

**Advanced Placement Comparative Government
Unit VI: Mexico**



Monday	2/1	Movie: Sicario
Tuesday	2/2	Continue: Sicario
Wednesday	2/3	“ “
Thursday	2/4	Mexican Drug Fiasco and compare with Sicario.
Friday	2/5	Class Notes: Mexico's government and political history.
Monday	2/8	Finish Class Notes, Russia/Mexico Comparison Intro: Is Mexico's past Russia's future?
Tuesday	2/9	Begin activity on Russia's future in Mexico's past?
Wednesday	2/10	Hand in Russia/Mexico Comparison: Critical Review Grade assigned.
Thursday	2/11	Vicente Fox: "A Revolution of Hope" Activity in class, collect at end of period. Critical Review Grade assigned.
Friday	2/12	Jeopardy Review assigned (Groups of three)/ Mexico's middle Class becomes a majority: Questions due, class discussion.
Monday	2/15	No School! President's Day

Tuesday 2/16 In Class Activity: The Mexican Connection: Seminar Discussion to follow.

Wednesday 2/17 Jeopardy Due/ Review for Test.


Thursday 2/18 **Quiz:** Mexico 20 multiple Choice Questions

1 Free-Response Question

40 points Total.

All Vocab and material on the test will be taken from your readings, your Kesselman text and in class activities.


We will have a larger test combined with Nigeria and the end of that unit. That test will be sometime in March.



Mexico

Constitution adopted in 1917
 Federal - 31 states and one federal district
 Presidential System of Government (sexenio)
 Bicameral Senate 128 (upper-6 yr term) and Chamber of Deputies (lower-3 yr term)
 Multiethnic (15% white, 18% native, 64% Mestizo)
 Religion 88% Catholic
 Newly Industrialized Country (NIC); PEMEX - nationally owned oil industry

**Mexico's Party System
 And the impact of recent Elections**




**Mexican Election of 1982
 A Typical Election**

Whispered: "I'm not a politician, I'm a politician."

Presidential Election: **James Blom**
 National PDI, 74%
 ANS (also PAN), 27%
 Others 9%


Legislative Elections: **Blom won**

Senate (64 total)	
PDI	59
Others	1
Chamber of Deputies (total 372)	
PDI	288
PAN	51
PRD (ODSA)	33



Madrid (1982-1988)

Political Parties in Mexico
left to right




Mexico's Political Parties-
PAN

- Rightist party – formed in reaction to the presidency of Cardenas (nationalized banks and devalues the peso).
- advocates free markets and other “neoliberal” economic reforms
- Supported by Catholic church
- Strongest support is in the North (maquiladora owners benefit from their policies)

Election of 2000 – surprise!!!

PRI Dominance ends
Vicente Fox (PAN) wins the
Presidential election



What led to the 2000 election in Mexico?
"Democratic Concessions"


Proportional Representation
 Established 1994, based on 27 million citizens, there are 300 seats in 2000 election (146 for PAN, 86 for PRI, 68 for PRD)


Federal Election Institute (IFE) independent organization oversees election and provides

Divided Government Occurs for the first time in 30
 (PRI is dominant for national, leading legislative branch)

PRD and PAN makes small electoral gains in 90s
 (Growth in states, Mayor, Governors)

President Zedillo (1994-2000) announces he does not intend to choose a successor, PRI holds its compulsory primary





2006 Presidential Election –
Mexico faces a crisis



Obrador (PRC)
Madrazo (PR)
Calderon (PAN)

Calderon Wins the Presidency
in the closest Race in Mexican history


Obrador lost some in part due to:

- he did not show up for 1st debate
- negative ads turned middle class against him

Results:

- Calderon 35.9 %
- Obrador 35.3 %
- Madrazo 22.2 %

Presidential Election of 2012
Return of the PRI
President Pena Nieto



More on Mexico

- 1. History of Economic Change
- 2. New Constitutional Amendments on Trials
- 3. Problem of Drug Trafficking

Import Substitution

Definition strategy of former colonies to improve development. Involves closing a country's borders and attempting to produce all goods domestically.

Describe result in Mexico high tariffs were placed on imports to protect Mexican industries & government subsidized production of goods. Initially a success - GDP grew. This bolstered support on left. Eventually cost of worker benefits were too high, inflation of domestic goods cost more than prices began to soar. Government had to raise taxes, cut back on spending/lending. Gap between rich and poor soared. Government began to borrow.

Economic Liberalization Structural Adjustment & NAFTA

Structural Adjustment defined a post-import substitution economic policy adopted by developing countries to compensate for high inflation or demands from international agreements. Involves reducing trade barriers and adopting market reforms.

NAFTA North American free trade agreement signed in the 20s. lowered trade barriers between Canada/US/Mexico. Mexico agreed to structural adjustment when it entered NAFTA.

The Courts in Mexico

• Like the US, Mexico has a dual court system, meaning citizens can be tried in Federal or State courts.
• State courts in the south are very primitive.
• The federal government recently reformed it's judicial process.

"Mexico's Congress Passes Overhaul of Justice Laws"

1. What changes will be made to Mexico's judicial system?
 2. How were the changes made?
- NPR Story on this (4) identify challenges of this change)

Vicente Fox "A Revolution of Hope"
Read Book Excerpt & Answer Questions

1. anticlericalism
2. Bureaucracy (questions should be “employs 20% of Mexican citizens”)
3. camarilla
4. Cardenas
5. Chamber of Deputies
6. Chiapas
7. corporatism
8. debt crisis
9. drug traffickers
10. Eschieverra
11. Porfirio Diaz
12. ejidos
13. electoral fraud
14. Federal Election Commission
15. federalism (or 31+ federal district)
16. Vincente Fox
17. Gobernacion
18. haciendas
19. immigration and reform control act
20. import substitution
21. Indigenous groups
22. mestizos
23. Miguel De La Madrid
24. military
25. Maquiladora
26. NAFTA
27. Newly Industrializing country (NIC)
28. Nonreelection
29. parastatl
30. patron-client relations
31. PAN
32. PEMEX
33. PRI
34. proportional representation and single member districts
35. public trials
36. president
37. Carlos de Salinas
38. sexeno
39. Sonoran Dynasty
40. structural adjustment
41. women’s movement
42. Ernest Zedillo
43. Zapatista

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Mexico's Drug Fiasco

FIGHTING THE SCOURGE WITH SOLDIERS AND GUNS, A STRATEGY ENDORSED BY THE U.S., HAS ONLY BRED MORE VIOLENCE. NOW THE BELEAGUERED PRESIDENT MAY BE READY TO TRY SOMETHING NEW.

By Alexis Okeowo

The murder of 16 teenagers was the breaking point for citizens of the violent Mexican border city of Ciudad Juarez. On the last night of January, a group of gunmen arrived at a local house where 60 youths were celebrating a friend's birthday. Without warning, the gunmen opened fire into the crowd, killing 16 and wounding more. After robbing the house, they fled the scene. None of Ciudad Juarez's 6,000-plus federal troops — put in place nearly two years ago to protect civilians from drug violence — were in sight. Suspects later claimed the teens at the party had links to a drug cartel, while others say the incident was a case of mistaken identity. Either way, despite having become Mexico's most militarized city, Ciudad Juarez also remains its most violent.

At the time of the birthday massacre, both Mexico and the U.S. were continuing to proclaim the benefits of the increased troop presence along the border. But in the wake of the 16 killings, Ciudad Juarez residents erupted—protesting, erecting banners calling Mexican President Felipe Calderon an assassin, and demanding that the government take new action to stop the spiraling violence. In response to the pressure, there are signs that President Calderon may at last now shift away from his primarily militarized strategy toward one more focused on tackling the social and economic roots of the problem.

During Calderon's aggressive three-year drug offensive, the level of drug-related violence in the country has exploded. More than 45,000 soldiers have been deployed throughout Mexico to interfere in turf wars between cartels and root out cartel leaders. In the first 10 days of this year, a total of 283 people are believed to have died in drug-related violence in Mexico, which is more than double the number during the same period in 2009. In Ciudad Juarez alone, 227 killings related to drug activity occurred in January, promising an even bloodier year than last.

Through a plan called the Mérida Initiative, President Barack Obama's administration has encouraged Mexico's militarization by promising \$1.4 billion in funds to help the country fight its drug war. The three-year aid package is intended to provide weapon-detection technology, surveillance and intelligence-gathering equipment, helicopters and training for police, prison and military personnel. In

actuality, however, little aid has yet been forthcoming from most of the U.S. defense and private security companies (like Northrop, Dyncorp and Blackhawk) that were awarded the Initiative contracts, and many have decried the Initiative's overall lack of transparency. According to the Mexican daily *El Universal*, 70 percent of the Initiative's funds are tied up in such nonproductive contracts in the United States.

Meanwhile, critics contend that Calderon has been perpetrating the drug war in part for questionable reasons. "President Calderon was very weak when he took office," says Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas Policy program at the Center for International Policy. "Two million people were protesting his election's legitimacy, and he had problems with unity. He decided to launch this war on drugs to consolidate power, but there is no strategy."

Public debate is still raging over whether the Mexican constitution even allows for the military to be deployed domestically. Because the military is trained only to fight against external forces, it has run into trouble when dealing with its own citizens: in many cases it has abused civilians, including political dissidents, and has been infiltrated by drug cartels. Human Rights Watch accused the Mexican military last spring of allowing numerous human rights abuses to go unpunished.

Some commentators, like Mexican former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, believe that the military approach is simply the wrong tack. "The success of Mexico's frontal assault on drug production and trafficking is about as unlikely as the prospect that American society will clamp down on demand," Castañeda writes in this month's *Foreign Policy*. The surge in drug violence that has accompanied Calderon's campaign, Castañeda suggests, has been misinterpreted by both the Mexican and U.S. governments as a sign that their war model is working. In fact, though the number of cartel leaders killed or arrested has increased, the number of prosecutions has not. Due to a deeply flawed and corrupt justice system, many of the cases against drug suspects are thrown out, leaving them to go free. This is usually due to either shoddy police investigative work or a lack of concrete evidence.

What's really needed, suggest a growing number of commentators, is not a flat-out military assault, but a bolstering of civil society and a "smarter war"—one that goes after the financial structures of cartels and the mainstream economic institutions that profit from drug money. As John Ackerman, a legal analyst and professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, argues, "the U.S. needs to realize that it's no accident that the violence is happening in these border cities, which are much more linked to U.S. economies than Mexican ones." This concentration of violence at the border suggests that U.S. demand plays a bigger role in bringing about the bloodshed than the country is acknowledging, and that any effective plan to combat the drug trade would also require action on the U.S.'s part, not just funds to boost the Mexican military's fighting capability.

Yet only 15 percent of the Mérida Initiative is earmarked for institution-building or reforming the rule of law — the rest is directed toward supporting Calderon's all-out military strategy. When it comes to providing support to the Mexican military in the form of arms and tanks, Obama has requested even more funds than Bush did. And until now, appeals to switch to strategic nonviolent tactics have largely gone unheeded by both governments.

But when news of the Juarez teenager massacre reached him last week on a short visit to Japan, Calderon was forced to call a press conference to address the angry grieving families who blamed him

Name _____

AP Comparative Government & Politics

Is Mexico's Past Russia's future?

Directions: Scholars and observers allege that Mexico's past of one party dominance (authoritarianism) may be the direction Russia is heading. What is the evidence of this? In this exercise, you will analyze data and use the information to support a thesis. You should use information from your reading and information discussed in class to explain your answers.

Mexico Questions

1. See table 1: Voting in Mexican Presidential elections (1934-2000). What is the trend in votes for PRI candidate? _____ What are reasons why the trend occurred?

2. What is the relationship between voter turnout and the percent of the vote received by the PRI in each Presidential election? _____ What can you conclude from this trend about actual support for the PRI?

3. In which election year was there the first significant challenge to PRI control? _____ Why did you select this year? _____

4. See table 2: Presidential Election 2006 What observations do you have about this election?

5. Based on the Mexican Presidential elections of 2000 and 2006 and the reading in your blogs, what do you expect from the Presidential election of 2012 (to be held this July)?

6. See tables 3&4: Chamber of Deputies and Senate What was it like for the President to govern Mexico from 2006-current? _____ Why? _____ What do you expect the government to look like in 2012? _____ Why? _____

Russia Questions

1. See tables 5-8; tables 12-14 In the Duma elections since the fall of communism, what is the trend in support for the Communist party (support your answer with data)? _____
What might account for the trend you identified?

2. What has happened to the number of parties gathering more than ten percent of the vote in the Duma? _____
What law accounts for this? _____ What other factors may account for this? _____

3. See tables 10, 11, and 15 How many presidential candidates captured more than 5 percent in each election shown? Name the candidates, election year, and the vote received.

4. What is the gap between the winning Presidential candidate and his closest competitor for each year?

5. See tables 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15 What is the trend in support for winning Presidential candidate in Russia? _____ Provide evidence for your answer.

Comparative Questions

1. How did the electoral system in Mexico reinforce the one party dominant system? _____ What similarities and differences are there in the Russian system? _____

2. What changes occurred in Mexico to make it more difficult for the one party dominant system to survive?

3. Is Mexico or Russia closer to a true multiparty system (many parties have a chance at winning and governing)? Support your answer.

Conclusion

Mexico's past of one party dominance is Russia's future. Support this thesis with evidence.

Russia is not headed down Mexico's past of one party dominance. Support this thesis with evidence.

Which thesis was easier for you to prove and why?

Reference Tables: Mexico Election Results

Table 1: Voting in Mexican Presidential Elections, 1934-2000

	Votes for PRI Candidate	Votes for PAN Candidate	Votes for All Others	Turnout (percent Voters Among Eligible Adults)
1934	98.2	—	1.8	53.6%
1940	93.9	—	6.1	57.5%
1946	77.9	—	22.1	42.6%
1952	74.3	7.8	17.9	57.9%
1958	90.4	9.4	0.2	49.4%
1964	88.8	11.1	0.1	54.1%
1970	83.3	13.9	1.4	63.9%
1976	93.6	—	1.2	29.6%
1982	71.0	15.7	9.4	66.1%
1988	50.7	16.8	32.5	49.4%
1994	50.1	26.7	23.2	77.16%
2000	36.1	42.5	19.2	64.0%

Source: Mark Kesselman et al., eds. *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas*, 4th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin College Division, 2007, 237.

Source for Tables 2-4 below: Federal Election Institute, www.ife.org.mx, accessed December 23, 2006, and checked against http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=143858.

Table 2: Presidential Election, 2006

Candidates—Parties	Votes	Percent
Felipe Calderon—National Action Party	15,000,284	35.89
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador—Alliance for the Good of All (PRD, PT, Convergence)	14,756,350	35.31
Roberto Madrazo Alliance for Mexico (PRI, PVEM)	9,301,441	22.26
Patricia Mercado Castro—Social Democrat and Peasant Alternative Party	1,128,850	2.7
Roberto Campa Cifrian—New Alliance Party	401,804	.96
Write-in	297,989	.71
Blank/Invalid	904,604	2.16
TOTAL (Turnout 58.9 percent)	41,791,322	100

Table 3: Chamber of Deputies, 2006

Party/Alliance	Votes	%	FPP Seats	PR Seats	Total
PAN	13,876,499	33.41%	137	69	206
Alliance for the Good of All (PRD, PT, Convergence)	12,040,698	28.99%	100	60	160
Alliance for Mexico (PRI, PVEM)	11,704,639	28.18%	63	58	121
New Alliance Party	1,887,667	4.55%	0	9	9
Social Democrat and Peasant Alternative Party	852,849	2.05%	0	4	4
TOTAL	41,531,750	100%	300	200	500

Table 4: Senate, 2006

Party/Alliance	Votes	%	FPP Seats	SPP Seats	PR Seats	Total
PAN	14,043,213	33.63%	32	9	11	52
Alliance for the Good of All (PRD, PT, Convergence)	12,403,241	29.70%	22	4	10	36
Alliance for Mexico (PRI, PVEM)	11,689,110	27.99%	10	19	10	39
New Alliance Party	1,689,099	4.04%	0	0	1	1
Social Democrat and Peasant Alternative Party	796,102	1.91%	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	40,740,318	100%	64	32	32	128

Reference Tables: Russia Election Results

Source for Tables 5-11 below: Russia Votes, www.russiavotes.org, Centre for the Study of Public Policy and the University of Aberdeen, accessed December 23, 2006.

Table 5: Duma Elections, 2003

Party	% List Vote	# List Seats	# SMD Seats	% of total Seats
United Russia	37.57	120	102	49.3
Communist Party of Russia	12.61	40	12	11.6
Liberal Democrats	11.45	36	0	8
Motherland	9.02	29	8	8.2
Yabloko	4.3	0	4	.9
Union of Right Forces	3.97	0	3	.7
Agrarian Party	3.64	0	2	.4
Other Parties	11.56	0	6	1.3
Independents	—	—	68	15.1

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 6: Duma Elections, 1999

Party	% List Vote	# List Seats	# SMD Seats	% of Total Seats
Communist Party of Russia	34.9	67	46	25.1
Liberal Democrats	6	17	0	3.8
Yabloko	5.9	16	4	4.4
Union of Right Forces	8.5	24	5	6.4
Agrarian Party	—	—	—	—
Russia's Choice	2	—	—	—
Women of Russia	2	—	—	—
Russia Unity and Concord	.2	—	—	—
Our Home is Russia	1.2	—	7	1.6
Communists of the USSR	2.2	—	—	—
Congress of Russian Communities	.6	—	1	.2
Worker's Self-Government	.2	—	—	—
Forward Russia	.7	—	—	—
Unity	23.3	64	9	16.2
Fatherland-All Russia	13.3	37	31	15.1
Party of Pensioners	1.9	—	1	.2
For Citizen's Dignity	.6	—	—	—
Movement in Support of the Army	.6	—	2	.4
Nikolaev-Federov Bloc	.6	—	1	.2
Russian Socialist Party	.2	—	1	.2
Russian People's Union	.4	—	2	.4
Spiritual Heritage	.1	—	1	.2
Independents	—	—	114	25.3

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 7: Duma Elections, 1995

Party	% List Vote	# List Seats	# SMD Seats	% of Total Seats
Liberal Democrats	11.2	50	1	11.3
Russia's Choice	3.9	—	9	2.0
Communist Party	22.3	99	58	34.9
Women of Russia	4.6	—	3	.7
Agrarian Party	3.8	—	20	4.4
Yabloko	6.9	31	14	10
Russian Unity and Concord	.4	—	1	.2
Cedar	1.4	—	—	—
Our Home is Russia	10.1	45	10	12.2
Communists of the USSR	4.5	—	1	.2
Congress of Russian Communities	4.3	—	5	1.1
Worker's Self-Government	4.0	—	—	—
Forward Russia!	1.9	—	3	.7
Power to the People!	1.6	—	9	2
Union of Labor	1.6	—	1	.2
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc	1.6	—	2	.4
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	1.1	—	3	.7
Stanislav Govorukin Bloc	1	—	1	.2
Independents	—	—	77	17.1

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 8: Duma Elections, 1993

Party	% List Vote	# List Seats	# SMD Seats	% of Total Seats
Liberal Democrats	21.4	59	5	14.3
Russia's Choice	14.5	40	30	15.6
Communist Party	11.6	32	16	10.7
Women of Russia	7.6	21	2	5.1
Agrarian Party	7.4	21	12	7.3
Yabloko	7.3	20	3	5.1
Russian Unity and Concord	6.3	18	1	4.2
Democratic Party of Russia	5.1	14	1	3.3
Movement for Democratic Reforms	3.8	—	4	.9
Civic Union	1.8	—	1	.2
Future of Russia	1.2	—	1	.2
Cedar	.7	0	0	0
Dignity and Charity	0	0	2	.4
Independents	—	—	146	32.5

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 9: Russian Presidential Election, 2004

Candidate	Votes	%
Valdimir Putin	49,565,238	71.3
Nikolai Kharitonov, Communist Party	9,513,313	13.7
Sergei Glazyev, Ind.	2,850,063	4.1
Irina Khakamada, Ind.	2,671,313	3.8
Oleg Malyshkin, Liberal Democrats	1,405,315	2.0
Sergei Mironov, Russian Party of Life	524,324	.7

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 10: Russian Presidential Election, 2000

Candidate	Votes	Percent
Vladimir Putin	39,740,434	52.9
Grigory Zyuganov, Communist Party	21,928,471	29.2
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko	4,351,452	5.8
Aman-Geldy Tuleev	2,217,361	3
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Liberal Democrats	2,026,513	2.7
Konstantin Titov	1,107,269	1.5
Ella Pamfilova, For Citizen's Worth	758,966	1
Yuri Skuratov	319,263	.4
Aleski Podberezkin, Spiritual Heritage	98,175	.1
Umar Dzhabrailov	78,498	.1

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 11: Russian Presidential Election, 1996

Candidate	Initial Vote %	Initial Votes	Run-off Vote %	Run-off Votes
Boris Yeltsin	35.8	26,665,495	54.4	40,203,948
Grigory Zyuganov, Communist Party	32.5	24,211,686	40.7	30,102,288
Alexander Lebed	14.7	10,974,736		
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko	7.4	5,550,752		
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Liberal Democrats	5.8	4,311,479		
Others	2.2	1,636,950		

Note: Totals may not equal 100% due to invalid votes and votes against all.

Table 12:

Summary of the December 2, 2007 Russian Duma election results

Parties and coalitions	Votes	%	Seats
<u>United Russia</u>	44,714,241	64.30	315
<u>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</u>	8,046,886	11.57	57
<u>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</u>	5,660,823	8.14	40
<u>Fair Russia</u>	5,383,639	7.74	38
<u>Agrarian Party of Russia</u>	1,600,234	2.30	—
<u>Russian Democratic Party "Yabloko"</u>	1,108,985	1.59	—
<u>Civilian Power</u>	733,604	1.05	—
<u>Union of Right Forces</u>	669,444	0.96	—
<u>Patriots of Russia</u>	615,417	0.89	—
<u>Russian Social Justice Party</u>	154,083	0.22	—
<u>Democratic Party of Russia</u>	89,780	0.13	—
Total (turnout 63.71%)	69,537,065	100.00	450

Table 13:

**Russian Presidential election results, 2008
(preliminary as of 15:57 UTC)**

Candidates	Nominating parties	Votes	%
<u>Dmitry Medvedev</u>	<u>United Russia, Agrarian Party, Fair Russia, Russian Ecological Party - "The Greens" and Civilian Power.</u>	52,402,008	70.23
<u>Gennady Zyuganov</u>	<u>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</u>	13,214,435	17.72
<u>Vladimir Zhirinovskiy</u>	<u>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</u>	6,968,912	9.35
<u>Andrei Bogdanov</u>	<u>Democratic Party of Russia</u>	965,471	1.29
TOTAL		71,131,166	98.63

Table 14

Summary of the 4 December 2011 State Duma election results

Parties and alliances	Seat composition			Popular vote	%	± pp swing
	Seats	±	%			
<u>United Russia</u>	238	▼77	52.88%	32,379,135	49.32%	▼14.98%
<u>Communist Party</u>	92	▲35	20.46%	12,599,507	19.19%	▲7.62%
<u>A Just Russia</u>	64	▲26	14.21%	8,695,522	13.24%	▲5.50%
<u>Liberal Democratic Party</u>	56	▲16	12.45%	7,664,570	11.67%	▲3.53%
<u>Yabloko</u>	0	—0	0%	2,252,403	3.43%	▲1.84%
<u>Patriots of Russia</u>	0	—0	0%	639,119	0.97%	▲0.08%
<u>Right Cause</u>	0	—0	0%	392,806	0.60%	<i>new party</i>
Total	450	0	100%	64,623,062	100%	
<i>Valid ballot papers</i>				64,623,062	98.43%	
<i>Invalid ballot papers</i>				1,033,464	1.57%	
Eligible voters				109,237,780	Turnout: 60.10%	
Source: Summary table of election results - Central Election Commission						

Table 15

Summary of the 4 March 2012 Russian presidential election results

Candidates	Nominating parties	Votes	%
<u>Vladimir Putin</u>	<u>United Russia</u>	45,513,001	63.64
<u>Gennady Zyuganov</u>	<u>Communist Party</u>	12,288,624	17.18
<u>Mikhail Prokhorov</u>	<u>Independent</u>	5,680,558	7.94
<u>Vladimir Zhirinovskiy</u>	<u>Liberal Democratic Party</u>	4,448,959	6.22
<u>Sergey Mironov</u>	<u>A Just Russia</u>	2,755,642	3.85
Valid votes		70,686,784	98.84
Invalid votes		833,191	1.16
Total votes		71,519,975	100.00
Registered voters/turnout		109,610,812	65.25
Source: <u>Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation</u>			

Name _____

“A Revolution of Hope” by Vicente Fox

Key terms:


1. Hacienda –
2. Ranchero -
3. Ejido –
4. Zapatista –
5. Escheverria -
6. Which President in Mexico instituted land redistribution? _____ Which party is most supportive of such programs? _____ What is typically involved in land redistribution policies?

Background to the book excerpt

Vicente Fox grew up on a large ranch that had been passed down through generations in his family. Fox was educated in the US and became an executive for Coca Cola but later returned to the family farm. Because of the amount of land his family owned, much of it was seized by the government. While his family was able to hold on to some of the land, squatters later attempted to seize the land for themselves.

Questions from the reading

1. What examples does Fox give of the extraordinary concentration of wealth in Mexico?
2. How do most Mexicans view revolutionary heroes? Why does Fox's grandfather have a different view?
3. Why were many haciendas successful according to Fox?
4. What injustices occurred on many haciendas?
5. How does Fox describe the ejido land reform?
6. What arguments did the Zapatista revolutionaries make?
7. How much of Fox's land did the government want to seize? _____ How much did they seize ultimately? _____
8. Describe what happened to the Fox family when Escheverria became President.
9. Why, according to Fox, was land reform a bad public policy?
10. What do you think of Vicente Fox (he's cool right??)



MY GRANDFATHER did not understand the Mexican Revolution. But I do. This is not only because I became a peaceful revolutionary of sorts myself and have the benefit of twenty-first-century democratic hindsight. The real difference is that Joseph Fox was a son of the United States, and I am a Mexican. My grandfather's view was that of the classic American: If these men were hungry, why didn't they grow food? If they were ignorant, why not study late at night by dim candles, improving themselves with Yankee ingenuity? If they had no land, why not go someplace where they could earn themselves a piece of the American dream?

In fact, many of Joseph's new neighbors from the Bajío were doing exactly that. The first great wave of Mexican immigration to the United States began in Guanajuato at the turn of the century, as landless peasants fled poverty and despair to head north to the former Mexican lands of Texas and California. As we say in Mexico, we don't cross the border, the border crossed us.

These people my grandfather respected; they were, like him, pioneers. But to my grandfather, the desperadoes who came to his gates in the name of the revolutionary heroes of my school days—Villa, Zapata, the great farmer-democrat Francisco Madero—were simply armed thugs who killed, raped, and stole from decent, hardworking farmers.

Many of these pistoleros were in fact criminals. Despite the glossy romantic portraits painted later by the textbooks authorized by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the PRI, the plain truth is that some of our revolutionary heroes were crooks, gangsters, murderers, and thieves. For example, there is Pancho Villa himself. No one knows the whole truth behind the cinematic legend of how Villa turned outlaw at age sixteen, after fighting to protect his sister from the *hacendado's* advances. But Villa was no Robin Hood: He immediately began robbing, murdering, and abducting women for his own pleasure. His first big score was the gang robbery of a wealthy miner. Villa's share came to fifty thousand pesos, 150 times the annual income of a peasant in Chihuahua. The historians tell us he blew it in less than a year on high living. If Villa ever gave any money away, it was in bribes to local authorities and payments to local peasants for food and a place to hide out. It was a trick he had learned from his first mentor, Ignacio Parra, the gangster "King of the Mountains" in Durango: If you paid in hard cash and let your men loot freely in your name, your network would protect you.

Mex - ico of the early twentieth century was a place of fabulously concentrated wealth, much more so than it is today: Mexican robber barons before 1910 made sure that there was virtually no middle class. Unlike the thrifty, upwardly mobile business classes of the United States and Britain, whose entrepreneurs invented machines and spawned an industrial revolution, Mexican tycoons of the Gilded Age were not hard-driving Vanderbilts and Carnegies, Edisons and Bells. Our country was run by an old Spanish class of absentee landlords who looked down on commerce, industry, and thrift. My ambitious grandfather Fox was only too glad to take advantage of what he saw as the Latin indolence of these wastrels. Joseph raised his son—José Luis Fox—and three daughters—Marta, Ana, and Bertha—in his spartan tradition: severe, frugal, hardworking, demanding, results-oriented, spiritually clean-cut. The Fox creed was this odd yet enormously successful Saxon culture that is simultaneously materialistic yet disapproving of worldly luxury: My aunt Bertha was sent back to Ohio as a girl to become a nun. She still lives there today at age ninety-six, cloistered away from worldly comforts in a Cincinnati convent.

If my strict Calvinist grandfather disapproved of Villa's men, he frowned equally on the *hacendados*, the lazy landowning class of the crooked *porfiriano*, the cruel crony-capitalist dictatorship that had ruled Mexico since 1876 and had driven these desperate men to join Villa and Zapata. By the time the bandits came calling at Joseph's gate, Mexico had been ruled for over thirty years by Porfirio Díaz, the demagogue-general who was our country's nineteenth-century prototype of Francisco Franco. Augusto Pinochet, or Hugo Chávez. If anyone complained, Porfirio kept rebels in line with the rule of *pan o palo*, "the bread or the stick": The dictator's friends were given the bread, and the peasants felt the stick. The *porfiriano* was like the lyric of the American country-western song: The *hacendados* got the gold mine, and Mexico got the shaft.

According to the historian Frank McLynn, by 1910 just three thousand rich families owned fully half of Mexico's land. Only seventeen of them controlled one fifth of Mexico, a land area larger than Japan.

One single family in Pancho Villa's Chihuahua owned 17 million acres, a private estate larger than the state of West Virginia.

Some 75 percent of Mexico's population worked as peasant farmhands, campesinos who lived in grinding poverty and debt peonage on the great haciendas, with no hope of escape. Ranchos like my grandfather's, where the owner worked his land side by side with his workers, paying them in corn, beans, and a little cash, were the exception. With their Latin disdain for business and hard work, the great *hacendados* looked down on mere rancheros like my grandfather, who dirtied their hands with stoop labor. The landlords left the farm work to the campesinos and the management of money to the thousands of brutal Spanish overseers, the

gachupines, who had been coming to Mexico from the time of the Conquest; their Mexican-born Creole and mestizo descendants often were even crueller. The job of these overseers was to keep the books and whip the peasants into line, begging them into debt so deep that they could never leave the landowner's estate. So campesinos lived from generation to generation on the same farm, bound to the land not by love or pride of ownership but as peons hopelessly mired in debt to the great haciendas, ignorant and sick, at the knife edge of starvation, with barely enough to buy from the landlord's hirelings the food they grew themselves. This accounts for the extreme xenophobia of agrarian revolutionaries like Emiliano Zapata, who hated Spain as much as he did the United States. To unite the campesinos against the overseers, Zapata's revolutionaries of 1910-17 echoed Father Hidalgo's rallying cry from our war of independence against Spain in the early 1800s: "Death to the *gachupines*!"

The cost of staples had doubled in Mexico in the decade prior to the revolution. By 1909, famine began to spread through the country. The average peasant earned just fifty centavos a day, but he could easily be four hundred pesos in debt. By the time he married and had children of his own in a little shack owned by the *hacendado*, the average adult male peasant owed three years of wages to his landlord. Schooling, health care, water, and sewage were virtually nonexistent (McLynn reports that Porfirio Díaz spent more on his eightieth-birthday gala than Mexico's entire 1910 national education budget).

Those few teachers who did exist were forbidden to teach the campesino children any arithmetic, for fear they would be able to calculate what they really owed. Peasants were bought and sold like slaves. Bounty hunters tracked down campesinos who fled their debts, shot fugitives out of hand while "trying to escape" under the unwritten law of the *ley fuga*—or brought the peasants back to the overseer's bastinado, a uniquely cruel whipping with the dried penis of a bull. As late as Villa's time, some lords of the manor still exercised medieval droit du seigneur, forcing virgins to give them the first "taste" before marriage. Some say this may have been what turned Pancho Villa outlaw, as he fled execution for shooting the landlord's son to protect the virtue of Pancho's sister Martina.

By 1938 Joseph Fox was over seventy, his blond hair gone steel gray as he climbed again to the minaret-domed turret to defend the hogs and the granaries from the federal soldiers. That year, President Cárdenas imposed the *ejido* land reforms that sent armed invaders to take San Cristóbal away from the Fox family.

My grandpa was joined by my father, Don José, lean and mustachioed and strapping a Colt .45. This time the pistoleros at the gate would not be satisfied with corn, beans, or eggs—they wanted the land. Never mind that San Cristóbal was a merely a rancho and not a full-fledged hacienda; the Fox family worked our land, every inch of it. But the president had decreed that all properties over two hundred acres were forfeit. Placing all such lands in public domain, the *ejido* scheme parceled out the rights to farm little ten-to-twelve-acre plots to millions of rural *ejidatarios*, who thus became utterly dependent on the federal government that now owned that *ejido* land, making the *ejidatarios* little more than sharecroppers to President Cárdenas and the PRI. So the *federates* rounded up landless peasants from other states, from drunken ruffians to the genuinely needy, and sent them to storm the gates of farms like San Cristóbal.

One of the sins of the great *hacendados* of Mexico was that they were too lazy to farm more than a tiny portion of their vast holdings. This had been a principal complaint of the *villista* and *zapatista* revolutionaries: If the landlords were too lazy to farm the huge estates, land reform should redistribute those lands to the campesinos.

So the yanqui immigrant Joseph Fox, who had paid his workers in full and milked cows alongside them for thirty years to the contempt of his *hacendado* neighbors, was furious when the soldiers of President Cárdenas came to take away nine thousand acres of his family's land. Finally my grandfather talked his way in to see Lázaro Cárdenas at Los Pinos and reminded the president that there were five Foxes—my grandfather, my dad, and his three sisters. Joseph Fox convinced the president that since each person was allowed two hundred acres, the family should be able to keep a thousand acres of San Cristóbal. To the end of his days, my grandfather still fumed about the nine thousand acres he lost to the federal government and the *ejidatarios*, many of whom he called "foreigners" from Chihuahua and Sonora. A week before he died, my mother had the old man baptized in the Catholic faith, so that he could receive last rites and go to heaven with his family. And so Joseph Louis Fox died, fully Catholic and utterly Mexican—and, no doubt, still angry that the government had taken away his land.

THESE THOUSAND ACRES of Rancho San Cristóbal were my boyhood home. The land nourishes me still, protected by the competitive work ethic of my father, Don José, and the loving care of my mother, Doña

Despite the loss of 90 percent of our land to the *ejido* of the 1930s, my father kept my grandfather's traditions, working our remaining thousand acres with discipline and efficiency.

Echeverría tried to channel the spirit of leftist president Lázaro Cárdenas and his 1938 *ejido*, when armed men had come to take my grandfather's land. They came through the gates, fifty or sixty campesinos from other states, a rough-looking bunch wielding shotguns and rifles, pistols and machetes. They seized the warehouses and the barns, the fields and the old irrigation works where we still watered our crops Aztec style, pulling wooden blocks out of stone dams to flood the fields with the brown waters of the lagoon, leaving patches of mud where my brothers and I grew garbanzo beans under our father's eye.

Now it was my dad's turn to defend the farm. My father, Don José Luis Fox, was nearly sixty, about the same age his father had been when the government came in 1938 to take away Joseph Fox's farm. There was a sprinkling of gray in my father's mustache, but still he stood strong and tall in the turret, watching everything he'd worked for all his life fall under the guns of the *ejidatarios*. Beside him paced his twenty-eight-year-old son, the Coca-Cola marketing director. I had rushed home in my Chrysler Valiant from corporate headquarters, four or five hours' drive now down the new debt-funded-but-never-repaid highway from Mexico City. And over the whole scene loomed my big brother, there as always to do the fighting for rest of the Fox boys.

"Shovels," my brother José ordered, handing out tools to my younger brothers and me. "We need to dig a well."

"Shovels?" we asked incredulously, ready to man the turret with rifles.

"They can't take the land from us if we're working it," my brother explained. "Start digging!"

Echeverría had decreed that squatters could simply move in and take any land that wasn't being farmed. So every weekend that year of the third great invasion of *bandidos* at San Cristóbal, we dug, my brother and I. We shoveled out irrigation trenches and made post holes for fences, sleeping in the mud and keeping vigil over the land of our fathers. In heaven I am sure my grandfather Fox smiled to see so much hard work being done.

Behind us, barricaded in the house, hid José's wife, seven months pregnant. My sister-in-law Lucha wrung her hands in worry for her unborn child; two children clung to the hem of her maternity dress. Outside, the *ejidatarios* from Sonora and Oaxaca waved their machetes and shot pistols in the air, shouting insults at the pregnant lady.

"You should go away from this, all of you," my father advised us one


might, tight-lipped with concern as we gathered around the kitchen table. "Lucha is pregnant; you should all go and take Doña Mercedes to safety in the city."

"No one is leaving," my mother stated flatly, to Lucha's tears. "Papa Joseph would never allow it. This is our home. I leave here only in a coffin."

And so we stayed. The invaders grew bored after months of occupation. Their efforts to whip up the local *ejidatario* smallholders came to no avail. San Cristóbal was an armed camp, a local civil war pitting the outsiders who wanted our land against the ranch hands who worked it. In the middle were the men who'd taken Papa Joseph's other nine thousand acres, all tilling their little ten-acre plots from the 1938 edict. They did not own any land—the land belonged to the state, which after 1938 had become one big *hacienda* for all of Mexico. The *ejidatarios* merely farmed their pieces of the federal hacienda as sharecroppers on the world's biggest fiefdom, keeping them utterly dependent on the state's largesse for seed, equipment, markets for their farm products, and continued permission to work their plots of land. By 1970 our *ejidatario* neighbors were in a quandary: They knew my family, that José and his men worked the thousand acres we had left, that my mother spent her days caring for their children. On the other hand, the state—their landlord and master—was telling the *ejidatarios* to take the rest of our land away from us, even to give some of our land to "foreigners" from outside the state. Fortunately, the farmhands of San Cristóbal and our *ejidatario* neighbors were not minded to join the pistoleros drinking, cussing, shooting, and gambling in our yard—there was work to be done on their own *ejidos*.

With the stress, my niece Paula was born to my sister-in-law Lucha two months premature. But she survived, as did Rancho San Cristóbal. I came home every weekend, down the mountains every Friday night to work with my brother in the moonlit fields—digging, digging, always digging, through the nights to Sunday, when I drove back to Mexico City and reported for work at Coca-Cola headquarters, where I was now (finally) back in an office, in a coat and tie. After two years of violent struggle, food shortages, mass protests from the farmers and an outcry from urban consumers, the government finally enforced the law on behalf of small farmers who worked their own land, and the would-be *ejidatarios* gave up waiting for us to finish digging those wells.

Name _____



Dance Class, a luxury in Mexico

Mexico's Middle Class is becoming Majority

Article By **William Booth** and **Nick Miroff**, Published March 17 The Washington Post

Read the article below and answer the questions as you read.

1. What is the evidence provided in the article that “Mexico’s middle class is becoming the majority”?
2. What role did the middle class play in the election of 2006 and what role are they expected to play in the next election?
3. Identify/describe common political ideas of the Mexican middle class.
4. Many newcomers to Queretaro arrived due to what? _____ Describe this area of Mexico.
5. What has NAFTA done for northern Mexico?
6. How is the middle class measured in Mexico (and the devolping world)?
7. What is the size of the typical middle class Mexican family?

QUERETARO, Mexico — A wary but tenacious middle class is fast becoming the majority in Mexico, breaking down the rich-poor divide in a profound demographic transformation that has far-reaching implications here and in the United States. Although many Mexicans and their neighbors to the north still imagine a country of downtrodden masses dominated by a wealthy elite, the swelling ranks of the middle class are crowding new Wal-Marts, driving Nissan sedans and maxing out their Banamex credit cards.



Mexico's ongoing drug war continues to claim lives and disrupt order in the country.

The members of this class are not worried about getting enough to eat. They're worried that their kids are eating too much.

"As hard as it is for many of us to accept, Mexico is now a middle-class country, which means we don't have any excuse anymore. We have to start acting like a middle-class country," said Luis de la Calle, an economist, former undersecretary of trade in the Mexican government and the co-author of a new report called "Mexico: A Middle Class Society, Poor No More, Developed Not Yet."

The stereotype is no longer an illegal immigrant hustling for day labor outside a Home Depot in Phoenix. The new Mexican is the overscheduled soccer dad shopping for a barbecue grill inside a Home Depot in booming Mexican cities like Queretaro.

When President Felipe Calderon of the center-right National Action Party won in 2006, outpolling the leftist Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, it was the middle class that gave Calderon his wafer-thin victory.

And in the presidential election in July, Mexico's growing economic center will again be decisive, say political analysts from all three major parties. The Mexican middle class is heterogeneous, anxious and divided among the major political parties; its members are socially moderate but fiscally conservative, cynical about political promises and fearful that recent gains could be lost in a financial crisis or social upheaval — the kind that buffeted Mexico in the 1990s.

"The middle class in this country doesn't want to lose what it's gained," said Gabriel Paulin, 30, living in a mod condo in a new subdivision in Queretaro. On his coffee table: a Spanish-language copy of Ayn Rand's "The Fountainhead" — essential reading for the striving class — alongside a boxed DVD set of the "Mad Men" television series.

Mexico's middle class thrives here in the country's central highlands, in buzzing industrial cities that bear little resemblance to the violent border towns of the Rio Grande or tourist magnets such as Cancun.

In Queretaro, a sunny, fastidious state capital of a million residents two hours north of Mexico City, new subdivisions and industrial parks are sprouting across the cactus lands, welcoming waves of aspiring Mexican families drawn by job opportunities and safe neighborhoods.

Some of the newcomers have fled the drug violence of cities farther north, such as Monterrey, where middle-class Mexicans feel increasingly vulnerable to kidnappers, extortionists and random killings — the Mexico they are eager to leave behind.

By comparison, Queretaro is a haven of relative calm. The homicide rate here is on par with Wisconsin, about 3.2 per 100,000 residents. It is in sunny Queretaro where you can clearly see the new Mexico of 60-hour workweeks, Costco box stores and private English-language academies churning out bilingual 14-year-olds.

It is the Mexico where the top 50 names for newborns include a lot of American-sounding names such as Vanessa and Jonathan, where people pay \$5 for movie tickets at the cineplex and the public tennis courts have a waiting list.

And it is the Mexico where NAFTA dreams came true, where billions in foreign investment have fostered a flourishing aircraft-manufacturing industry anchored by companies such as Bombardier Aerospace, General Electric and Siemens.

On Queretaro's eastern edge, developers are building a planned community from scratch, a middle-class burb-topia called "Zibata" (a made-up word) designed for 150,000 people. Zibata will be a gated community — a gated city — with security checkpoints that use facial-recognition software to determine who can enter. But its target demographic is not the wealthy — it's the middle class, said Zibata pitchman Miguel Vega, pointing to a scale model showing entire neighborhoods of modestly priced apartments and townhouses among bicycle paths, greenbelts and retail plazas.

"This is an inclusive community, not an exclusive one," he said. "We're trying to make high standards of living accessible to everyone." Vega said nothing symbolizes this impulse more than Zibata's most revealing idea: a planned 18-hole, par-72 public golf course, aimed at Mexico's upwardly mobile, with a dedicated golf academy on-site to teach the swing fundamentals to future duffers.

Off the links, Zibata plans classes in deportment and civility, and the posting of lots of rules — about curbing pets, making noise and taking out recyclables — the kind of social mores local governments in Mexico rarely bother to enforce.

The advertising slogan for Zibata is "where the impossible . . . is possible."

"It is what Mexicans want," Vega said.

Hard to measure

The exact size and shape of this new class of home buyer is hard to measure. Counting the middle class in Mexico (pop. 114 million) is not a straightforward calculation as it is in the United States, where a 1040 tax return and a Zip code define who's who on the economic scale.

In the developing world, in countries such as India, China and Mexico, scholars argue, the middle class can be defined by what its members consume, and so a Mexican homeowners household with a new refrigerator, a car and a couple of cellphones is considered middle-class — even if the combined salaries of the members of the household would make them miserably poor in Washington.

Another measure is perception: You are middle-class if you think you are middle-class. A February survey of Mexicans by the independent pollster Jorge Buendia reports that 65 percent of respondents consider themselves in the middle (27 percent described themselves as lower class, and only 2 percent copped to upper-class status).

If you just look in someone's wallet, Mexico is not growing that fast," said Willy Azarcoya, founder of a small marketing research firm here, referring to Mexico's steady but unspectacular annual GDP growth of 2 or 3 percent.

"But people think they can achieve things now, and that is the difference," Azarcoya said. "It is an attitude adjustment." Azarcoya acknowledged that Mexico still harbors a huge number of poor — between a fourth and half the population, depending on the measures (food security vs. ability

to buy needed household goods). Poverty ticked upward slightly after the 2008 global recession, but Mexico's middle-class march is back on track, and the broader trajectory shows a steady climb out of mass poverty.

Azarcoya's morning routine is not unusual. He gets up early. His wife works. Women represent 45 percent of the labor force. He drives the kids through rush-hour traffic to two private schools. There are now more than 20 million cars on Mexican roads, up from 4 million in 1980. He reads e-mails on his iPhone while gulping a yogurt for breakfast.

When one of his clients, the cereal giant Kellogg's, wanted Azarcoya to gather a dozen families for an advertisement showing them eating breakfast together at home, he had trouble finding them.

"Nobody lives like that anymore," he said. "They want to live like that. But they don't."

Trend of smaller families

Smaller families are a hallmark of the growing middle class. In 1960, Mexico's fertility rate was 7.3 children per woman, according to World Bank figures. Today, it's 2.3, slightly above the U.S. rate of 2.1. "My friends think we're crazy for having three kids," Azarcoya said. "Nobody has three anymore."

Mela Ruiz, 30, who is expecting her first child in a couple of months, said she and her husband plan to have no more than two. The young couple own three small businesses — including her manicure shop, a franchise operation called "Spa Manos," that Ruiz runs six days a week in a mall adjacent to a new subdivision.

"Going to college was expensive for me, so it's going to cost even more in the future," Ruiz said. "I want to be able to give my children the same things I had."

Ruiz is not unusual, either. Since 1980, the number of Mexicans receiving a university education has tripled, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Private for-profit universities, with relatively affordable tuitions, are flourishing, such as TecMilenio, with 40 campuses across Mexico, that offer students the option of taking classes via the Internet.

"Those of us in the middle are the engine for progress in this country," said Paulin, the "Mad Men" fan. "The rich? They've already got it made," he said.

Paulin went to college, got an MBA and moved back to Queretaro for the job as a sales manager at a company that makes industrial disinfectants for Mexican agribusiness — mostly farms that export to the United States. Parked outside was his brand-new Mitsubishi pickup. He said a salary for his position is about \$31,000 a year.

"There are good opportunities here," he said. "There's no reason to go abroad in search of a better life."

Road to getting ahead

Although blue-collar Mexicans may continue to look north for job opportunities in manual labor markets such as farming and construction, a growing pool of professional and service workers see few reasons to go abroad, researchers say. They see a road to getting ahead right at home.

It's a path paved with plastic for more and more Mexicans. The number of credit cards in circulation nearly quadrupled between 2002 and 2009, according to Mexico's Central Bank, but

debt leaves many Mexicans sensing that their foothold in the middle class is slippery.

“You may be middle class, but you still feel poor,” said Oscar Marquez, a 33-year-old father who has worked 10 years for Telcel, the phone giant controlled by Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim, ranked by Forbes as the world's richest man.

A good salary at Telcel is about \$1,000 to \$1,500 a month, Marquez said, enough for today but maybe not tomorrow.

“We live well, but it’s living well day to day. My wife wants me to set aside \$100 a month for our savings,” he said. “But I’ve got car payments to make.”

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
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The Mexican Connection

MASS MIGRATION HAS LEFT MANY TOWNS IN MEXICO HALF-EMPTY, BUT MUCH WEALTHIER.

By Matthew Quirk

Among the crumbling adobe shacks of rural Mexico, two-story California-style housing developments are rising. In the tiny city of Tlacolula, plots of land that sold for about \$10,000 in 1994 now cost \$60,000. Like the towns where they are going up, the new developments are partly empty. The home owners are among the many Mexican workers—nearly one in seven overall, and *half* the adult population of some communities, such as La Purísima and San Juan Mixtepec—who are in the United States. Typically working low-wage jobs, they send home much of their pay (41 percent on average, or \$300 a month) to support families left behind and build a better life for their return.

Remittances to Mexico exceed \$20 billion a year. By 2003, they had become the nation's second-largest source of external finance, ahead of tourism and foreign investment and just behind oil exports. That same year, then-President Vicente Fox noted that the roughly 20 million Mexican-origin workers in America create a larger gross product than Mexico itself.

Worldwide, remittances have surpassed direct aid in volume, and international development institutions (along with the governments of many less-developed countries) have recently seized upon them as a key to economic growth in the global South. The United States is the largest source of remittances—Saudi Arabia, with its armies of serflike guest workers, is No. 2—and Mexico the largest recipient of U.S. funds.

The map below, based in part on work by Raúl Hernández-Coss for the World Bank, shows the flow of remittances from different parts of the United States to various states in Mexico—a mirror image of migration flows from south to north. Though *mass* migration from Mexico to the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon, it has grown through century-old social networks linking specific immigrant communities in America to their hometowns in Mexico. Most of these networks have their roots in rural Mexico, though migration from urban areas is now increasing as well.

Remittances are unquestionably a boon to Mexican living standards, but they are also changing the character of Mexican life. In some towns with a long history of migration, leaving home to work in the United States has become a rite of passage for young men, often in place of completing school. Many of

for the deaths. According to Carlsen, "people were blaming the government, saying, 'You are not only losing the war, you are accelerating it.'" In his speech from Japan, the president acknowledged that his militarized approach has not been enough in Juarez and he vowed to address the social roots of the drug problem. "We need an integral strategy of social restructuring, prevention, and treatment for addictions, a search for opportunities for employment and recreation and education for youth," Calderon said.

As a first step, the government has already sent 2,000 federal police to Ciudad Juarez as part of a greater move to scale back the military presence. But as most in Mexico know, when the police and the military switch places, only the uniforms change, while the commanders giving them their orders stay the same.

Truly changing course in the drug war will require that the U.S. stop pumping money into both its contractors and the Mexican government without demanding more accountability. And above all, it will require a comprehensive economic and social strategy on which both countries can collaborate.

This article available online at:

<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/02/mexico-s-drug-fiasco/7942/>

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these towns are bereft of men and dominated by single-parent households. The money flowing in reduces local incentives to work and fuels inflation. Many of the houses being built boost real-estate prices beyond the reach of people working in Mexico.

Typically the men—most Mexican emigrants are men, though in border states women increasingly cross over—leave believing that they will eventually return. But most do not. U.S. crackdowns on illegal immigration have made the trip north dangerous and expensive (financing an illegal entry can cost \$20,000 or more), so workers sometimes must remain for years just to repay transit debts. As seasonal visits to Mexican hometowns become more difficult and rare, family ties weaken. Perversely, stepped-up attempts to keep illegal immigrants out of the United States have resulted in a migrant population more likely to stay. The fact that more than \$20 billion is sent back to Mexico each year is evidence of a robust labor flow that seems to benefit both economies. It's also a sign of workers stuck between two worlds.

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Branching Out

Social networks have long connected certain communities in Mexico to specific cities in the U.S.—Puebla to New York, Michoacán to Chicago, Jalisco to Boston. As migration has grown, these networks have proliferated. But new links are forming as well; for instance, workers are increasingly migrating from Guerrero to Georgia, with money flowing back the other way.

The Hollow States

Five predominantly rural Mexican states—Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas—send a disproportionately large number of emigrants to the United States. Their links to the U.S. date back a century, to when American mining and railroad companies recruited workers from these regions to offset reductions in Chinese and Japanese immigration. Home to less than a third of Mexico's population, they receive 44 percent of Mexico's remittances.

Staying Put

The relatively small remittance flow to Mexico's border states attests to their economic strength. The spread of factories along the border to perform cheap manufacturing for U.S. companies allows many Mexicans to find work without crossing over.

Community Development (from 2,000 miles away)

Mexican "hometown associations" are common in American cities. They host dances, rodeos, and picnics, and send the proceeds back to their members' native towns to finance water, electricity, or building projects. Migrants in Chicago, for instance, gathered \$240,000 one year to build a church in the small village of La Purisima (pop. 4,000). The Mexican government matches such funds 3-to-1.

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