

AP Comparative Government: Russia Unit V: Chapter 7



- Wednesday 1/6 Review/Discuss Semester Book Reviews, Discuss AP Exam, and **Video: Putin's Way Part I**
- Thursday 1/7 **Video: Putin's Way Part II** Class Discussion.
- Friday 1/8 Begin Lecture on Russia: its geography, culture and government. Finish Putin's way and discussion.
- Monday 1/11 In Class Reading/Discussion on "**Rule of Law, Russian Style**. Begin questions in class, finish for homework.
- Tuesday 1/12 Collect "**Rule of Law, Russian Style questions**. Finish Lecture and introduce first group activity: Comparing Russia's constitution to Britain's
- ”
- Wednesday 1/13 Group Activity: Powers of the Institutions of Government: Russia's Constitution versus Britain's. Collect at end of period.
- Thursday 1/14 Video: Commanding Heights: Age of Reform (Russia)
- Friday 1/15 Video: Commanding Heights continued/Discuss Shock therapy: attached questions.
- Monday 1/18 NO SCHOOL: MARTIN LUTHER KING DAY!**
- Tuesday 1/19** Commanding Heights continued: collect video questions. **Assign**

Russia – Unit Summary

Russia is an important case study for students of AP Comparative Government & Politics because it represents a country transitioning from communist rule to democracy. Russia was once the center of the Soviet Union, a world power. Because of its former status many look to Russia's transition to a democratic form of government as a case study of the challenges and successes that other countries may face as they engage in a similar transition. Because the AP Comparative Government & Politics curriculum has an increased emphasis on concepts, so it is important for teachers at the beginning of each case study to consider the concepts that will be emphasized through the case study at hand. Studying Russia will provide students the opportunity to apply several key concepts in the course including: revolution, democratization, political/economic change, and relationship between the citizen and the state. Additionally students will find that democratic countries are not always simply parliamentary or presidential, as Russia is a "mixed presidential parliamentary" system with a dual executive. Russia is often taught in AP Comparative Government & Politics classrooms right after the United Kingdom. Students should be able to compare Russia's system of government to the United Kingdom's system of government and see many differences as well as some similarities.

When studying Russia, it is important that students understand the role of communism in its development. Many adults in Russia today were a part of the Soviet Union's system of government and citizens in Russia have little experience with democracy. Many of the former communist officials still hold powerful positions in government (including the current President, Vladimir Putin, who was a member of the KGB in the Soviet Union) while others who were once managers of major industry were able to purchase formerly state owned industry for private consumption. Many citizens in Russia consider themselves better off during communist rule, as communism guaranteed employment and health care. This is a reason why the communist party has relatively strong support in Russia today. Students should also be aware that Russia arrived at a communist system through a grass roots revolution (the Russian Revolution of 1917). At this time the Tsarist system was replaced with first a provisional government and then a system with Marxist goals that operated under the principle of democratic centralism.

Because of the prominent role of communism, students should study the system of government in the Soviet Union almost as closely as they should study the current system. Students should study the ideas of Karl Marx (activity 1) and should be familiar with how Lenin and Stalin attempted to implement Marxist goals. They should study how the institutions of government functioned in the communist system, including the role of the Communist party, the politburo, the secretariat, as well as the "rubber stamp" function of the Supreme Soviet. Students should also learn about the "command economy" and be able to describe Stalin's five year plan and its impact for those living under its repression. Finally, students should have a sense that the command economy did not yield the benefits of market economies abroad. They should be able to describe the scarcity of goods available for purchase under a command economy compared to most countries that had market economies. The fact that the Soviet Union's economy lagged behind the West had an impact on Gorbachev, who was leader of the Soviet Union in the late eighties and was educated in the west. Gorbachev decided to make major political and economic public policy changes to the Soviet Union.

Russian president has a two term limit, but has an election that is regularly scheduled. Britain has a two party system, Russia has a multiparty system. Both countries use national referenda, but in the UK referenda are only advisory, as the parliament has sovereignty. In Russia citizens have voted and passed very important measures, including their new constitution through the use of referenda. Britain is a unitary system becoming more like a federal system. Under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin Russia's federal system has become more centralized.

Russia and the United Kingdom today have similar goals – greater democracy. Yet the histories of these two countries have caused them to take quite divergent paths.

Name _____

AP Comparative Government, Mr. Brady

Guided Reading - Russia (Chapter 7)

Part II

1. What are some key features of the Russian constitution of 1993? (See page 174, and full document is available at <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/constit.html>).
2. What are some of the powers of the President?
3. What are some powers of the Prime Minister?
4. Describe executive-legislative relations in Russia.
5. Describe federal-state relations in Russia.
6. Describe bureaucracy (civil service) in Russia.
7. How does the Soviet past present a challenge to the current government? In your answer define the term below.

Politburo -

Nomenklatura -

Supreme Soviet -

Path to dependence-

8. Semi-Presidential system (aka mixed Presidential-parliamentary system)-

What is the role of the president?

How is the Prime Minister selected and what is his/her role?

How have President's Putin and Medvedev handled these responsibilities?

How is the president elected and how long is his term? (now 6 yrs)

9. What power did Yeltsin use frequently (provide examples) and name some additional powers of the president.
10. Describe how the President selects the Prime Minister and what occurred in this regard during Yeltsin's term?
11. Describe **the national bureaucracy**. Include a definition of **clientelistic networks**.
12. Identify and describe both **public and semipublic institutions**.

27. (page 298) What is the voter turnout in Russian elections? _____ Describe elections in Russia.
28. What was the first system for electing members of the Duma? _____
29. In 2007 what electoral system was implemented? _____ The minimum winning threshold was raised from _____ to _____.
30. In order to participate in the election, a party must have what?
31. Why have opposition parties fared poorly?
32. (page 300) How does Russian political culture differ from political cultures in countries with long histories of democracy?
33. Russia is a multiethnic state. How does this impact political culture?
34. What role does religion (Russian Orthodox church) play in Russian identity?
35. Describe the role of women in Russian society.
36. (page 301) What obstacles exist to forming private organizations?

Russia Jeopardy - Terms

1. Asymmetrical federalism
2. Checka (or KGB)
3. Civil society
4. Chernobyl
5. Clientelistic networks
6. collectivization
7. comintern
8. Communist Party
9. Coup against Gorbachev
10. democratic centralism
11. Duma
12. five year plan
13. glasnost
14. gosplan
15. Gorbachev
16. Governors (apply to Russia)
17. illiberal democracy
18. insider privatization
19. Khordokovsky
20. Lenin
21. legitimacy
22. Liberal Democrats
23. mafia
24. Marxism
25. Mensheviks
26. Nomenklatura
27. Oligarchs
28. Power vertical
29. our home is Russia
30. perestroika
31. president
32. provisional government
33. proportional representation
34. privatization
35. privatization voucher
36. purges
37. Putin
38. rule of law
39. shock therapy
40. Stalin
41. tsar
42. United Russia Party (Unity)
43. Yabloko
44. Yeltsin
45. Zhirinovsky

Russia Notes Part 1:

Overview of the Russian Federation & Challenges to Democratic Transition

**Russian History Overview
= History of Strong Leaders**

.Czarist Russia

.Russian Revolution (1917)

.Soviet Union (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev)

.Russian Federation (1991) (Putin)

Challenges of Russian Federation's Democratic Transition

Lack of civil society, legitimacy, and rule of law makes Russian democratic transition shaky.

civil society = existence of voluntary associations.

political legitimacy = citizen's belief in government's right to rule.

Rule of law = rules/laws being enforced & applied equally to all citizens, regardless of stature.

Russia: Current Politics

What do you know about President Putin's policies?



Obama meets with Russian counterpart ...



Federalism & Putin



- o Federation Council (upper house) appointed (originally they were directly elected)
- o Governors are directly elected but can be fired by President, and candidates must come from a list approved by the President.
- o Referenda on Chechen Independence was held under Putin (2003 failed)

Rule of Law, Russian-Style

KATHRYN HENDLEY

Almost without exception, Russia languishes near the bottom of indexes that purport to measure elements of the “rule of law” in countries around the world. Assessing the extent to which this contempt is deserved depends on how rule of law is defined. As the term has become part of the global political lexicon, its precise meaning has become increasingly opaque. Even so, the principle that law should apply in equal measure to everyone, irrespective of wealth or political clout, is generally accepted as the foundational principle of the rule of law. By this standard, Russia falls short today. What is worse, the continuing behavior of Russia’s public officials, as well as deeply set attitudes among ordinary Russians, offers little promise of improvement any time soon.

Certainly Russia’s history provides little evidence of commitment to a universalistic view of law. Both the czars and the Communist Party leadership routinely used law as a blunt instrument to advance their interests, enforcing it strictly against the powerless, but stretching it beyond recognition to accommodate themselves and their favorites. Laws were often written in the broadest terms possible so as to give officials maximum flexibility.

Beginning with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s endorsement of a “rule-of-law-based state” (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) at the outset of perestroika, the Kremlin’s rhetoric shifted. The leaders who have followed Gorbachev have likewise committed themselves to the goal of universalistic law. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, who like Gorbachev are legally trained, have both spoken repeatedly of the importance of institutionalizing a “supremacy of law” (*gospodstvo zakona*). Sadly, their policies have often failed to match their rhetoric.

Much like their predecessors, these post-Soviet leaders have proved willing to countenance the manipulation of law when it has been inconvenient to live up to the law. The Kremlin’s seemingly endless campaign against oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his company, Yukos, is only the most notorious example. Not only does such behavior demonstrate the shallowness of Russia’s commitment to the civil liberties embodied in the country’s constitution and criminal procedure code, but it also reveals the Kremlin’s lack of respect for the independence of the judicial branch.

The Kremlin’s brazen disregard of legal niceties whenever the law threatens to cramp its style contributes to an “anything goes” legal culture in Russia. Human rights activists and

journalists have been murdered with seeming impunity. Business is riddled with corruption. To some extent, of course, this is nothing new. Finding creative ways to get around (*oboiti*) the law has long been the norm in Russia. Indeed, it was a critical coping mechanism in response to the perennial shortages of the Soviet era.

In a perfect world, skirting the law would have become unnecessary with the end of state socialism and, more importantly, unacceptable. But the chaotic nature of the transition only emboldened those who sought to circumvent legal constraints. The well-known adage in Russia, “It is forbidden, but if you really want to do it, then go ahead” (*eto nel’zya, no esli ochen’ khochetsya, to možno*), captures this sentiment perfectly. So long as those who engage in extralegal behavior stay out of the way of those more powerful, the state has turned a blind eye.

Dual Justice

Most outside observers have assumed that all of these shortcomings add up to a legal system that is dysfunctional and virtually unusable. As usual, Russia confounds expectations. Over the past two decades, with surprisingly little fanfare, the legislative base and institutional infrastructure of the Russian legal system have undergone a remarkable transformation. Citizens’ access to the legal system has been enhanced through the introduction of justice-of-the-peace courts (*mirovye sudy*), which have absorbed the bulk of simple cases, freeing up other courts to devote attention to more complicated cases. Thanks to the internet, information about the substance of law and the activities of courts at all levels is increasingly transparent.

Not coincidentally, Russians’ use of the courts has grown dramatically. The number of civil (non-criminal) cases has doubled over the past decade. But people’s use of the courts is savvy. Russians seek help from the courts when they encounter disputes with those who are similarly situated; they shy away from the courts when they tangle with anyone more powerful.

The dual legal system that has evolved in Russia—in which the courts can be relied on to handle mundane cases, but are likely to bow to the will of the powerful in touchier cases—is a far cry from the rule-of-law-based state that was the initial goal. At the same time, it does provide a small measure of the sort of predictability that lies at the heart of the rule of law. In Russia’s

Russia Unit

Unit Overview

Russia is an important case study for students of AP Comparative Government & Politics. Russia was once a part of the powerful Soviet Union and used a Communist system of government. Today Russia provides a key example of the struggle faced by former communist countries that attempt to effectively transition to a democratic form of government. The Soviet Union and communism has shaped much of Russia's past and has impacted the present system of government and its people greatly. Because of this, students studying Russia will examine the system of government of Russia as part of the Soviet Union and the system of government of Russia today, as a country attempting to transition to democracy.

Objectives

In this unit, students will learn about the following:

- Key vocabulary related to the Soviet Union and Russia
- How current political and economic data related to current Russia can be interpreted
- Marxist political theory and its impact
- Constitutional powers of the major institutions of government in Russia
- The process and impact of privatization in Russia
- Public policy changes made in Russia under President Vladimir Putin and their impact for democracy
- Similarities and differences between Russia and the United Kingdom

Vocabulary Review Activity (45 minutes)

Directions: This activity will ask students to review vocabulary that is commonly used in Comparative Government & Politics courses when studying Russia. This list should both review as well as supplement most core textbooks. Some of these terms, such as "illiberal democracy" may require teachers to look at the AP Central Web Site for reference. This lesson will be most useful if it is used towards the end of your unit.

To complete this activity, you will be dividing your class into 4-5 groups. Make 4-5 copies of the list on page 10 (to correspond with your groups) and cut out the words and cut out the definitions. Paste each word on an index card and each definition on an index card. Keep one complete copy for you to use as a key. At the beginning of class, tell students their group will be competing against another group to match the correct definition with the appropriate word. Give each group a set of words and a set of definitions (make sure these are scrambled) and ask the students to place the correct word on top of a definition. When a group is finished, come around and check to be sure the pairings are correct. If time permits, have students come up with a concrete example of the term as it pertains to Russia.

Activity 2: The Russian Constitution

<http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/constit.html>

As you read the Constitution, paraphrase the powers listed below.

Fundamentals of the Constitutional System, Chapter 1	What type of system does the Constitution set up? What similarities do you see between this system and the United States? Referendum – Local government -
Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen Chapter 2	What rights does the Constitution give to Russian citizens? (list 3-5)
The Russian Federation Chapter 3	Summarize the objectives of this part of the Constitution
The President of the Russian Federation Chapter 4	Outline the powers of the Russian President.
The Federal Assembly Chapter 5	What is the Federal Assembly? What are the two houses of the Federal Assembly?

	What is the relationship between the President and the Chairman (discussed in Article 117?)
The Judiciary Chapter 7	How long do judges serve? How are judges appointed? What is their role/responsibility? What is the role of the Supreme Court?
Local Self Government Chapter 8	What are the responsibilities of local government?
Constitutional Amendments and Revisions Chapter 9	How can the Constitution be amended?
Concluding and transitional provisions	By what method was the Constitution accepted?

Unit Activity – How does Russia compare to the United Kingdom?

	Russia	United Kingdom
Constitution		
Head of State and Head of Government		
Political Party System		
Executive Legislative Relations		
Referenda		
Federal/Unitary structure		
Civil Liberties and Rights		
Civil Society		

Name _____

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/index.html>

Commanding Heights: Battle for the World Economy: Russia PBS

Directions click link above, click “countries,” click “Russia,” click “video.” Then watch the segments below.

“Gorbachev Tries China 1991” through “Loans for Shares”

1. Why did Gorbachev go to Beijing in 1989?
2. What types of economic reforms had China made?
3. What are the differences in the economies of Russia and China?
4. What approach to the economy did Gorbachev want to take?
5. What impact did the 1991 coup have on Gorbachev?
6. Gaidar-
7. What was the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms on the economy?
8. Chubaias-
9. The parliament was dominated by whom?
10. What was the goal of the reformers?
11. What law did Gaidar abolish?
12. Reform meant what for the economy?
13. What was Chubais in charge of?
14. Each citizen got a voucher worth what?
15. Young reformers had to move fast to prevent what?
16. How was the Bolshevik biscuit factory privatized?
17. What happened the next day in Parliament?
18. Chernomyrdin-

The Making of a Neo-KGB State

Political power in Russia now lies with the FSB, the KGB's successor.

On the evening of August 22nd 1991—16 years ago this week—Alexei Kondaurov, a KGB general, stood by the darkened window of his Moscow office and watched a jubilant crowd moving towards the KGB headquarters in Lubyanka Square. A coup against Mikhail Gorbachev had just been defeated. The head of the KGB who had helped to orchestrate it had been arrested, and Mr Kondaurov was now one of the most senior officers left in the fast-emptying building. For a moment the thronged masses seemed to be heading straight towards him.

Then their anger was diverted to the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the KGB's founding father. A couple of men climbed up and slipped a rope round his neck. Then he was yanked up by a crane. Watching "Iron Felix" sway in mid-air, Mr Kondaurov, who had served in the KGB since 1972, felt betrayed "by Gorbachev, by Yeltsin, by the impotent coup leaders". He remembers thinking, "I will prove to you that your victory will be short-lived."

Those feelings of betrayal and humiliation were shared by 500,000 KGB operatives across Russia and beyond, including Vladimir Putin, whose resignation as a lieutenant-colonel in the service had been accepted only the day before. Eight years later, though, the KGB men seemed poised for revenge. Just before he became president, Mr Putin told his ex-colleagues at the Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB's successor, "A group of FSB operatives, dispatched under cover to work in the government of the Russian federation, is successfully fulfilling its task." He was only half joking.

Over the two terms of Mr Putin's presidency, that "group of FSB operatives" has consolidated its political power and built a new sort of corporate state in the process. Men from the FSB and its sister organisations control the Kremlin, the government, the media and large parts of the economy—as well as the military and security forces. According to research by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist at the Russian Academy of Sciences, a quarter of the country's senior bureaucrats are *siloviki*—a Russian word meaning, roughly, "power guys", which includes members of the armed forces and other security services, not just the FSB. The proportion rises to three-quarters if people simply affiliated to the security services are included. These people represent a psychologically homogeneous group, loyal to roots that go back to the Bolsheviks' first political police, the Cheka. As Mr Putin says repeatedly, "There is no such thing as a former Chekist."

By many indicators, today's security bosses enjoy a combination of power and money without precedent in Russia's history. The Soviet KGB and its pre-revolutionary ancestors did not care much about money; power was what mattered. Influential though it was, the KGB was a "combat division" of the Communist Party, and subordinate to it. As an outfit that was part intelligence organisation, part security agency and part secret political police, it was often better informed, but it could not act on its own authority; it could only make "recommendations". In the 1970s and 1980s it was not even allowed to spy on the party bosses and had to act within Soviet laws, however inhuman.

The KGB provided a crucial service of surveillance and suppression; it was a state within a state. Now, however, it has become the state itself. Apart from Mr Putin, "There is nobody today who can say no to the FSB," says Mr Kondaurov.

All important decisions in Russia, says Ms Kryshtanovskaya, are now taken by a tiny group of men who served alongside Mr Putin in the KGB and who come from his home town of St Petersburg. In the next few months this coterie may well decide the outcome of next year's presidential election. But whoever succeeds Mr Putin, real power is likely to remain in the organisation. Of all the Soviet institutions, the KGB withstood Russia's transformation to capitalism best and emerged strongest. "Communist ideology has gone, but the methods and psychology of its secret police have remained," says Mr Kondaurov, who is now a member of parliament.

Scotched, Not Killed

Mr Putin's ascent to the presidency of Russia was the result of a chain of events that started at least a quarter of a century earlier, when Yuri Andropov, a former head of the KGB, succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary of the Communist Party. Andropov's attempts to reform the stagnating Soviet economy in order to preserve the Soviet Union and its political system have served as a model for Mr Putin. Early in his presidency Mr Putin unveiled a plaque at the Lubyanka headquarters that paid tribute to Andropov as an "outstanding political figure".

Staffed by highly educated, pragmatic men recruited in the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB was well aware of the dire state of the Soviet economy and the antique state of the party bosses. It was therefore one of the main forces behind *perestroika*, the loose policy of restructuring started by Mr Gorbachev in the

within the army's headquarters. Mr Sechin has close family ties to the minister of justice. The prosecution service, which in Soviet times at least nominally controlled the KGB's work, has now become its instrument, along with the tax police.

The political clout of these *siloviki* is backed by (or has resulted in) state companies with enormous financial resources. Mr Sechin, for example, is the chairman of Rosneft, Russia's largest state-run oil company. Viktor Ivanov heads the board of directors of Almaz-Antei, the country's main producer of air-defence rockets, and of Aeroflot, the national airline. Sergei Ivanov oversees the military-industrial complex and is in charge of the newly created aircraft-industry monopoly.

But the *siloviki* reach farther, into all areas of Russian life. They can be found not just in the law-enforcement agencies but in the ministries of economy, transport, natural resources, telecoms and culture. Several KGB veterans occupy senior management posts in Gazprom, Russia's biggest company, and its pocket bank, Gazprombank (whose vice-president is the 26-year-old son of Sergei Ivanov).

Alexei Gromov, Mr Putin's trusted press secretary, sits on the board of Channel One, Russia's main television channel. The railway monopoly is headed by Vladimir Yakunin, a former diplomat who served his country at the United Nations in New York and is believed to have held a high rank in the KGB. Sergei Chemezov, Mr Putin's old KGB friend from his days in Dresden (where the president worked from 1985 to 1990), is in charge of Rosoboronexport, a state arms agency that has grown on his watch into a vast conglomerate. The list goes on.

Many officers of the active reserve have been seconded to Russia's big companies, both private and state-controlled, where they draw a salary while also remaining on the FSB payroll. "We must make sure that companies don't make decisions that are not in the interest of the state," one current FSB colonel explains. Being an active-reserve officer in a firm is, says another KGB veteran, a dream job: "You get a huge salary and you get to keep your FSB card." One such active-reserve officer is the 26-year-old son of Mr Patrushev who was last year seconded from the FSB to Rosneft, where he is now advising Mr Sechin. (After seven months at Rosneft, Mr Putin awarded Andrei Patrushev the Order of Honour, citing his professional successes and "many years of conscientious work".) Rosneft was the main recipient of Yukos's assets after the firm was destroyed.

The attack on Yukos, which entered its decisive stage just as Mr Sechin was appointed to Rosneft, was the first and most blatant example of property redistribution towards the *siloviki*, but not the only one. Mikhail Gutseriev, the owner of Russneft, a fast-growing oil company, was this month forced to give up his business after being accused of illegal activities. For a time, he had refused; but, as he explained, "they tightened the screws" and one state agency after another—the general prosecutor's office, the tax police, the interior ministry—began conducting checks on him.

From Oligarchy to Spookocracy

The transfer of financial wealth from the oligarchs to the *siloviki* was perhaps inevitable. It certainly met with no objection from most Russians, who have little sympathy for "robber barons".

It even earned the *siloviki* a certain popularity. But whether they will make a success of managing their newly acquired assets is doubtful. "They know how to break up a company or to confiscate something. But they don't know how to manage a business. They use force simply because they don't know any other method," says an ex-KGB spook who now works in business.

Curiously, the concentration of such power and economic resources in the hands of a small group of *siloviki*, who identify themselves with the state, has not alienated people in the lower ranks of the security services. There is trickle-down of a sort: the salary of an average FSB operative has gone up several times over the past decade, and a bit of freelancing is tolerated. Besides, many Russians inside and outside the ranks believe that the transfer of assets from private hands to the *siloviki* is in the interests of the state. "They are getting their own back and they have the right to do so," says Mr Goloshchapov.

The rights of the *siloviki*, however, have nothing to do with the formal kind that are spelled out in laws or in the constitution. What they are claiming is a special mission to restore the power of the state, save Russia from disintegration and frustrate the enemies that might weaken it. Such idealistic sentiments, says Mr Kondaurov, coexist with an opportunistic and cynical eagerness to seize the situation for personal or institutional gain.

The security servicemen present themselves as a tight brotherhood entitled to break any laws for the sake of their mission. Their high language is laced with profanity, and their nationalism is often combined with contempt for ordinary people. They are, however, loyal to each other.

Competition to enter the service is intense. The KGB picked its recruits carefully. Drawn from various institutes and universities, they then went to special KGB schools. Today the FSB Academy in Moscow attracts the children of senior *siloviki*; a vast new building will double its size. The point, says Mr Galeotti, the British analyst, "is not just what you learn, but who you meet there".

Graduates of the FSB Academy may well agree. "A Chekist is a breed," says a former FSB general. A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's *siloviki*. Marriages between *siloviki* clans are also encouraged.

Viktor Cherkesov, the head of Russia's drug-control agency, who was still hunting dissidents in the late 1980s, has summed up the FSB psychology in an article that has become the manifesto of the *siloviki* and a call for consolidation.

We [*siloviki*] must understand that we are one whole. History ruled that the weight of supporting the Russian state should fall on our shoulders. I believe in our ability, when we feel danger, to put aside everything petty and to remain faithful to our oath.

As well as invoking secular patriotism, Russia's security bosses can readily find allies among the priesthood. Next to the FSB building in Lubyanka Square stands the 17th-century church of the Holy Wisdom, "restored in August 2001 with zealous help from the FSB," says a plaque. Inside, freshly painted icons gleam with gold. "Thank God there is the FSB. All power is from God and so is theirs," says Father Alexander, who leads the service. A former KGB general agrees: "They really believe

**The
Economist**

Russia's opposition **Lonely but not lost**

A Russia after Putin is hard to imagine right now but one man is trying

Sep 12th 2015 | MOSCOW | From the print edition

ALEXEI NAVALNY, Russia's most conspicuous opposition politician, would not look out of place on the presidential campaign trail in America, with his strident speeches and polished manner. But



Navalny has a dream

in a country where politics is mostly bland bureaucracy, Mr Navalny, a 39-year-old with broad shoulders and bright blue eyes, cuts a striking figure—when he is allowed to speak. At a rare public appearance in the Kostroma region, 300 kilometres (188 miles) north of Moscow, he banters with old ladies, takes selfies with teenagers and spars with hecklers. In his stump speech he attacks local officials (“the mafia”) and Vladimir Putin’s ruling party (“crooks and thieves”). He implores voters in local elections on September 13th “not to be silent” and to cast their ballots for a largely unknown party, RPR-Parnas.

The Kremlin has tried to bar Mr Navalny from politics. He is not allowed to hold office because the Kremlin gave him a criminal conviction on trumped-up charges. His own party, called Progress, was disqualified. Yet in the real world of Russian politics, rather than the Kremlin simulacrum, Mr Navalny is a professional politician who has had a greater impact on the country’s future than any member of parliament or leader of a “licensed” political party outside government in recent times.

He first gained recognition as the main leader of a series of street protests in 2011 when he rallied parts of the urban middle class against the Kremlin. His stated aim of building a modern state with European characteristics appealed to many who had once voted for Mr Putin. In 2013 he received 27% of the vote in the Moscow mayoral election despite being in and out of jail, and having almost no access to state television. This rattled the Kremlin. Yet it realised that

city of Kostroma, and from 15% to 40% in the surrounding region.

For Mr Navalny the main goal of participating in regional elections is to show that an opposition party can clear the 5% legal threshold necessary to win representation. He hopes such a feat will revive popular interest in politics and revitalise the democratic electorate, not least ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2016. To this end he is conjuring up somewhat far-fetched next steps. "First we get into parliament, then we form an important faction and afterwards form a government through a coalition agreement," he says.

Next for Mr Navalny is a further evolution of his public image. He aims to assume the mantle of the eastern European protest leaders who won power in Soviet satellite states in 1989, eventually leading their people into the European Union. He recently spent three days conversing with Adam Michnik, a Polish historian and former dissident, comparing the experiences of Poland and Russia for a book to be published in Russian in October, followed by an English translation.

The tone of the conversation is very different from the self-deprecating ease of 1990s liberalism and centres around a people's craving for status. "My task is to create a new type of patriotism without Russian tanks going into Czechoslovakia, Poland or Ukraine. If Russia needs an expansion, it has to be a cultural and scientific one," he tells Mr Michnik. "My main motivation is to prove that Russians are no less suited to democracy than any other people."

Where Mr Navalny differs most obviously from post-Soviet liberals is in his hard-man attitude to politics. He doubts that economic reform ideals will ever be sufficient to turn Russia into a modern European country. The entire political system needs overhauling. "I am a politician, not a philosopher, and I am fighting for power," he says.

From the print edition: Europe

Name _____

**AP Comparative Government
Putin's Reforms in Russia – Debate**

Side A

President Putin's reforms are a good for Russia.

Side B

President Putin's reforms were bad for Russia.

Preparation Assignment (Homework)

1. Read "Russian Democracy Under Putin" by Michael McFaul
2. Summarize this article section by section.
3. **Find at least one current event to update this article. Your current event must provide new information and be about changes made by Vladimir Putin.**
4. List three arguments that will support side (A) and three arguments that will support side (B) in a chart similar to the one below.

Preparation Assignment (In-Class) Debate will take place on _____

You will draw from a hat to determine which side of the debate you will be on. Then, each side will be given approximately time to prepare. Each side is to make a list on news print of their arguments, beginning with the best argument down to their weakest argument. Then identify the arguments you believe your opposition will say and discuss how you will refute their arguments.

Debate Procedure: Side A and B will be seated facing one another. Side A will begin, raise your hand when you have a comment. I will call on students from sides a/b. This debate will last approximately 15 minutes. At the conclusion of the debate we will debrief – I will ask you if you agreed with your side and why.

Arguments in Favor of Side A

Arguments in Favor of Side B

independence.

Nonetheless, the Russian state and Russian society displayed features of democratic development.³ Elections took place under a set of rules recognized by all. The results of these elections were not entirely certain beforehand, and no authority intervened after Election Day to reverse the outcome of the voting. The playing field for competitors in elections was never equal and has steadily become less so. Nonetheless, the rulers of Russia were selected in competitive elections. The regime that emerged in the 1990s was qualitatively different from the communist and tsarist dictatorships.

> START
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Since Vladimir Putin became president at the beginning of 2000, democratic institutions have eroded. When Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister in the fall of 1999, the regime's uncertain and unconsolidated nature lowered the barriers for institutional change. Putin soon put his imprint not only on policy but on institutions. He has not amended or radically violated the 1993 constitution, and he has not upended the institutional configuration of Yeltsin's regime. Nor does he seem to have any coherent plan for doing so. He has, however, initiated or tolerated a series of discrete changes that have diminished the democratic legacy of the reform years. Yeltsin, in recruiting Putin from the closed world of the security agencies and announcing him as the "steel core" of a revitalized government, undoubtedly expected a course correction toward discipline and order. He now thinks that Putin has gone too far in certain respects. However, Yeltsin's feelings are irrelevant. What is important and worrisome is the cumulative impact of the changes.

Putin's innovations coincide with a spate of revisionist thinking about democratization in the contemporary world. Some say that autocracies are being replaced, as often as not, by hybrid regimes entwining democratic with authoritarian principles. Others go further, asserting that Russia and a series of other countries are best thought of as "competitive-authoritarian" systems, in which the authoritarian element has the upper hand.⁴ Much ink has been spilled in recent years on the failure of the promising "third wave" of global democratization, which extended from the 1970s into the 1990s, and was capped by the fall of the Soviet dictatorship and its satellites in Eastern Europe. Although there have been democratic success stories in the former Soviet Union, there have been terrible failures and disappointments as well.⁵

It is premature to pigeonhole Russia into any of these autocratic categories. The phrase "managed democracy" will do as a marker for the current condition of its polity. If it is too early to sign the death certificate for democracy, it is too late to ignore tokens of a backing away from the liberal and democratic ideals in which name the Soviet regime was overthrown. Having begun on Yeltsin's watch, the retreat has gathered momentum under Putin. Russia's present rulers are modernizers in the economic and socioeconomic sphere and pro-Western realists in foreign policy.

In the political domain, they take the electoral mechanism and the trappings of democracy for granted. They accept that they must periodically renew their popular mandate and that when they do, society must be afforded alternatives to the status quo. They are also reconciled to a limited diversity of opinions and interests within the state machinery. Without setting out to extinguish it, they aim to contain this

The new relationship between the Duma and the president is not "anti-democratic." Every president around the world wants to work with a pliant parliament. Executives in liberal democracies most certainly spend considerable political and material resources to achieve a pro-presidential majority in their legislatures. The anti-democratic flavor of current executive-legislative relations in Russia comes from the way in which the new pro-presidential majority was achieved, that is, through an election in which the playing field was not level for all participants. Unlike any previous parliamentary election in Russia, the Kremlin intervened actively in the 1999 contest to assist Unity and destroy Fatherland-All Russia. The Kremlin relied on its allies in the country's two largest television networks, ORT and RTR, to unleash a negative assault against Fatherland-All Russia. Although other factors contributed to Unity's strong finish and Fatherland-All Russia's disappointing showing in the 1999 parliamentary vote, the playing field for the two parties was not equal.¹²

Weakening the Federation Council

Putin has assembled super-majorities in the Duma-majorities capable of overriding vetoes of bills handed down by the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament. As a result, he has been able to transform the organization of the upper house and therefore the federal system. To everyone's surprise, Putin made reform of the Federation Council one of his top political goals in his first months in office.

The Russian constitution states that after an interim period during which members would be directly elected (1993-1995), each region of the federation was to send two deputies to the Federation Council: one representing the province's legislative assembly, and one representing its chief executive. The constitution did not specify how these representatives were to be selected. By the end of the two years, the regional governments had won agreement on a law mandating that all provincial leaders were to be popularly elected-until then, Yeltsin had appointed many governors-and that governors and legislative heads would henceforth sit *ex officio* in the Federation Council. This formulation gave the governors and their legislative colleagues increased local legitimacy and greater autonomy from Yeltsin and Moscow. By granting the governors and republic presidents a direct voice in the national parliament, it also created a constitutional anomaly in that these figures would be concurrently executives and legislators. The Federation Council functioned mostly as a lobby for regional interests.

Two weeks after he was sworn into office, Putin proposed a new recipe for the upper house that replaced the regional leaders with persons designated by them under an intricate formula.¹³ The members of the Federation Council resisted tenaciously, knowing they would lose their apartments and offices in Moscow, their parliamentary immunity, and much of their clout with the federal government. After a heated battle, in which the Duma said it would override a Federation Council veto and the Kremlin allegedly threatened governors with criminal investigations if they did not support Putin's plan, the law was adopted in July 2000. As a sop, many governors and retired governors were appointed to a new presidential advisory body, the State Council.

The reform has emaciated a significant institutional counterweight to the president. Council members, being unelected, do not have the same authority as their predecessors. Many, in fact, are Muscovites with patronage ties to Putin-they

Party Fractures, Election Machinations

Russia's party system does not perform the role that party systems play in working democracies. Most of the country's parties lack a distinct identity or a stable following. They have little effect on the elections that count, the ones in which the president and the regional administrative heads are chosen. Russian electoral law assigns political parties a pivotal role in parliamentary elections, but nonpartisans and weak party organizations continue to play a critical role. Finally, there is little internal cohesion within the parties that remain.

Fatherland-All Russia. The Fatherland-All Russia bloc (OVR), the founding of which initiated the electoral struggle, spoke for current and recent officeholders who sought control of the national government on the assumption that Yeltsin and his entourage were a spent force. Unity, the response to OVR's challenge, was initially created by some pro-Kremlin governors and businessmen like Boris Berezovskii who were concerned about the problems they would face if OVR and former prime minister Evgenii Primakov came to power.

Both founding groups miscalculated. OVR made the biggest blunder when it fumbled the Duma election and then concluded that it could not field a credible candidate for president. All Russia and the Regions of Russia caucus defected in January 2000 and mended fences with the Kremlin. In due course, the entire coalition followed abjectly into Putin's camp.

Unity. The original masterminds of Unity miscalculated in a different way. Unity achieved electoral success and incorporation into the power structure, but its architect, Berezovskii, did not survive as a political insider. Anticipating Putin's gratitude, Berezovskii got the back of his hand, because Putin feared that the "Family" group around Berezovskii and his business ventures had too much influence. He first ostracized Berezovskii and then pushed him into exile in London in 2001. Unity thrived without Berezovskii, upgrading its legal status from electoral bloc to civic movement and then, in 2002, into a political party named Unified Russia. OVR agreed to a phased-in merger with Unified Russia that will be complete in time for the 2003 parliamentary election. Whereas Yeltsin discarded two consecutive parties of power, Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia, Putin favors strengthening Unity/Unified Russia as an organization and seems ready to endorse and assist it in the 2003 parliamentary elections.

Communists. A smoldering disagreement in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the main opposition party, between the leader, Ziuganov, and the parliamentary speaker, Seleznev, burst into flame in 2002. Seleznev resigned from the party but, with Kremlin support, kept the speaker's job. He has formed his own political organization, Russia (Rossiia), and vows to battle the KPRF for leftist votes in the next elections. Many members are disgruntled with Ziuganov's inflexibility, and thus the KPRF may very well nominate a younger, less hidebound individual, such as Sergei Glazev, as its presidential standard bearer in 2004. Despite these internal battles, the KPRF is poised to benefit from its loyal and stable electorate. Compared to all of Russia's other parties, the KPRF has the most promising short-term future.

Union of Right Forces. On the right, the SPS has made the transition from a coalition

from the gubernatorial ballot in Kursk on the eve of the election. Ruskoi, a supporter of Unity in 1999 and Russia's vice president from 1991 to 1993, had, among other things, offended Putin during the controversy about the sinking of the submarine Kursk several months before.²⁵ In April 2002, the scenario was repeated with the front-runner for president of Ingushetia, a republic bordering Chechnya.²⁶ The same year, Moscow intervened on behalf of clients in gubernatorial elections in Krasnoarsk and Nizhni Novgorod, and there were charges of fraud in the vote counting.²⁷ Such practices, whether or not they spread to the national level, compromise Russia's functioning even as an electoral democracy. As Andreas Shedler has observed, the process of assessing electoral democracies is like multiplying by zero, as opposed to adding: "Partial compliance to democratic norms does not add up to partial democracy. Gross violation of any one condition invalidates the fulfillment of all the others. If the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, elections become not less democratic but undemocratic."²⁸

The lack of strong opposition parties and the central state's ability to intervene in local elections underscore the weakness of the checks on the Kremlin's power. Rather than consolidating, these potential balancers of presidential power have weakened with time.

Chechnya and Civil Liberties

Putin's rise to power dovetailed with a cruel war in Chechnya, the second Russia had fought there since 1994. In the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, voters saw Unity and then Putin as the political players who could best handle this tormenting issue. The initial use of force against the Chechen fighters making raids on nearby Dagestan in 1999 was justified. Russia also had a sovereign right to deal with the lawlessness that enveloped Chechnya after the Khasavyurt accord ended the first war in 1996, a plague whose barbarous manifestations included a wave of kidnappings and the execution of hostages. The Russian government's response—full-scale reoccupation, bombardment by heavy weaponry, oppressive patrols and "filtration camps" for segregating and interrogating suspects—has not brought about the promised result. Putin has pledged military reform, as did Yeltsin before him, and appointed a civilian, Sergei Ivanov of the FSB, as defense minister in 2000, but this objective has taken a back seat to prosecuting the war with archaic military forces consisting of sullen conscripts led by a Soviet-era officer corps.²⁹

Wars are always brutal, and Chechnya is no exception, but the violence of the guerrillas and the terrorists linked to them does not exonerate Russia's routinely inhumane actions. Human Rights Watch has documented atrocities that include summary shootings, the torching of villages, the rape of Chechen women, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war.³⁰ Experts reckon that the fighting has displaced 400,000 refugees.³¹ Moscow has no strategy for either withdrawal or a negotiated settlement. The March 2003 referendum on Chechnya's status, in which more than 90 percent of its citizens supposedly endorsed all three of Moscow's questions, was a farce, emphasizing yet again the lack of a serious plan to end the bloodshed. To stanch the flow of information about human rights violations, Russia has expelled the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from the republic.

President Putin has loosened the leash on the FSB, which he headed in 1998-1999

Russia as "not free" for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the 2003-2004 round of elections approaches, even moderate opponents of Putin have many fewer outlets for delivering their message than in 1999-2000.³⁷

Putin's Agenda and the Future of Russian Democracy

Putin and his statecraft cannot be appraised on one level or by one criterion. Enough is not yet known to make it possible to sort through the ellipses and contradictions in the thinking of the public man. The private man is hidden behind many veils.

Some of what is here called managed democracy is a pragmatic response to the trying circumstances Russia found itself in at the end of the 1990s. Boris Yeltsin, capable of flashes of imagination and boldness, was bored with the minutiae of government and preferred changing officials to rethinking policies. To buy support and stability in tumultuous times, he repeatedly made concessions to groups like the provincial governors and the new business elite, barely considering the costs. Putin inherited these arrangements, found many of them lacking, and set out to enforce or negotiate better terms. The particulars often reflect common sense more than ideology, and might very well have been implemented no matter who succeeded Yeltsin. Although the means have sometimes been suspect, there is nothing objectionable in Putin's ending the polarization of executive and legislature, removing the anomaly of governors sitting in the upper house of parliament, squeezing more tax revenues from the provinces, tinkering with the electoral system, putting one or two of the most arrogant oligarchs in their place, and retaliating against the Chechen incursion into Dagestan. In economic policy, Putin has listened to liberal advice and converted it into legislation more consistently and effectively than Yeltsin did. His reforms, along with the 1998 devaluation and the rise in world oil prices, have helped sustain an economic recovery now in its fifth year, a welcome respite after so long in the doldrums.

Prolonged economic growth should be conducive to democracy, for it will grow a middle class that will demand freedoms and accountable governance.³⁸ This could end up being Putin's most benign legacy to Russia. Nor should one ignore the institutional and political projects he supports that may ultimately strengthen democratic governance. To his credit, for example, Putin favors legal reforms that will pare the power of prosecutors, introduce jury trials nationwide, and lessen the incarceration rate. In 2002, he vetoed restrictive amendments to the law on the mass media passed by parliament after the Moscow hostage crisis. On occasion at least, Putin says the right things about democracy and human rights. In November 2001, he attended a Civic Forum sponsored by his administration with the purpose of bridging the chasm between state officials and grassroots activists. The sight of a former KGB agent, Putin, sitting at the same table as a former Soviet dissident and Helsinki Watch leader, Ludmila Alekseeva, was a stirring one, although some fretted that it was all a ploy to co-opt activists.³⁹ A year later, Putin met with a similar group on International Human Rights Day and proclaimed that his heart was with them: Protecting civil rights and freedoms is a highly relevant issue for Russia. You know that next year will see the tenth anniversary of our constitution. It declares the basic human rights and freedoms to be the highest value and it enshrines them as self-implementing standards. I must say that this is of course a great achievement.⁴⁰

Unfortunately, Putin's actions are all too frequently at variance with his words. He

stable regime somewhere in between. Putin has eroded democratic institutions and practices but has not destroyed them, nor has he articulated a plan for their further erosion. Russian society seems content with the current quasi-democratic, quasi-autocratic order. Russians value democracy but are too exhausted, from decades of turmoil, to fight for better democracy. Stability is the greater priority. Managed democracy could be around in Russia for a long time.

END

Notes

1. For more skeptical assessments, see Vladimir Brovkin, "The Emperor's New Clothes: Continuities of Soviet Political Culture in Contemporary Russia," *Problems of Post-Communism* 43, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 21-28; Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Gliniski, *Market Bolshevism: The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Stephen Cohen, "Russian Studies Without Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 15, no. 1 (1999): 37-55; Lilia Shevstova, *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
2. On the differences between electoral and liberal democracies, see Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
3. For elaboration of the authors' views on this subject, see Timothy J. Colton, *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
4. See Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 21-35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 51-65; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democracy after Communism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
5. Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 212-44.
6. See Thomas F. Remington, "Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties," in *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, ed. Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 39-62.
7. The pact scrapped a rule of thumb that assigned committee chairs in proportion to the size of the respective fractions. OVR and the two liberal groups, SPS and Yabloko, boycotted Duma sessions for several weeks, to no end.
8. Quoted by Susan Glasser in the *Washington Post* (June 8, 2002): A14.
9. For details on the package, see Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, "Resource Wealth and Institutional Change: The Political Economy of Tax Reform in