mayor of London with increased authority
- Freedom of information Act

15

The European Union

1. What is the EU?
2. How the EU begin?
3. What are the goals?

16

The European Union
Branches of Government

How are officials in each selected and what is the function of each?

- Commission
- Council

- Commission
 - Council
 - Council of Ministers
 - Court of Justice
 - Parliament

17 

The European Union **Key Terms - research these!!**

- Supranational Organization -
- Maastricht Treaty -
- Broadening -
- Deepening -
- Sovereignty –
- Euro
 - Reasons to adopt
 - Reasons against adopting
- Qualified majority voting
- Democratic Deficit
("Euroskepticism")

18 

The European Union -Public Policy

Describe the following key policy areas in the EU:

- Trade
- Monetary System
- Common Agriculture Policy (CAP)
- Justice
- Human Rights
- Citizenship
 - passport
 - labor

Identify and describe the limited policy

Areas of the EU:

- Military
- Foreign Policy

19  **EU Public Policy Examples**

Be able to describe the EU's role in each of these:

19 **EU Public Policy Examples**

Be able to describe the EU's role in each of these:

1.Chocolate

1.Wine

1.McDonald's Libel Suit

4. Ban export of British Beef

20 **Current EU Challenges**

- The European Union imposes a ceiling on each member countries domestic debt levels.
- When Greece exceeded this, the EU offered a bailout deal in the form of a loan. In exchange the Greek government had to make cuts to salaries/benefits (known as austerity measures).
- Several member countries have had to accelerate such austerity measures which have led to riots and protests which were violent and visible in the international media.
- At present, the EU has not cut it's own spending.

21

- Syrian Refugee Crisis? Let them in? Let them earn?

CHAPTER 2

Britain

Summary Overview

Located off the northwest coast of Europe, Great Britain is an island nation composed collectively of England, Wales, and Scotland. Separated from continental Europe by the English Channel, this body of water has protected Britain from invasion for nearly a millennium. Though the occasional target of intrigue by its continental competitors, France and Spain, Britain's geography meant its culture and institutions have developed mostly absent of foreign influence. Among the notable achievements was a slow but steady drift toward rule by the governed, culminating in near universal suffrage in 1918. The first country in the world to industrialize, Britain had a significant advantage over less industrialized countries, an important factor in allowing it to colonize large swaths of the world.

Like the United States, Britain has two major political parties. These parties have taken turns ruling the country for many decades. And like the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, the Conservative and Labour parties in Britain often offer dramatically different policy prescriptions for the country's ills. An exception to this rule occurred in the aftermath of the devastation of World War Two. Exhausted after six years of total war, the nation and the parties agreed to the establishment of the welfare state, whereby the needs of citizens, such as health care, pensions, and unemployment, would be guaranteed by the government.

The welfare state unraveled in the economic stagnation of the late 1970s, and after a series of devastating strikes by trade unions, Britain elected as prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who wrenched the country onto a free market trajectory. The 1980s and early 1990s were a time of Conservative dominance. But when Thatcher's successors proved inadequate for the times, Tony Blair led a reinvigorated "New" Labour Party, as it was unofficially called, to electoral victory by offering a "third-way" between the statist policies of the collectivist era and Thatcher's free market approach.

Single-party government rule is common in Britain, but it is largely a function of a "first-past-the-post" electoral system. With no proportional representation, the winner-take-all legislative election system over-represents large parties. In 2010 an unusual two-party coalition government, dedicated to deficit reduction and economic stabilization, took the reins of power in the form of a Conservative-Liberal Democratic alliance.

Britain lacks a single document to call its constitution. Rather, Britain relies upon several written sources, precedent, and tradition to provide guidance and limits on governmental power. Parliament, located in Westminster, contains Britain's two legislative chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The most important of these is the House of Commons, where laws are passed. The majority party in the House of Commons also has the right to form a government by electing a prime minister, effectively fusing the legislative and executive powers into the hands of a single person. The prime minister then forms a cabinet by asking leading figures from the majority party to head the various bureaucracies, such as the Exchequer and Foreign Ministry. This is referred to as a cabinet government. The judiciary is weak and does not have the power, for example, to declare acts of government unlawful.

The strength of the political parties in Britain means that Parliament does not legislate as much as it

simply agrees to the prime minister's policies. Political power has come to be more and more concentrated in the executive. The House of Commons nevertheless retains important tax and oversight functions. Parliament's upper chamber, the House of Lords, continues to lose influence to the prime minister and to the lower chamber, and many forecast its irrelevancy in the future.

Britain faces several challenges. Immigrants from former colonies, refugees, and those seeking asylum have changed the cultural and racial makeup of Britain. And Britain's class-based institutions do not always represent the interests of what is now a diverse and multicultural country. While at the same time, the decline of British political, military and economic global influence limits its ability to effectively address these and other challenges.

Chapter Outline

- I. The Making of the Modern British State**
 - A. Politics in Action
 - B. Geographic Setting
 - C. Critical Junctures
 - D. The Four Themes and Britain
 - E. Themes and Comparisons
- II. Political Economy and Development**
 - A. State and Economy
 - B. Society and Economy
 - C. Environmental Issues
 - D. Britain in the Global Economy
- III. Governance and Policy-Making**
 - A. Organization of the State
 - B. The Executive
 - C. Other State Institutions
 - D. The Policy-Making Process
- IV. Representation and Participation**
 - A. The Legislature
 - B. Political Parties and the Party System
 - C. Elections
 - D. Political Culture, Citizenship, and Identity
 - E. Interest Groups, Social Movements, and Protest
 - F. The Political Impact of Technology
- V. British Politics in Transition**
 - A. Political Challenges and Changing Agendas
 - B. Youth Politics and the Generational Divide
 - C. British Politics in Comparative Perspective

Lecture Launchers

1. Explore with students the pros and cons of nonelected legislative chambers. Should the House of Lords be eliminated? What purposes does it serve? Do its benefits outweigh its disadvantages?

Comparing Countries

1. Explore with students the significance of the British and American first-past-the-post election system with special reference to its effect on the party system in each country. How does it limit the development of third parties? Why have the Liberal Democrats been successful in joining the government despite the strong limits on representation that the electoral system provides?
2. France and Britain both have large immigrant populations, and both countries have faced challenges in assimilating those new arrivals. How have these ethnic groups reacted to being marginalized? What are the root causes of marginalization? How has each country addressed those causes? What structural problems exacerbate the challenge of assimilating culturally different people into the mainstream culture of each country?
3. Compare and contrast the political parties in the United States and Great Britain. How do the major parties in each country compare in terms of their views on the role and power of government, taxation, and social welfare? How do the parties align between the US and Britain? What factors would make Britain's parties stronger than those in the United States? What are the advantages of a strong party?

Key Terms

Cabinet Government: A system of government in which most executive power is held by the cabinet, headed by a prime minister.

Constitutional Monarchy: System of government in which the head of state ascends by heredity but is limited in powers and constrained by the provisions of a constitution.

Foreign Direct Investment: Ownership of or investment in cross-border enterprises in which the investor plays a direct managerial role.

Fusion of Powers: A constitutional principle that merges the authority of branches of government, in contrast to the principle of separation of powers.

Hegemonic Power: A state that can control the pattern of alliances and terms of the international order and often shapes domestic political developments in countries throughout the world.

Hung Parliament: A situation after an election when no single party comprises a majority in the Commons.

Industrial Revolution: A period of rapid and destabilizing social, economic, and political changes caused by the introduction of large-scale factory production, originating in England in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Chapter 2: Britain

Judicial Review: The ability of a high court to nullify actions by the executive and legislative branches of government that in its judgment violate the constitution.

Keynesianism: Named after British economist John Maynard Keynes, an approach to economic policy in which state economic policies are used to regulate the economy to achieve stable economic growth.

Laissez-Faire: A term taken from the French, which means “to let do,” it refers to the pattern in which state management is limited to such matters as enforcing contracts and protecting property rights, while private market forces are free to operate with only minimal state regulation.

Macroeconomic Policy: Policy intended to shape the overall economic system by concentrating on policy targets such as inflation and growth.

Monetarism: An approach to economic policy that assumes a natural rate of unemployment, determined by the labor market, and rejects the instruments of government spending to run budgetary deficits for stimulating the economy and creating jobs.

Neoliberalism: A term used to describe government policies aiming to promote free competition among business firms within the market, including reduced governmental regulation and social spending.

Parliamentary Democracy: System of government in which the chief executive is answerable to the legislature and may be dismissed by it.

Parliamentary Sovereignty: The doctrine that grants the legislature the power to make or overturn any law and permits no veto or judicial review.

Quangos: Acronym for *quasi-nongovernmental organizations*, the term used in Britain for nonelected bodies that are outside traditional governmental departments or local authorities.

Special Relationship: It refers to relations between the United States and Britain and is meant to convey not only the largely positive, mutually beneficial nature of the relationship but also the common heritage and shared values of the two countries.

Unitary State: In contrast to a federal system, a system of government in which no powers are reserved for subnational units of government.

Welfare State: A set of public policies designed to provide for citizens’ needs through direct or indirect provision of pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, and assistance to the poor.

Westminster model: A form of democracy based on the supreme authority of Parliament and the accountability of its elected representatives; named after the Parliament building in London.

CHAPTER 5

European Union

Summary Overview

When is a country not really a country? For example, the EU possesses many of the same features of a country. It has a history with a unique set of critical junctures, a population identifiable by the citizenship cards it carries, defined borders, its own currency called the Euro, institutions which make policy on behalf of its citizens, officials who stand for open and free elections, a constitution which defines the rights of citizens and the power of government, a capitol, and yes, even a flag. In sum, the European Union displays all of the trappings of a country, but nevertheless it is not. To illustrate why not, one must examine its history.

The EU began in the aftermath of World War Two. From out of the rubble of a devastated Europe, an idea was born. In 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed that formerly bitter rivals, France and Germany, should join in a trade union covering coal and steel. From this rather innocuous suggestion eventually developed the modern-day EU comprising over 500 million souls spread out over 28 countries in Western and Eastern Europe. But we are rushing the story.

Soon after Schuman's proposal, four other European countries, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, joined the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The success of the ECSC led to an even stronger desire to continue down the path of integration and in 1957 the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community, or Common Market. The EEC eliminated national trade barriers of the member countries, allowing for a free flow of goods and services and the development of a strong, vibrant economy.

The EEC expanded to nine countries in 1973 when the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined. Their membership coincided with the first oil shock of the 1970s and a sharp downturn in Europe's economy. An extended period of stagflation led to a malady known as "Eurosclerosis," and state-centric preferences dominated. The appeal of integration eventually resurged, however, culminating with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and the EEC became the European Union. EU members agreed to create a common currency, build a common foreign and security policy, and cooperate on the unfettered movement of EU citizens throughout the EU. After several setbacks, Europe ratified the Lisbon Treaty, which redesigned the EU's institutions. The treaty created a new position of President and increased the powers of the European Council and European Parliament.

The institutions of the EU include a legislative branch, the Parliament and Council of Ministers, which together "codecides" EU law. The executive branch consists of a European Council, where heads of state consider grand strategies, and the European Commission, which ensures the implementation of EU policy. The judicial branch is embodied in a European Court of Justice, whose decisions are binding on member states and their citizens. The EU method of making decisions is called the community method.

Having established state-like institutions, the EU began the difficult process of making policy, difficult because its decisions inevitably conflicted with the views of its member states. Conflict within the EU has arisen most notably during times of economic crises. Integration stalled during the 1970s era

of stagflation as nations licked their economic wounds. The financial meltdown of 2008 exposed a rift between wealthier EU members and poorer ones when Germany balked at providing billions of Euros to bailout Greece, Portugal, and potentially others whose public debts exceeded their capacity to manage.

These episodes highlighted the EU's greatest weakness, its lack of legitimacy. The rise of other contentious issues, such as immigration and globalization, have only exacerbated this weakness. France and Germany fear an erosion of their national identity as increasing numbers of foreigners cross national borders in search of jobs. These developments have dismayed ordinary Europeans, who do not understand the EU's institutions and processes and react by clinging to their own national identities at the expense of the EU. Today the country of Europe remains more of a dream than a reality.

Chapter Outline

- I. The Making of the European Union**
 - A. Politics in Action
 - B. Critical Junctures
 - C. Themes and Comparisons
- II. Politics and Economics in the Development of the European Union**
 - A. State and Economy: EU Economic Governance
 - B. Globalization and the EU
- III. EU Governance**
 - A. The Maze of EU Institutions
- IV. The EU and its Policies**
 - A. Building a European Market
 - B. Competition Policy
 - C. Agriculture
 - D. Regional Development
 - E. The Euro and EMU
 - F. Shared Policies
 - G. Intergovernmental Europe
- V. Euro-Politics in Transition**

Lecture Launchers

1. History is not written but made. Review the critical junctures in the process of creating the EU. At which critical juncture could integration have ended?
2. Discuss how changes to the international environment affected EU integration in both positive and negative ways. Ask the class what this suggests about the strength or fragility of the process and the prospects of further integration.
3. Explain what the Schengen area is and why it is contentious.

Chapter 5: European Union

Critical Thinking Questions

1. What is the trend in European integration toward: a unitary, federal or confederal arrangement? Explain why you feel this way. What might alter this trend?
2. Why do you think European integration was done in stages rather than all at once?
3. Revisionist history of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention criticizes it as being elite-driven and undemocratic. How could the process of European integration be similarly criticized?

In-Class Activities

1. Assign students to go through the chapter and identify important points based on these categories: institutions, critical junctures, and personalities. The students should write these categories on one side of a flash card and a related quiz question on the other side. Collect the cards and then quiz the class. You may want to make a game of this by creating teams and awarding prizes.
2. Divide the class into teams. Each team is to identify “country-like” features of the EU. Have the teams take turns reading items from their list. As the features are read, the other groups should cross out like items from their own lists. The winning team has unique features still remaining on their list.
3. Lead a discussion on how the personal histories of Robert Schuman and Conrad Adenauer affected their views on European integration.

Comparing Countries

1. Why is the EU difficult for some Europeans to understand? To better understand their plight, can you name your federal representatives? How long are their terms? Can you name the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? How does this compare with what the average European must remember?
2. Why was it important that France and Germany led the effort towards integration? Are these countries more or less important today to continued European integration?
3. Why is it easier to get transnational cooperation on economic issues than on social or domestic issues?

Key Terms

Citizen Initiative: Clause in 2009 Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to propose referendums to initiate EU legislation, provided 1 million legal signatures have been obtained in a “significant number” of different EU member states.

Common Foreign and Security Policy: Commitment in the Maastricht Treaty for deeper cooperation in international affairs and defense.

Community Method: The EU method of making decisions in which the European Commission proposes, the Council of Ministers and European Parliament decide, and the European Court of Justice reviews European law.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): The 1991 Maastricht Treaty federalized EU monetary policy, created a European Central Bank and founded the Eurozone and its single currency, the euro.

European Commission: The EU executive, which has a legal monopoly on proposing EU legislation and overseeing its implementation as “guardian of the treaties.”

European Council: The European Council is a regular summit meeting of heads of state and government, under an appointed president, to find grand strategies for resolving EU problems and delineating paths into the future.

European Court of Justice: EU Supreme Court that decides the legality of EU legislation and its implementation.

European Parliament: The Parliament of the European Union, which meets in Strasbourg and Brussels, “co-decides” EU law with the Council of Ministers, but it cannot initiate legislation.

European Single Market: Official title of the EU’s barrier-free economic space created after 1985.

Eurozone Crisis: Crisis of sovereign debt within Eurozone that broke out after 2009 that led to frantic emergency efforts by Eurozone members and the European Council to bail out Greece, Ireland, and Portugal and reconfigure EMU rules.

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): Engagements to make legal and regulatory changes to allow free movement of EU citizens throughout the EU.

Lisbon Treaty: After a decade of efforts to redesign EU institutions in light of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the treaty created new positions of the President of the European Council and High Representative for foreign and security policy and increased the powers of the European Council and European Parliament.

Maastricht Treaty: Treaty renegotiations (ratified in 1993) that gave the EU its present name, created the EMU and the CFSP, and granted the European Parliament power to “co-decide” EU legislation.

Qualified Majority Voting: Method in the Council of Ministers for deciding most EU legislation that weights member state voting power depending upon size and defining how many votes constitute a majority.

Chapter 5: European Union

Schengen Area: EU area, named after small city in Luxembourg, where freedom of transnational movement without border controls was first agreed in 1985. Schengen now includes all EU members except Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the United Kingdom and, Ireland. It also includes non-EU countries Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.

Subsidiarity: Principle consecrated by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty that the EU should seek decision making at the level of the lowest effective jurisdiction.

Web Links

1. Delegation of the European Commission to the USA: www.eurunion.org
2. European Union, official Brussels site: www.europa.eu
3. **Bruegel**, a good site for EU economics: www.bruegel.org
4. **EUobserver**, excellent daily EU bulletin from centrist-liberal group in the European Parliament: www.EUObserver.com
5. **Notre Europe-Institut Jacques Delors** (Paris); includes many documents in English: www.notre-europe.eu/en/

Instructor Resources

1. Bastasin, Carlo. *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro* Washington Brookings, 2012.
2. Cini, Michelle and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan. *European Union Politics*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
3. Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union*, 4th ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010.
4. Eichengreen, Barry. *The European Economy Since 1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
5. Kassim, Hussein, John Peterson, Michael W. Bauer, and Sara Connolly. *The European Commission in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
6. Rosamond, Ben. *Theories of European Integration*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 2000.
7. Ross, George. *The European Union and Its Crises seen through the Eyes of the Brussels Elite*. Houndsworth: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011.
8. _____ *Jacques Delors and European Integration*. Cambridge: Polity, 1995.

The European Union Review Sheet

By Mr. Brady

- The EU is supranational organization or an organization that transcends national boundaries. The United Kingdom is a member, but the UK has opted out of the monetary system (Euro currency) keeping the pound as its currency and maintaining control over its economy, including the setting of interest rates.
- The EU began with the Maastricht treaty which reduced trade barriers but has expanded since then to numerous policy areas including:
 - **Trade** (sets uniform standards for products and export decisions)
 - **Monetary System** (Euro currency/central bank)
 - **Justice** (cooperation among nations in fighting crime)
 - **Labor** (sharing of workers freely between countries)
 - **Agriculture** (subsidies and agricultural planning, most of the budget)
 - **Human Rights** (requires elimination of death penalty and sets other standards of human rights)
 - **Foreign and military policy** (currently by far the weakest area of EU)
- The EU has become increasingly powerful and increasingly likely to impact member countries sovereignty. This is best exemplified by the Court of Justice that has the ability to declare member states laws unconstitutional.
- The democratic deficit refers to the lack of citizen's understanding of the EU. Most policy elites support further integration, while citizens largely mistrust the organization.
- Qualified majority voting means that some rulings require unanimous decisions (such as admitting a new member state), there are fewer of these now and many decisions are reached by a majority

Institutions of Government in the EU

- **Commission** – each national government appoints the head (executive)
- **Council** – made up of heads of government of member countries, rotate (executive)
- **Council of ministers** – made up of cabinet ministers from member countries (legislative)
- **Parliament** – directly elected by member countries (legislative, advisory power)
- **Court of Justice** – one judge per country, Supreme Court, can uphold/strike down laws of member countries

Pro EU:

safeguard peace

- **Common currency: the Euro - facilitates trade vs punitive tariffs**
- **Migration: ability to move freely between both in travel and residence**
- **Trade: rules and regulations to encourage trade = more money stays in Europe - makes them a larger and more powerful international trading entity, more able to compete with countries like the US and China; increase exports, good for businesses and jobs**
- **Political: leads to more prominent global influence**
- **Culture: shared culture and more cultural diversity**

<http://econ.economicshelp.org/2007/03/benefits-of-european-union.html>

<http://www.newton-dunn.com/about-the-eu/top-6-benefits-of-british-membership-of-the-eu.html>

- **brings political stability**
- **allows for greater mobility**
- **more transparency**
- **more human rights**
- **allows extradition**
- **membership in the largest single market in the world**
- **Study found that membership in EU led to a 2.2% increase in GDP and 2.75 jobs created in 14 years**
- **2.75 mil jobs created by the introduction of the eu from 1992 to 2007**
- **End of tariff and non-tariff barriers**
- **Can participate in decision making regarding rules and regulations**
- **Generally results in increases in foreign direct investment**
- **233 billion increase in gdp since 2007**
- **world's largest economic market**
- **freedom to travel, work, study and retire in EU nations**
- **Access to EU Health Insurance**
- **Greater social protections for workers**
- **Justice across state lines**
- **Greater environmental controls**
- **Wider choice in purchasing products, greater competition, lower prices**
- **need eu to lead out of current financial crisis**
- **individual governments would respond quicker to local economic downturns if there was interconnectivity**
- **3.5 million jobs in UK directly tied to the EU**

Anti EU:

- **could negatively impact countries job markets**
- **discussion on the possible ban on slim and menthol cigarettes - wheres the individual choicel? (i dont really think that, but it's a point)**
- **the common fisheries policy hurts Ireland and UK, limits size of their fleets**
- **fisheries quotas too high - overfished waters**

- everyone is tied to each other (Greece can drag you down...)
- can lose skilled workers
- risk losing individual cultures
- regulations can restrict job growth
- save billions in payments to EU budget
- have to follow the VAT EU levels - no fiscal sovereignty
- Costs a lot of tax money to run and operate
- Too interconnected - when one country's economy struggles, it drags down the value of the Euro
- While migration is easier, it is hard for a country to refuse refugees or immigrants...and criminals can easily sneak in
- general resistance to recent decision to grant the EU the authority to exercise limited oversight of national budgets (75% Brits, Greeks and Czechs oppose loss of national sovereignty) Pew Research
- the Franco-German alliance dictates and can overwhelm smaller countries
- 81% of British citizens would vote against the Euro & 49% would vote to leave the EU in a referendum

Pros & Cons Websites:

<http://www.europeword.com/blog/europe/european-union-pros-and-cons/>

<http://www.europeword.com/blog/europe/european-union-pros-and-cons/>

<http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/OS12.htm>

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/chapter-1-dispirited-over-national-conditions/>

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/29/european-unity-on-the-rocks/>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20448450>

Anti: Quality of products will be cheaper overall.

Already in EU nations, 47% see the expansion of the EU as a threat, 37% as a positive opportunity.

<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/breurope/213.php?nid=&id=&pnt=213&lb=breu>

54 % of British citizens see the EU as having a negative impact. http://www.angus-reid.com/search/European+Union/?s=European+Union&issue=15&country=0&rtd=0&orderby=date&order=desc&posts_per_page=10

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

lots of data available here in cool charts and analyses of data. not really pro or con consistently- a bit of both.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe>
Is Germany too powerful for Europe?

www.euromove.org

MOVIE REVIEW:

The Fifth Estate:

Based on the movie and your own insight, write a one page critical analysis of Fifth Estate. You may use the following prompts as a guideline if you wish.

In your opinion is Wiki-Leaks as damaging to national security for the American Government? The British Government?

In Democratic societies, how important is freedom of information? Do you believe that this is the great 'levelling agent' against the lack of transparency by governments?



The Fifth Estate, Bill Condon's frenetic thriller about WikiLeaks and its founder Julian Assange, suffers from one very obvious fundamental flaw. It can't work out its own attitude toward its central character. The filmmakers haven't made up their minds yet whether Assange is a visionary champion of free speech or an autocratic and "manipulative asshole" with a personality skirting on the autistic end of the spectrum. The film veers toward the latter interpretation, one reason why Assange himself has been so dismissive of it.

Another problem is the sheer complexity of the new media world that Assange inhabits. Things seemed very much simpler in *All the President's Men* when the *Washington Post* journalists Woodward and Bernstein were told by their source to "follow the money" and ended up bringing down a president. Here, after WikiLeaks posts online its huge hoard of leaked military and diplomatic documents, the results are nowhere near so straightforward. It is therefore a huge challenge for Condon and the screenwriter Josh Singer (best known for *The West Wing*) to create a taut and coherent narrative. With Assange currently holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London fighting extradition after sexual assault claims from two Swedish women, this is hardly a story that has reached a natural conclusion either.

The film-making style is flashy and energetic. The tone is set by the montage sequence which opens the film. We're bombarded with images which give a mini-history of printing and publishing, taking us from the earliest days of typesetting to the birth of the worldwide web.

The action begins in earnest in late 2010, just as *The Guardian*, *The New York Times* and *Der Spiegel* are about to release the classified US documents that came WikiLeaks' way via the US soldier Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning. The *Guardian* journalists are in a state of hyper-excitement. The music, sound and quick-fire editing heighten the tension. It is one of the paradoxes of *The Fifth Estate* that it is a film about characters who spend a large part of their lives staring at computer screens but Condon still manages to make it seem like an action movie.

Benedict Cumberbatch is very well cast as Assange. In a bizarre way, the role makes a perfect companion piece to *Parade's End*. The aristocratic British army officer he played may have been a Tory clinging to old world values but was as stubborn as Assange is shown to be here – and as principled.

With his white hair (which one character in the film claims is dyed) and pale skin, Assange looks as otherworldly as David Bowie's alien in *The Man Who Fell to Earth*, but Cumberbatch gives the character gravitas and dignity. He has absolutely no regard for social nicety. This is brought out in two of the film's most poignant scenes in which he stumbles into the private life of his assistant Daniel Domscheit-Berg (Daniel Brühl.) In the first, he walks into Daniel's apartment late in the evening, sets up his laptop and starts working, completely oblivious to the fact that Daniel had just been making love to his girlfriend (Alicia Vikander). Privacy, it seems, is an utterly foreign concept to him. The second scene involves him going to dinner with Daniel's parents. He can't hide his contempt for their tidy bourgeois lives.

This isn't a biopic of Assange. At times, it looks as if it might turn into one. There are references to the son he hasn't seen for a year and to his own traumatic childhood in Australia where his mother was part of a religious cult. However, the filmmakers are too busy dealing with the other strands of the WikiLeaks story to delve too deeply into his background.

On one level, *The Fifth Estate* is a buddy movie. We see Assange from the perspective of Daniel Domscheit-Berg, whose memoir, *Inside WikiLeaks*, partially inspired the screenplay. There is a comic dimension to their relationship. Daniel is the Sancho Panza to Assange's Don Quixote or the Robin to his Batman. When Daniel first starts working for WikiLeaks, he thinks Assange has a huge army of assistants. In fact, it often seems it's just the two of them against the world. Condon throws in stylised sequences in which we see Assange and Daniel in what looks like a vast office with row after row of desks behind them. Of course, they're really hackers with laptops who work on the move.

The film hints at Assange's ambivalent relationship with mainstream media. He sneers at "the hallowed *Guardian*" with its high-minded airs and declining readership. At the same time he yearns for approval from its editors and journalists. He also begins to behave more and more like an old fashioned *Citizen Kane*-like proprietor.

The Fifth Estate pulls in far too many directions at once. The WikiLeaks story, it becomes apparent, is too big and complex to be turned into a coherent two-hour feature film. Characters flit in and out of sight for no particular reason. The brilliant young Swedish actress Alicia Vikander is in the film simply to provide at least a hint of a romantic subplot. There's a nicely caustic performance from Laura Linney as an American diplomat, and a very disturbing sequence showing a Libyan civil servant whose life is put in danger because of the leaks.

WikiLeaks has already dismissed *The Fifth Estate* as "a work of fiction masquerading as fact". It's a moot point whether the film really offers an accurate or fair portrayal of Assange, but what it does underline is that the man who set up an obscure website in 2006 is now one of the most famous media figures in the world. Hero or villain, DreamWorks wouldn't be making movies about him otherwise.

The EU and Its “Constitution”

Public opinion, political elites, and their international context.

ALBERTA SBRAGIA

The European Union is going about its regular business. It is putting forth proposals to keep the Doha Round alive, continuing to negotiate a major trade agreement with Mercosur in South America, keeping peace-keeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, spending development aid in numerous poor countries, financially supporting the Palestine Authority while giving Israel preferential access to the EU market, investigating Microsoft's business practices, and battling over the reach and scope of an ambitious new legislative attempt to regulate the chemical industry. The EU Greenhouse Trading Scheme, the largest greenhouse emissions trading scheme in the world, is up and running. The European Central Bank is making monetary policy decisions while the euro makes up almost 60% of central banks' foreign currency holdings. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has called for suspending the sale of the children's vaccine Hexavac. The European Court of Justice, for its part, has recently declared illegal a high profile Italian law designed to prevent foreign take-over of Italian energy companies. And the commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection is playing a leading role in the EU's response to the threat of a pandemic of avian bird flu.

Meanwhile, EU citizens are enjoying the benefits of the EU in very direct ways—when they fly on a low cost airline, make a phone call which is far cheaper than it otherwise would have been, study abroad while receiving credit back at their home institution, cross national boundaries without passport or customs control, or use the euro in any one of the 12 EU member-states which have adopted it. Although the EU is often characterized as a regulatory rather than a welfare state (Majone 1996), it is responsible for many policy outputs which are generally popular.

The defeat of the EU Constitution¹ in French and Dutch referenda held in mid-2005 has not blocked the EU from carrying out its usual activities. Those are currently subject to the Treaty of Nice as well as the other treaties which have been ratified since 1958 and are still in force. Nor has it affected the kinds of benefits to which EU citizens have become accustomed. While there is angst and confusion about the future direction of the Union among political elites, it is important to note that the

institutionalized machinery of governance which has evolved over nearly 50 years is in place and functioning. The fact that the Constitution's defeat did not alter the by now routine operations of policymaking highlights how embedded such policymaking is in the political life of an integrating Europe. The institutions of the European Union—the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Central Bank—are in place and doing the kind of substantive work they did before the Constitution was drafted.

Nonetheless, the Constitution's defeat is clearly an important moment in the history of European integration. For the first time, an agreement designed to further integration has been resoundingly defeated in two of the original six founding members of the European Union. Although supporters of the Constitution argue that the use of the referendum is an inappropriate mechanism for the approval of treaties, the referendum does enjoy a legitimacy which is difficult to negate. The impact of the “no” votes has been so great that many analysts argue the days of further integration in Europe are finished.

The medium- to long-term impact of the Constitution's rejection, however, is far from clear. Even without the contingency endemic to international affairs, the Constitution's defeat very probably will have unanticipated consequences. And those consequences, in turn, may actually run counter to the predictions of those who argue that the future looks bleak for European integration.

Two basic arguments can be made regarding the implications for European integration of the Constitution's defeat. The first argues that the political context has changed so fundamentally that policymaking and the trajectory of further integration will be affected in irreversible ways. In that sense, the defeat is a strategic defeat for those who wish for Europe to move toward ever greater integration.

The second argues that, by contrast, this defeat will simply encourage Europe's political elites to continue the process of integration through means other than treaties put to a referendum. That process could include a new treaty focused on the

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institutional changes incorporated in the Constitution which would be submitted to parliamentary ratification only. More interestingly, however, it could also involve moving toward further integration by using the institutional instruments currently available under the Treaty of Nice—in spite of the fact that political elites supported the Constitution because they viewed those instruments as too weak to allow further integration. Both arguments can be justified.

The Constitution

The Constitution was clearly meant to drive integration forward. Although the “Constitution” was actually a constitutional treaty since it had to be ratified unanimously and could only be amended unanimously, it was viewed as the next major agreement which would lead both to more integration among the EU-25 and pave the way for further enlargement. It was written in a less intergovernmental fashion than had been previous treaties. Although national governments negotiating in an intergovernmental forum had the last word, national and (especially) European parliamentarians had an important role in shaping its content and direction.

The comparatively diverse group of participants in the Constitution-drafting process highlighted the Constitution’s symbolic value. That symbolic value was in fact far greater than its actual substantive content would have warranted. And the question now stands—how much does its defeat matter?

Much of the EU Constitution was not new. It included “old” treaties which had been approved (at times in referenda in selected countries) and had been in effect for years. Those treaties will remain in effect. The defeat primarily affects proposed new institutional arrangements. Those included increasing the power of the European Parliament, establishing new voting weights for the various member-states, and strengthening the Union’s external relations. It may, therefore, become more difficult, at the institutional level, to construct a more cohesive European Union in the global arena. Finally, enlargement will become more problematic, as the proposed institutional changes were designed to accommodate new members.

A Strategic Defeat?

There is no doubt that the defeats have re-framed the process of European integration in the minds of Europe’s political class. There is currently a sense of indirection, of confusion, and of doubt as to where the grand project that the Six began with the Treaty of Paris in 1951 is going. The current climate is reminiscent of that which emerged after the Maastricht Treaty was approved by a margin of 1% in France in September 1992 and was only approved by the Danes in a second referendum in May 1993. At that time, too, the Commission was weakened, political elites were shaken, and the process of integration seemed much frailer than it had appeared only a few months earlier. The calls for full EU membership by the post-communist countries undergoing often difficult transitions to democracy added a kind of pressure which national leaders were at times reluctant to accept. Terms such as “a multi-speed Europe,” “variable geometry,” and

a “Europe a la Carte” entered the political as well as academic discourse about future paths which European integration might follow (Stubb 1996).

Of course, the EU recovered in a spectacular fashion from the Maastricht crisis. Although a great deal was written at the time about the caution that elites would need to demonstrate given the French public’s reluctance to whole-heartedly endorse the next stage of integration, the European Union in 2005 looks very different from its pre-Maastricht incarnation. It created the new institutions called for in the Treaty and continued to become more important as a global actor. The European Central Bank was established, the euro was accepted by 12 of the 15 members, and, on the international stage, the EU was critical to the establishment of an important new international institution—the International Criminal Court—as well as to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. It even began developing a European Security and Defense Policy. Thus, the question arises of whether the long-term implications of the Constitution’s defeat will be as transient as were those of the narrow margin of victory in France (and the necessity of holding a second referendum in Denmark) during the Maastricht process.

The difference between Maastricht and the Constitution lies in the clear and unequivocal distinction between approval (however slim the margin) and defeat. Maastricht became the treaty in force—with its commitment to a single currency and a more united European Union acting on the global stage. Furthermore, it was a much smaller EU that had to deal with the aftershocks of the Maastricht debate—the then EU-12 could more easily regroup than the current EU-25 (soon to be 27).

The consequences of defeat could in fact be far more damaging than the consequences of a razor-thin ratification. The political momentum which has traditionally been so important for the movement toward further integration could be absent, for political leaders would be unwilling to act against public opinion. The lack of a “permissive consensus” on the part of electorates could lead to a protracted stalemate, paralysis, and a gradual drift away from the kind of goals and aspirations which are traditionally associated with further integration. In particular, the attempt to create a stronger global presence would be stymied, and the move toward bringing ever more policy areas under the EU umbrella would be stopped or even reversed. The role of the so-called Community method—which involves a key policymaking role for the supranational European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice—would be at best frozen. And further enlargement—beyond the accession of Romania and Bulgaria—would become impossible.

In a worst case scenario, the lack of commitment by political leaders to the European Union would gradually infect the EU’s institutions, for the latter’s effectiveness is in fact anchored in the willingness of national institutions and elites to support the overall project of integration by supporting its supranational institutions.

The view that the defeat of the Constitution will sap the political momentum from the Union privileges the role of public opinion in the process of European integration. It implicitly argues that the hitherto elite-driven process of integration has been fundamentally transformed. The role of a majoritarian representative

institution—the national parliament—in ratifying treaties which advance European integration would have been diminished by the expression of voters engaged in direct democracy through the referendum. In fact, given the role of party government and party discipline in national parliamentary systems, the role of political parties would have been diminished.

Since the major political parties in Europe (whether in government or in opposition) have supported treaty ratification since 1958 and supported the ratification of the Constitution, the view that European integration will stall privileges public opinion *vis a vis* the opinions of governmental and party elites. In brief, the key support for integration—elite consensus—would become less powerful as an effective driving force.

The role of public opinion in European integration over the past 50 years has been ambiguous. The scholarly literature has come to varied conclusions, and in general scholars of European integration have focused on the role of elites in driving integration forward. Yet it is fair to ask how such an elite-driven process could sustain itself over so many decades. The liberalization of markets in particular would have been expected to lead to more contentious politics directed specifically against the EU than has been evident (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Gabel 1998; Sbragia 2000). Perhaps the underlying assumption of those who assume that public opinion should be expected to play a central role in the integration process was most pungently expressed by Herbert Morrison, deputy prime minister of Britain at the time when the British Cabinet rejected the invitation to join the European Coal and Steel Community. As Morrison summed up the issue, "It's no good. We can't do it. The Durham miners would never ar it" (cited in Gilbert 2003, 42).

If public opinion were indeed to significantly slow the pace of integration or re-shape its nature in the post-Constitution phase, it would have entered the stage as a significant factor relatively late in the process of integration. Given that elections to the European Parliament have been viewed as "second order elections"—based far more on national issues and political cleavages as opposed to EU-wide political debate—and that elites have enjoyed a "permissive consensus" which they have used to deepen integration, the strengthening of the role of public opinion in determining the course of European integration would represent a major new phase in this project.

The EU: A Geo-Economic/Political Project?

Europe's political elites, however, may well continue the process of European integration, enlargement, and global integration *even if* key aspects of the Constitution are not ultimately resurrected in some fashion. This argument views the European Union as a key geo-economic/political project as well as a complex variant of a (con) or (semi) or (crypto) federation/federalism-constructing exercise (Sbragia 1993; Majone 2006).

It is quite possible that the EU's international dimension will override the kinds of constraints imposed by public opinion. If the EU is viewed only or primarily as a domestic political system, the defeat of the Constitution would in fact

be a strategic defeat. If the EU is also conceptualized as a geo-economic/political project, however, the defeat might well have unanticipated consequences which are far more conducive to further integration than might be evident in the short-term.

The beginning of the accession negotiations with Turkey in October in the face of widespread public hostility to Turkish membership symbolizes the determination of governments to carry out the promises they have already made to other international actors. Although governments opened the accession negotiations with Turkey after a good deal of conflict with each other and down-to-the-wire negotiations with the Austrian government (which wanted to leave open the possibility of a privileged partnership for Turkey rather than accession), what stands out is the fact that accession negotiations actually went forward as planned. A mere four months after the Constitution's defeat, the EU was not only back in business, but back in a very difficult kind of business. Although many analysts argue that Turkey will never actually join, the very fact of opening negotiations has triggered a process of long-term change within Turkey that makes the outcome less predictable than the skeptics admit.

In a similar vein, the active engagement of the EU in the Doha Round symbolizes the understanding by elites that Europe's economic well-being is nested within a larger—global—economic reality. Although French voters fear economic liberalization of the services sector, it is quite possible that at least some such liberalization will occur due to pressure from the Doha negotiations. The EU is enmeshed in a larger multilateral trading system, and the decisions made at that level affect it in ways which have not been well understood by either publics or political scientists.

I would argue that external challenges, although understudied in the EU literature, have always been very significant in influencing the evolution of European integration.² The Soviet threat and the evolution of the GATT in the 1950s, the impact of de-colonization on states' commercial interests in the 1960s, the changes in economic competitiveness in the 1980s, and the perceived need for greater military and political power during the Balkan crises of the 1990s have all been influential in the process. The dynamics of European integration have been embedded in the larger international environment, and that environment cannot be ignored in explaining the extraordinary depth of European integration.

More specifically, the implementation of the customs union in goods was supported by the GATT negotiations in the Kennedy and Dillon rounds (Langhammer 2005). The Single European Act which brought the single market to the EU was motivated in great part by the sense that European firms were falling behind their Japanese and American counterparts (Sandholtz and Zysman 1992) while the Maastricht Treaty was shaped in significant ways by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of Europe. The restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy was partially driven by the Uruguay Round negotiations (Patterson 1997). The movement toward a European Security and Defense Policy was at least partially a response to pressure from Washington (Howorth 2005) as well as to Europe's failures in addressing the tragedy of the wars in the Balkans.

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External economic and security pressures will continue to exert a deep influence. While some of the most immediate pressures have been addressed by extending membership to the EU-15's neighbors, the enlargement process cannot keep meeting that challenge indefinitely. The WTO, the rise of China, changes in American grand strategy, and new security threats on the periphery of the Union will unavoidably push the European project in new directions as elites attempt to deal with emerging situations in world politics.

Some of the most significant institutional changes that the Constitution would have made were in fact designed to help the EU address foreign policy challenges in a more cohesive and effective way. Ironically, public opinion across the EU seems to favor a more unified global posture on the part of Brussels (German Marshall Fund 2005). Europe does not exist in a vacuum, and both elites and publics are aware of that basic fact. A more cohesive Euro-level foreign policy may therefore emerge even in the absence of the institutional changes that the Constitution would have produced. It is very likely that elites can pull mass publics with them in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the effort to strengthen the Union as a global actor can serve to link elites and publics more firmly than have economic policies of liberalization and regulation.

Economic integration, inevitably involving economic liberalization, is not as intuitively attractive as is a "stronger Europe on the world stage." Whether such liberalization can be successfully presented to voters as necessary for the strengthening of the EU as a geo-economic project is unclear, but it is possible that the "twinning" of European economic and foreign policy integration would help make economic liberalization more appealing.

The argument that an elite-driven process of integration—which incorporates party, governmental, and many business elites as well as national parliamentarians—has suffered a disruption but neither a strategic change of direction nor a strategic defeat downplays the role of public opinion as expressed in the defeat of the Constitution. It assumes that elites will in fact be able to move toward further integration. External events will provide support for further integration—such as recent events in the area of energy have demonstrated.

One of the unanticipated consequences of the Constitution's defeat in France and the Netherlands may be that integration will proceed in new ways. Just as the defeat of the European Defence Community in 1954 led to the European Economic Community, so too the need to circumvent public opinion (or at least not consult it directly) may lead to new forms of integration. The American executive, for example, has developed a host of ways to deal with international affairs which essentially circumvent or limit the role of Congress. Executive agreements and "fast track authority" for trade agreements (now known as trade promotion authority) both have been designed to allow the executive to have more flexibility in international than domestic affairs.

Second, cohesion in the foreign policy arena may develop more quickly than it has heretofore. Integration in foreign policy has lagged integration in "domestic" affairs given the member-states' concern with sovereignty. However, elites' desire to continue the process of integration coupled with the need to matter in a world in which not only the U.S. but also such countries as China and

India will be important actors may provide the impetus for moving forward in that area. The role that the EU has played since 1958 in the GATT/WTO provides a useful precedent.

The defeat of the Constitution ironically may lead national leaders to move forward, develop new mechanisms to forge agreements without creating a context in which referenda are called, and actually become far more cohesive in foreign policy than would have been expected. One of the motivating forces for the Constitution was the desire on the part of national elites that the European Union should become a more effective global actor. The defeat of the Constitution will not necessarily defeat that desire, and external pressures will continue to entice national leaders to follow that road. Geo-economics and geo-politics have always provided a rationale within domestic politics for the insulation of representative institutions from direct constituency pressures. It is very possible that they will provide the same kind of rationale for the European Union.

If the EU is in fact framed or presented by elites as a geo-economic and geo-political project which will maximize European influence on the world stage and thereby help it respond to external events, it is quite possible that mass publics will become more supportive and that integration will move relatively rapidly in the one area that has been most resistant to Europeanization—that of foreign policy. Furthermore "sensitive" domestic areas clearly subject to external influences, such as energy, will become Europeanized far more quickly than one would expect.

The lack of institutional efficiency which the Constitution was supposed to remedy will undoubtedly make this process messier and more convoluted than the Constitution's backers would have liked. That same inefficiency will, however, allow the new accession states to play a role more similar to that which the EU-15 have played and give them a chance to make their mark in the shaping of the EU-25. If external pressures do indeed allow political elites to move integration forward, convince public opinion that such integration is acceptable, and help integrate the new accession states politically rather than simply institutionally, the defeat of the Constitution may be viewed quite differently 20 years from now than it is at present.

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Notes

1. The "Constitution" was actually a constitutional treaty rather than a constitution as traditionally understood. However, the

political debate in most countries used the term "Constitution" rather than "constitutional treaty," and I therefore shall use the term "Constitution" as well.

2. For a similar perspective on American politics, see Mayhew 2005.

Critical Thinking

1. What does it mean that "public opinion" is not supportive of the EU?
2. How may political elites circumvent defeat by public opinion?
3. What does it mean to conceptualize the EU as a "geopolitical" or "geoeconomic" project?
4. Is conceptualizing the EU in this broader context consistent with the discussion in Unit 1? Why or why not?

ALBERTA SBRAGIA is director of the European Union Center of Excellence and a Jean Monnet Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. She has chaired the European Union Studies Association and is particularly interested in EU-U.S. comparisons. Her current work focuses on the role of the EU in the field of commercial diplomacy and the global emergence of economic regionalism.

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The Washington Post



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French Vintners Find E.U. Concoction Unpalatable

By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, May 4, 2009

TARADEAU, France -- To the buttoned-down European Union bureaucrats in Brussels, the idea was simple: squeeze costs, conquer new markets, maximize profits. But to the vintners of Taradeau, a sun-splashed Provencal village 800 miles to the south -- and a world away, mentally -- it was an attack on their Mediterranean heritage, a crack in French civilization, a fraud against wine lovers everywhere.

Never, they cried, can you mix a bucket of red wine into a barrel of white and call it rosé. Only the age-old process in which grape skins macerate in the juice for a finely calculated moment before fermentation, they protested, can produce the seductive color, fruity aromas and delicate structure of a true rosé. Mixing red and white, they sniffed, may make something pink to drink, but it is not rosé wine.

The trouble began in January when the European Union's agriculture commission decided, as part of a broad revamping of regulations on the wine industry, that starting Aug. 1 European producers can mix red wine with white and label it "rosé." To add insult to injury, vintners in Provence complained, France's representatives voted with the majority to make the abomination possible.

"They were had," charged Marc Rolley, director of the Cotes de Provence Wine Union in Les Arcs sur Argens, 15 miles inland from Saint-Tropez on the Mediterranean Sea.

Undeterred by the outcry here, the E.U. agriculture commission had been due to finalize its decision last week. But French Agriculture Minister Michel Barnier obtained a postponement until June 19. Between now and then, rosé producers said, the French government will attempt to line up enough support among the 27 E.U. governments to cancel the rule change.

Johan Reyniers, a spokesman for the commission in Brussels, said E.U. officials meant well and had their reasons: They were seeking to arm European vintners for competition in emerging markets such as China, where producers from Australia and South Africa, for example, do not hesitate to mix red wine with white and undersell European rosé by several dollars a bottle. Anyway, he added, relaxing Europe's rosé rules was only "one little thing" in a vast program to unshackle the wine industry from outdated regulations.

The clashing perspectives -- this "one little thing" is a way of life in the hills of Provence -- have once again pitted France's tradition of good living and great gastronomy against the seemingly unstoppable march of economic imperatives. Across the country, from wine cellars to cheese vats, from sausagemakers to bakers, artisans are confronted by 21st-century demands for efficiency, cost-cutting and homogenization.

Consumers' shopping carts may be fuller and supermarket chains' profit ledgers may be

blackier as a result, but something is being lost in the process, traditional producers say.

Looking across the sloping hillsides lined with grapevines that surround Chateau de Saint Martin here, it is easy to understand their point. Ever since the Count of Rohan Chabot bought the beautiful vineyards from a group of monks in the 17th century as a dowry for his daughter, the same family has been producing a sunny line of red, white and rosé wines with a proud heritage.

When Chateau de Saint Martin marketers decided to call a premium old-vine rosé "Comtesse de Saint Martin," for instance, they had only to go to family portraits hanging in the chateau to make a historically accurate label. Strikingly, the enterprise has been in the hands of several such women through the years, the current owner and operator being Adeline de Barry.

To her, the new rule was a "stupid" decision, taken to allow merchants to dump large quantities of white wine, particularly from Spain, that have backed up in storage since rosé overtook white in recent years as the second most popular wine, after red, in France; as of last year, nearly a quarter of all the wine consumed in France was rosé. If nothing can be done to reverse the decision, she said in an e-mail, then at least some clear term must be devised to distinguish real rosé from mixes.

And, she added, the term must be "chosen not by incapable politicians but by international marketers to avoid words that have no sense except in bureaucrats' offices and outside our borders."

That was de Barry's way of dismissing a suggestion from the E.U. agriculture commission that the concerns of French rosé producers could be met simply by adding "traditional" to the label of real rosé.

"I think that the advantage of rosé is above all a delicacy," de Barry said, "and a variety of savors that one cannot obtain except, at harvest time, by judging the maturity of the grapes for a rosé, except by a learned dosage of contact between skin and juice so the color is perfect, except by precise work on the temperature according to what one is seeking in the rosé."

Gregoire de Bucy, the chief winemaker at Chateau de Saint Martin, said the several hours during which the skin remains with the juice are mainly responsible for giving rosé its personality. Losing that moment, he added, means losing the aromas, the fruity accents and the colors that, taken together, evoke the sun-baked hillsides and Mediterranean breezes of the wine's birthplace.

Adding red to white, he said, will produce nothing but white wine with a little color. Linda Schaller-Gallet, marketing manager of nearby Chateau les Crostes, said it was possible that, over a few years, the pink color of a mixed wine could fade away, leaving a clear, white drink.

"Every year is different when we make rosé," de Bucy said. "That's why we never end up with the same wine from one year to the next. With mixing, they would be making a sort of Coca-Cola, so they would standardize it completely."

François Millo, director of the Interprofessional Provence Wines Council, said it would be incongruous to allow mixes to be labeled as rosé when the World Trade Organization and individual European governments are waging war against counterfeit brands of

handbags, perfumes and clothes.

"Here we have the contrary," he added. "The European Union is legalizing fakery."

Barnier's agriculture ministry, apparently not proud of its performance so far, declined to respond to a query on the controversy. Producers said Barnier has promised to push hard for a return to rules requiring the traditional process. "But the minister's not going to be there for very long," cautioned Gerard Audibert, a winemaking consultant in the Cotes de Provence region.

The European Union's parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 4 to 7, two weeks before the vote in the agriculture commission, and President Nicolas Sarkozy has put Barnier at the top of a list of candidates from France's ruling majority. His likely victory means he would no longer be agriculture minister for the vote on rosé, raising fears among rosé producers that their concerns will be dropped again and that mixed wine will flood the market beginning this fall.

"And what if it's good?" Audibert asked, half-smiling.

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McDonald's Protesters Win in Court

European Panel Voids British Libel Ruling in Saga That Began in 1980s

By Glenn Frankel

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LONDON, Feb. 15 -- The longest-running case in English legal history neared the end of the road Tuesday when the European Court of Human Rights ruled that two environmental activists whom McDonald's successfully sued for libel 15 years ago did not receive a fair trial and had been denied freedom of expression.

A triumphant Dave Morris and Helen Steel stood outside the McDonald's in central London where the saga began two decades ago and declared total victory over the fast-food giant. They and their joyous supporters handed out copies of a scathing anti-McDonald's leaflet similar to the one that triggered the original libel suit, and they pledged to renew their campaign against McDonald's and other corporate behemoths that they claim are ruining the world's agriculture, environment and large intestines.

The McLibel Case, as it came to be known, consumed 314 days in court and cost McDonald's more than \$16 million in legal fees as well as a super-sized helping of bad publicity. Although a British judge upheld the activists' right to make some of their allegations, McDonald's won the original verdict in 1997 and a \$98,000 libel award. That sum was reduced by one-third on appeal.

On Tuesday, the rest of it went down the drain. A seven-judge panel in Strasbourg, France, threw out the original judgment, ruling unanimously that Morris and Steel should have received legal aid from the British government to defend themselves. The ruling was a blow not only to McDonald's but to Britain's libel laws, which, compared with U.S. laws, tend to favor plaintiffs.

"We won hands down on both our points -- that the libel laws in this country are oppressive and they're unfair," Morris told reporters gathered on the Strand, the central London thoroughfare where the restaurant is located. Below a full-color poster in the display window trumpeting the fast-food chain's new bacon-and-egg bagel, Morris taped up a hand-lettered sign proclaiming: "Celebrate 20 Years of Resistance to McWorld!"

McDonald's, which was not a party to the proceedings at the European court -- Morris and Steel had sued the British government there -- declined to comment on the decision. But it noted that "although the so-called 'McLibel' case came to court in 1994, the allegations related to practices in the '80s. The world has moved on since then and so has McDonald's."

It all began in September 1985 when activists for London Greenpeace -- no relation to the international Greenpeace group -- started picketing McDonald's on the Strand. The following year they handed out a five-page leaflet titled "What's wrong with McDonald's." It displayed a cartoon of a man wearing a Stetson hat and hiding behind a "Ronald McDonald" clown mask, along with the words "McDollars, McGreedy, McCancer, McMurder, McDisease . . ." superimposed over the golden arches symbol.

The leaflet accused the company of contributing to Third World poverty, destroying rain forests, exploiting cheap labor and using deceptive advertising, as well as poisoning

children with bad food.

McDonald's denied the allegations, saying it was a good corporate citizen that paid close attention to environmental and nutritional concerns.

Because London Greenpeace was not an incorporated body, the company hired seven private investigators whom it sent undercover to try to figure out who was responsible, according to court papers. The investigators obtained confidential information from police files on activists.

The company threatened legal action against a number of groups and activists, who backed down. But Morris, now 50, an unemployed former postal worker, and Steel, now 39, a part-time bar worker, decided to make a legal stand.

Transcripts of the trial took approximately 20,000 pages, and there were about 40,000 pages of documentary evidence. In addition to many written witness statements, 130 witnesses testified. Although the defendants raised and spent about \$60,000 in legal fees, they worked without lawyers, while the company fielded a full battery of libel specialists and researchers. In a 762-page judgment in 1997, a judge ruled for McDonald's on most counts.

The company never sought to collect. "We have always said it was not our intention to bankrupt the defendants," a spokeswoman said at the time. But appeals dragged on for eight more years.

In 2000, Steel and Morris went to the European court, which hears claims of violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Their action against the British government contended that its refusal to give legal aid denied them a free hearing in violation of the convention and deprived them of freedom of expression.

In its ruling, the Strasbourg court emphasized that the activists had not brought the original case but were simply seeking to protect their right of free expression against legal action by a multinational corporation.

"As a result of the law as it stood in England and Wales, the applicants had the choice either to withdraw the leaflet and apologize to McDonald's, or bear the burden of proving, without legal aid, the truth of the allegations contained in it," wrote the judges. "Given the enormity and complexity of that undertaking, the court does not consider that the correct balance was struck between the need to protect the applicants' rights to freedom of expression and the need to protect McDonald's rights and reputation."

The court ordered the British government to pay Morris and Steel the equivalent of about \$105,000 in damages and costs. The government has three months to appeal the decision.

A spokesman for the British Department for Constitutional Affairs said the government would "study the judgment very carefully." Some analysts say the decision could bring changes in British policy concerning aid to libel defendants.

Steel said she and Morris never expected the case to drag on so long, but also never intended to back down. "We would never have paid them anything," she said of McDonald's. "They're the ones with something to apologize for, not us."