

Advanced Placement Comparative Government

Unit III: European Union



Monday	10/19	Debrief British Parliament/Post Assessment
Tuesday	10/20	Movie: Fifth Estate
Wednesday	10/21	Continue Fifth Estate
Thursday	10/22	Fifth Estate
Friday	10/23	Finish up Fifth Estate: Assign Movie Review Due Monday 10/26. European Union Notes. In class reading: EU and Constitution
Monday	10/26	Collect: Movie Review Fifth Estate. Discuss Impact of Wiki leaks on Britain/Europe and U.S. security.
Tuesday	10/27	Critical Review Due: EU and its "Constitution" Class Discussion of Article
Wednesday	10/28	Quiz: pp.126-131
Thursday	10/29	Critical Review due: The Reluctant European: Class Discussion
Friday	10/30	Quiz: pp. 131-139 Class reading: Not Team Players: Annotations
Monday	11/2	Quiz 140-149. Discussion "Not Team Players"
Tuesday	11/3	No School: Teacher Professional Development
Wednesday	11/4	Quiz: pp.149-158

Thursday 11/5 Preview **Simulation** over entry into European Union

Friday 11/6 **Quiz: pp. 159-166/ Continue preview of simulation.**

11/9-11/11 Mon-Wed Simulation: Debating Entry into EU

11/12 Thursday European Web Crawl.

11/13 Friday **Web Crawl, if time permits.**

Thursday 11/5 Preview **Simulation** over entry into European Union

Friday 11/6 **Quiz: pp. 159-166/ Continue preview of simulation.**

11/9-11/11 Mon-Wed Simulation: Debating Entry into EU

11/12 Thursday European Web Crawl.

11/13 Friday **Web Crawl, if time permits.**

MOVIE REVIEW:

The Fifth Estate:

Based on the movie and your own insight, write a one page critical analysis of Fifth Estate. You may use the following prompts as a guideline if you wish.

In your opinion is Wiki-Leaks as damaging to national security for the American Government? The British Government?

In Democratic societies, how important is freedom of information? Do you believe that this is the great 'levelling agent' against the lack of transparency by governments?



The Fifth Estate, Bill Condon's frenetic thriller about WikiLeaks and its founder Julian Assange, suffers from one very obvious fundamental flaw. It can't work out its own attitude toward its central character. The filmmakers haven't made up their minds yet whether Assange is a visionary champion of free speech or an autocratic and "manipulative asshole" with a personality skirting on the autistic end of the spectrum. The film veers toward the latter interpretation, one reason why Assange himself has been so dismissive of it.

Another problem is the sheer complexity of the new media world that Assange inhabits. Things seemed very much simpler in *All the President's Men* when the *Washington Post* journalists Woodward and Bernstein were told by their source to "follow the money" and ended up bringing down a president. Here, after WikiLeaks posts online its huge hoard of leaked military and diplomatic documents, the results are nowhere near so straightforward. It is therefore a huge challenge for Condon and the screenwriter Josh Singer (best known for *The West Wing*) to create a taut and coherent narrative. With Assange currently holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London fighting extradition after sexual assault claims from two Swedish women, this is hardly a story that has reached a natural conclusion either.

The film-making style is flashy and energetic. The tone is set by the montage sequence which opens the film. We're bombarded with images which give a mini-history of printing and publishing, taking us from the earliest days of typesetting to the birth of the worldwide web.

The action begins in earnest in late 2010, just as *The Guardian*, *The New York Times* and *Der Spiegel* are about to release the classified US documents that came WikiLeaks' way via the US soldier Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning. The *Guardian* journalists are in a state of hyper-excitement. The music, sound and quick-fire editing heighten the tension. It is one of the paradoxes of *The Fifth Estate* that it is a film about characters who spend a large part of their lives staring at computer screens but Condon still manages to make it seem like an action movie.

Benedict Cumberbatch is very well cast as Assange. In a bizarre way, the role makes a perfect companion piece to *Parade's End*. The aristocratic British army officer he played may have been a Tory clinging to old world values but was as stubborn as Assange is shown to be here – and as principled.

With his white hair (which one character in the film claims is dyed) and pale skin, Assange looks as otherworldly as David Bowie's alien in *The Man Who Fell to Earth*, but Cumberbatch gives the character gravitas and dignity. He has absolutely no regard for social nicety. This is brought out in two of the film's most poignant scenes in which he stumbles into the private life of his assistant Daniel Domscheit-Berg (Daniel Brühl.) In the first, he walks into Daniel's apartment late in the evening, sets up his laptop and starts working, completely oblivious to the fact that Daniel had just been making love to his girlfriend (Alicia Vikander). Privacy, it seems, is an utterly foreign concept to him. The second scene involves him going to dinner with Daniel's parents. He can't hide his contempt for their tidy bourgeois lives.

This isn't a biopic of Assange. At times, it looks as if it might turn into one. There are references to the son he hasn't seen for a year and to his own traumatic childhood in Australia where his mother was part of a religious cult. However, the filmmakers are too busy dealing with the other strands of the WikiLeaks story to delve too deeply into his background.

On one level, *The Fifth Estate* is a buddy movie. We see Assange from the perspective of Daniel Domscheit-Berg, whose memoir, *Inside WikiLeaks*, partially inspired the screenplay. There is a comic dimension to their relationship. Daniel is the Sancho Panza to Assange's Don Quixote or the Robin to his Batman. When Daniel first starts working for WikiLeaks, he thinks Assange has a huge army of assistants. In fact, it often seems it's just the two of them against the world. Condon throws in stylised sequences in which we see Assange and Daniel in what looks like a vast office with row after row of desks behind them. Of course, they're really hackers with laptops who work on the move.

The film hints at Assange's ambivalent relationship with mainstream media. He sneers at "the hallowed *Guardian*" with its high-minded airs and declining readership. At the same time he yearns for approval from its editors and journalists. He also begins to behave more and more like an old fashioned *Citizen Kane*-like proprietor.

The Fifth Estate pulls in far too many directions at once. The WikiLeaks story, it becomes apparent, is too big and complex to be turned into a coherent two-hour feature film. Characters flit in and out of sight for no particular reason. The brilliant young Swedish actress Alicia Vikander is in the film simply to provide at least a hint of a romantic subplot. There's a nicely caustic performance from Laura Linney as an American diplomat, and a very disturbing sequence showing a Libyan civil servant whose life is put in danger because of the leaks.

WikiLeaks has already dismissed *The Fifth Estate* as "a work of fiction masquerading as fact". It's a moot point whether the film really offers an accurate or fair portrayal of Assange, but what it does underline is that the man who set up an obscure website in 2006 is now one of the most famous media figures in the world. Hero or villain, DreamWorks wouldn't be making movies about him otherwise.

The EU and Its “Constitution”

Public opinion, political elites, and their international context.

ALBERTA SBRAGIA

The European Union is going about its regular business. It is putting forth proposals to keep the Doha Round alive, continuing to negotiate a major trade agreement with Mercosur in South America, keeping peace-keeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, spending development aid in numerous poor countries, financially supporting the Palestine Authority while giving Israel preferential access to the EU market, investigating Microsoft's business practices, and battling over the reach and scope of an ambitious new legislative attempt to regulate the chemical industry. The EU Greenhouse Trading Scheme, the largest greenhouse emissions trading scheme in the world, is up and running. The European Central Bank is making monetary policy decisions while the euro makes up almost 50% of central banks' foreign currency holdings. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has called for suspending the sale of the children's vaccine Hexavac. The European Court of Justice, for its part, has recently declared illegal a high profile Italian law designed to prevent foreign take-over of Italian energy companies. And the commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection is playing a leading role in the EU's response to the threat of a pandemic of avian bird flu.

Meanwhile, EU citizens are enjoying the benefits of the EU in very direct ways—when they fly on a low cost airline, make a phone call which is far cheaper than it otherwise would have been, study abroad while receiving credit back at their home institution, cross national boundaries without passport or customs control, or use the euro in any one of the 12 EU member-states which have adopted it. Although the EU is often characterized as a regulatory rather than a welfare state (Majone 1996), it is responsible for many policy outputs which are generally popular.

The defeat of the EU Constitution¹ in French and Dutch referenda held in mid-2005 has not blocked the EU from carrying out its usual activities. Those are currently subject to the Treaty of Nice as well as the other treaties which have been ratified since 1958 and are still in force. Nor has it affected the kinds of benefits to which EU citizens have become accustomed. While there is angst and confusion about the future direction of the Union among political elites, it is important to note that the

institutionalized machinery of governance which has evolved over nearly 50 years is in place and functioning. The fact that the Constitution's defeat did not alter the by now routine operations of policymaking highlights how embedded such policymaking is in the political life of an integrating Europe. The institutions of the European Union—the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Central Bank—are in place and doing the kind of substantive work they did before the Constitution was drafted.

Nonetheless, the Constitution's defeat is clearly an important moment in the history of European integration. For the first time, an agreement designed to further integration has been resoundingly defeated in two of the original six founding members of the European Union. Although supporters of the Constitution argue that the use of the referendum is an inappropriate mechanism for the approval of treaties, the referendum does enjoy a legitimacy which is difficult to negate. The impact of the “no” votes has been so great that many analysts argue the days of further integration in Europe are finished.

The medium- to long-term impact of the Constitution's rejection, however, is far from clear. Even without the contingency endemic to international affairs, the Constitution's defeat very probably will have unanticipated consequences. And those consequences, in turn, may actually run counter to the predictions of those who argue that the future looks bleak for European integration.

Two basic arguments can be made regarding the implications for European integration of the Constitution's defeat. The first argues that the political context has changed so fundamentally that policymaking and the trajectory of further integration will be affected in irreversible ways. In that sense, the defeat is a strategic defeat for those who wish for Europe to move toward ever greater integration.

The second argues that, by contrast, this defeat will simply encourage Europe's political elites to continue the process of integration through means other than treaties put to a referendum. That process could include a new treaty focused on the

ANNUAL EDITIONS

institutional changes incorporated in the Constitution which would be submitted to parliamentary ratification only. More interestingly, however, it could also involve moving toward further integration by using the institutional instruments currently available under the Treaty of Nice—in spite of the fact that political elites supported the Constitution because they viewed those instruments as too weak to allow further integration. Both arguments can be justified.

The Constitution

The Constitution was clearly meant to drive integration forward. Although the “Constitution” was actually a constitutional treaty since it had to be ratified unanimously and could only be amended unanimously, it was viewed as the next major agreement which would lead both to more integration among the EU-25 and pave the way for further enlargement. It was written in a less intergovernmental fashion than had been previous treaties. Although national governments negotiating in an intergovernmental forum had the last word, national and (especially) European parliamentarians had an important role in shaping its content and direction.

The comparatively diverse group of participants in the Constitution-drafting process highlighted the Constitution’s symbolic value. That symbolic value was in fact far greater than its actual substantive content would have warranted. And the question now stands—how much does its defeat matter?

Much of the EU Constitution was not new. It included “old” treaties which had been approved (at times in referenda in selected countries) and had been in effect for years. Those treaties will remain in effect. The defeat primarily affects proposed new institutional arrangements. Those included increasing the power of the European Parliament, establishing new voting weights for the various member-states, and strengthening the Union’s external relations. It may, therefore, become more difficult, at the institutional level, to construct a more cohesive European Union in the global arena. Finally, enlargement will become more problematic, as the proposed institutional changes were designed to accommodate new members.

A Strategic Defeat?

There is no doubt that the defeats have re-framed the process of European integration in the minds of Europe’s political class. There is currently a sense of indirection, of confusion, and of doubt as to where the grand project that the Six began with the Treaty of Paris in 1951 is going. The current climate is reminiscent of that which emerged after the Maastricht Treaty was approved by a margin of 1% in France in September 1992 and was only approved by the Danes in a second referendum in May 1993. At that time, too, the Commission was weakened, political elites were shaken, and the process of integration seemed much frailer than it had appeared only a few months earlier. The calls for full EU membership by the post-communist countries undergoing often difficult transitions to democracy added a kind of pressure which national leaders were at times reluctant to accept. Terms such as “a multi-speed Europe,” “variable geometry,” and

a “Europe a la Carte” entered the political as well as academic discourse about future paths which European integration might follow (Stubb 1996).

Of course, the EU recovered in a spectacular fashion from the Maastricht crisis. Although a great deal was written at the time about the caution that elites would need to demonstrate given the French public’s reluctance to whole-heartedly endorse the next stage of integration, the European Union in 2005 looks very different from its pre-Maastricht incarnation. It created the new institutions called for in the Treaty and continued to become more important as a global actor. The European Central Bank was established, the euro was accepted by 12 of the 15 members, and, on the international stage, the EU was critical to the establishment of an important new international institution—the International Criminal Court—as well as to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. It even began developing a European Security and Defense Policy. Thus, the question arises of whether the long-term implications of the Constitution’s defeat will be as transient as were those of the narrow margin of victory in France (and the necessity of holding a second referendum in Denmark) during the Maastricht process.

The difference between Maastricht and the Constitution lies in the clear and unequivocal distinction between approval (however slim the margin) and defeat. Maastricht became the treaty in force—with its commitment to a single currency and a more united European Union acting on the global stage. Furthermore, it was a much smaller EU that had to deal with the aftershocks of the Maastricht debate—the then EU-12 could more easily regroup than the current EU-25 (soon to be 27).

The consequences of defeat could in fact be far more damaging than the consequences of a razor-thin ratification. The political momentum which has traditionally been so important for the movement toward further integration could be absent, for political leaders would be unwilling to act against public opinion. The lack of a “permissive consensus” on the part of electorates could lead to a protracted stalemate, paralysis, and a gradual drift away from the kind of goals and aspirations which are traditionally associated with further integration. In particular, the attempt to create a stronger global presence would be stymied, and the move toward bringing ever more policy areas under the EU umbrella would be stopped or even reversed. The role of the so-called Community method—which involves a key policymaking role for the supranational European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice—would be at best frozen. And further enlargement—beyond the accession of Romania and Bulgaria—would become impossible.

In a worst case scenario, the lack of commitment by political leaders to the European Union would gradually infect the EU’s institutions, for the latter’s effectiveness is in fact anchored in the willingness of national institutions and elites to support the overall project of integration by supporting its supranational institutions.

The view that the defeat of the Constitution will sap the political momentum from the Union privileges the role of public opinion in the process of European integration. It implicitly argues that the hitherto elite-driven process of integration has been fundamentally transformed. The role of a majoritarian representative

institution—the national parliament—in ratifying treaties which advance European integration would have been diminished by the expression of voters engaged in direct democracy through the referendum. In fact, given the role of party government and party discipline in national parliamentary systems, the role of political parties would have been diminished.

Since the major political parties in Europe (whether in government or in opposition) have supported treaty ratification since 1958 and supported the ratification of the Constitution, the view that European integration will stall privileges public opinion *vis a vis* the opinions of governmental and party elites. In brief, the key support for integration—elite consensus—would become less powerful as an effective driving force.

The role of public opinion in European integration over the past 50 years has been ambiguous. The scholarly literature has come to varied conclusions, and in general scholars of European integration have focused on the role of elites in driving integration forward. Yet it is fair to ask how such an elite-driven process could sustain itself over so many decades. The liberalization of markets in particular would have been expected to lead to more contentious politics directed specifically against the EU than has been evident (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Gabel 1998; Sbragia 2000). Perhaps the underlying assumption of those who assume that public opinion should be expected to play a central role in the integration process was most pungently expressed by Herbert Morrison, deputy prime minister of Britain at the time when the British Cabinet rejected the invitation to join the European Coal and Steel Community. As Morrison summed up the issue, "It's no good. We can't do it. The Durham miners would never ar it" (cited in Gilbert 2003, 42).

If public opinion were indeed to significantly slow the pace of integration or re-shape its nature in the post-Constitution phase, it would have entered the stage as a significant factor relatively late in the process of integration. Given that elections to the European Parliament have been viewed as "second order elections"—based far more on national issues and political cleavages as opposed to EU-wide political debate—and that elites have enjoyed a "permissive consensus" which they have used to deepen integration, the strengthening of the role of public opinion in determining the course of European integration would represent a major new phase in this project.

The EU: A Geo-Economic/ Political Project?

Europe's political elites, however, may well continue the process of European integration, enlargement, and global integration *even if* key aspects of the Constitution are not ultimately resurrected in some fashion. This argument views the European Union as a key geo-economic/political project as well as a complex variant of a (con) or (semi) or (crypto) federation/federalism-constructing exercise (Sbragia 1993; Majone 2006).

It is quite possible that the EU's international dimension will override the kinds of constraints imposed by public opinion. If the EU is viewed only or primarily as a domestic political system, the defeat of the Constitution would in fact

be a strategic defeat. If the EU is also conceptualized as a geo-economic/political project, however, the defeat might well have unanticipated consequences which are far more conducive to further integration than might be evident in the short-term.

The beginning of the accession negotiations with Turkey in October in the face of widespread public hostility to Turkish membership symbolizes the determination of governments to carry out the promises they have already made to other international actors. Although governments opened the accession negotiations with Turkey after a good deal of conflict with each other and down-to-the-wire negotiations with the Austrian government (which wanted to leave open the possibility of a privileged partnership for Turkey rather than accession), what stands out is the fact that accession negotiations actually went forward as planned. A mere four months after the Constitution's defeat, the EU was not only back in business, but back in a very difficult kind of business. Although many analysts argue that Turkey will never actually join, the very fact of opening negotiations has triggered a process of long-term change within Turkey that makes the outcome less predictable than the skeptics admit.

In a similar vein, the active engagement of the EU in the Doha Round symbolizes the understanding by elites that Europe's economic well-being is nested within a larger—global—economic reality. Although French voters fear economic liberalization of the services sector, it is quite possible that at least some such liberalization will occur due to pressure from the Doha negotiations. The EU is enmeshed in a larger multilateral trading system, and the decisions made at that level affect it in ways which have not been well understood by either publics or political scientists.

I would argue that external challenges, although understudied in the EU literature, have always been very significant in influencing the evolution of European integration.² The Soviet threat and the evolution of the GATT in the 1950s, the impact of de-colonization on states' commercial interests in the 1960s, the changes in economic competitiveness in the 1980s, and the perceived need for greater military and political power during the Balkan crises of the 1990s have all been influential in the process. The dynamics of European integration have been embedded in the larger international environment, and that environment cannot be ignored in explaining the extraordinary depth of European integration.

More specifically, the implementation of the customs union in goods was supported by the GATT negotiations in the Kennedy and Dillon rounds (Langhammer 2005). The Single European Act which brought the single market to the EU was motivated in great part by the sense that European firms were falling behind their Japanese and American counterparts (Sandholtz and Zysman 1992) while the Maastricht Treaty was shaped in significant ways by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of Europe. The restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy was partially driven by the Uruguay Round negotiations (Patterson 1997). The movement toward a European Security and Defense Policy was at least partially a response to pressure from Washington (Howorth 2005) as well as to Europe's failures in addressing the tragedy of the wars in the Balkans.

ANNUAL EDITIONS

External economic and security pressures will continue to exert a deep influence. While some of the most immediate pressures have been addressed by extending membership to the EU-15's neighbors, the enlargement process cannot keep meeting that challenge indefinitely. The WTO, the rise of China, changes in American grand strategy, and new security threats on the periphery of the Union will unavoidably push the European project in new directions as elites attempt to deal with emerging situations in world politics.

Some of the most significant institutional changes that the Constitution would have made were in fact designed to help the EU address foreign policy challenges in a more cohesive and effective way. Ironically, public opinion across the EU seems to favor a more unified global posture on the part of Brussels (German Marshall Fund 2005). Europe does not exist in a vacuum, and both elites and publics are aware of that basic fact. A more cohesive Euro-level foreign policy may therefore emerge even in the absence of the institutional changes that the Constitution would have produced. It is very likely that elites can pull mass publics with them in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the effort to strengthen the Union as a global actor can serve to link elites and publics more firmly than have economic policies of liberalization and regulation.

Economic integration, inevitably involving economic liberalization, is not as intuitively attractive as is a "stronger Europe on the world stage." Whether such liberalization can be successfully presented to voters as necessary for the strengthening of the EU as a geo-economic project is unclear, but it is possible that the "twinning" of European economic and foreign policy integration would help make economic liberalization more appealing.

The argument that an elite-driven process of integration—which incorporates party, governmental, and many business elites as well as national parliamentarians—has suffered a disruption but neither a strategic change of direction nor a strategic defeat downplays the role of public opinion as expressed in the defeat of the Constitution. It assumes that elites will in fact be able to move toward further integration. External events will provide support for further integration—such as recent events in the area of energy have demonstrated.

One of the unanticipated consequences of the Constitution's defeat in France and the Netherlands may be that integration will proceed in new ways. Just as the defeat of the European Defence Community in 1954 led to the European Economic Community, so too the need to circumvent public opinion (or at least not consult it directly) may lead to new forms of integration. The American executive, for example, has developed a host of ways to deal with international affairs which essentially circumvent or limit the role of Congress. Executive agreements and "fast track authority" for trade agreements (now known as trade promotion authority) both have been designed to allow the executive to have more flexibility in international than domestic affairs.

Second, cohesion in the foreign policy arena may develop more quickly than it has heretofore. Integration in foreign policy has lagged integration in "domestic" affairs given the member-states' concern with sovereignty. However, elites' desire to continue the process of integration coupled with the need to matter in a world in which not only the U.S. but also such countries as China and

India will be important actors may provide the impetus for moving forward in that area. The role that the EU has played since 1958 in the GATT/WTO provides a useful precedent.

The defeat of the Constitution ironically may lead national leaders to move forward, develop new mechanisms to forge agreements without creating a context in which referenda are called, and actually become far more cohesive in foreign policy than would have been expected. One of the motivating forces for the Constitution was the desire on the part of national elites that the European Union should become a more effective global actor. The defeat of the Constitution will not necessarily defeat that desire, and external pressures will continue to entice national leaders to follow that road. Geo-economics and geopolitics have always provided a rationale within domestic politics for the insulation of representative institutions from direct constituency pressures. It is very possible that they will provide the same kind of rationale for the European Union.

If the EU is in fact framed or presented by elites as a geo-economic and geo-political project which will maximize European influence on the world stage and thereby help it respond to external events, it is quite possible that mass publics will become more supportive and that integration will move relatively rapidly in the one area that has been most resistant to Europeanization—that of foreign policy. Furthermore "sensitive" domestic areas clearly subject to external influences, such as energy, will become Europeanized far more quickly than one would expect.

The lack of institutional efficiency which the Constitution was supposed to remedy will undoubtedly make this process messier and more convoluted than the Constitution's backers would have liked. That same inefficiency will, however, allow the new accession states to play a role more similar to that which the EU-15 have played and give them a chance to make their mark in the shaping of the EU-25. If external pressures do indeed allow political elites to move integration forward, convince public opinion that such integration is acceptable, and help integrate the new accession states politically rather than simply institutionally, the defeat of the Constitution may be viewed quite differently 20 years from now than it is at present.

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Article 41. The EU and Its "Constitution"

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political debate in most countries used the term "Constitution" rather than "constitutional treaty," and I therefore shall use the term "Constitution" as well.

2. For a similar perspective on American politics, see Mayhew 2005.

Critical Thinking

1. What does it mean that "public opinion" is not supportive of the EU?
2. How may political elites circumvent defeat by public opinion?
3. What does it mean to conceptualize the EU as a "geopolitical" or "geoeconomic" project?
4. Is conceptualizing the EU in this broader context consistent with the discussion in Unit 1? Why or why not?

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Notes

1. The "Constitution" was actually a constitutional treaty rather than a constitution as traditionally understood. However, the

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James Brady - The world's new great-power contest

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Date: 10/15/2015 12:09 PM
Subject: The world's new great-power contest



Special report:
Britain and Europe

Britain and Europe

The reluctant European

Though Britain has always been rather half-hearted about the European Union, its membership has been beneficial for all concerned, argues John Peet. It should stay in the club

Oct 17th 2015 |
From the print edition

THE QUESTION THAT will be put to British voters, probably in the autumn of 2016, sounds straightforward: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union, or leave the European Union?” (The final clause was added last month at the insistence of the Electoral Commission, which decided the question might look biased without it.) When David Cameron, Britain’s Conservative prime minister, first proposed a referendum in early 2013, he was hoping that the answer would also be straightforward. Once he had successfully renegotiated some of Britain’s membership terms, the electorate would duly endorse him by voting to stay in.



But referendums are by their nature chancy affairs, as a string of previous European examples have shown (see [article](#)). Mr Cameron is well aware that the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, an issue about which he said he felt far more strongly than he does about the EU, became a closer-run thing than expected. There is no guarantee that the EU referendum will go his way, and if voters chose to leave it would cause great uncertainty not only for business and the economy but for Mr Cameron himself. Assuming that he campaigns for Britain to stay in, which seems a near-certainty, it is hard to see how he could remain prime minister if he lost the vote. Moreover, the Scottish Nationalists have said that if Britain were to withdraw from the EU, they would press for another referendum on Scottish independence, which they might expect to win. So Brexit could, in due course, lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom. The EU referendum will thus become a defining moment not just for Britain's relationship with the rest of Europe but for the future of the country itself.

When Mr Cameron became Tory leader in 2005, and then prime minister of a Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, he had a moderately Eurosceptic reputation. As part of his leadership campaign he pledged to pull the Tories out of the European People's Party, the umbrella organisation for the centre-right in the European Parliament, and in 2009 he did so. That decision helps explain why Mr Cameron has often found it hard to form alliances with other European centre-right leaders, notably Germany's Angela Merkel. Yet although Mr Cameron has also urged his party to stop "banging on about Europe", his Eurosceptic backbenchers, scared witless by the rise of Nigel Farage's virulently anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP), have constantly hassled him to adopt a tougher line with Brussels. His response has generally been to appease them.

One early morsel he threw them was the 2011 European Union Act, which requires any EU-wide treaty that passes substantive new powers to Brussels to be put to a British referendum. That sounded like a big concession, but no new treaties were then in prospect. Another was to launch a wide-ranging review by the British government of the "balance of competences" between the EU and national governments, in hopes that it would favour some shift of powers back from Brussels. Unfortunately for Mr Cameron, the review concluded that the present balance was about right, so the Tories quietly buried it.




We will do such things...

In 2012 Mr Cameron offered the Eurosceptics another sop: he promised to deliver a big flag-

waving speech on Britain and the EU in a continental European city. He eventually gave it at the London headquarters of Bloomberg, an international media group, in January 2013, promising that, if the Tories were re-elected in May 2015, he would renegotiate Britain's membership and hold an in-out referendum by the end of 2017. He later declared that the renegotiation provided a chance to "reform the EU and fundamentally change Britain's relationship with it" and that, to underpin this, he would aim for "full-on treaty change".

Yet the reforms that Mr Cameron has since gone on to propose, most recently at an EU meeting of heads of government in June, hardly match this rhetoric of fundamental change. That may be why his government has been coy about setting them out in much detail ahead of the EU summit in December that is meant to agree to them. Still, his proposals can be summarised under six broad headings.

First, migration. Mr Cameron is seeking to put a stop to "welfare tourism" by limiting some benefits for new immigrants. In particular, he wants a four-year ban on benefits, including those paid to people in work, being claimed by migrants who arrive from the rest of the EU.



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Second, he is looking for a general reduction in EU regulation, and in some cases a repatriation of regulatory powers from Brussels to national capitals. Third, he would like to see a stronger push to complete the single market in such fields as services, digital technology and energy. Fourth, he is demanding some form of opt-out for Britain from the treaties' objective of "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". Fifth, he is determined to give national parliaments, which he calls the true source of democratic authority in the European project, greater powers to block EU legislation. And finally, he wants a guarantee that an increasingly integrated euro zone will not act against the interests of EU countries that remain outside it.

These demands have been carefully calibrated to ensure they have a chance of success. For example, Europe's recent migration and refugee crisis may have made limiting welfare benefits for migrants more acceptable to public opinion in several other member countries, including Germany. Two recent cases in the European Court of Justice suggest that migrants who have not lived in a country and contributed to its welfare system might be legally stopped from claiming benefits as soon as they arrive. Britain (and maybe others) could impose some

minimum length-of-residence requirements that should avoid charges of discrimination against other EU nationals.

In the same vein, the European Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker has already announced plans to cut red tape and unnecessary regulation; indeed, it has withdrawn some 80 draft directives and is considering repealing others already in force. It has also launched new efforts to complete the single market for energy, digital technology and services, and to add a capital-markets union. Even the Netherlands, which has traditionally been in favour of the EU, has said that the era of ever closer union is over, and the European Council conceded in June last year that the phrase could be interpreted in different ways. The Dutch and Scandinavians also want to enhance the role of national parliaments, as does Frans Timmermans, a commission vice-president and former Dutch foreign minister. And the eight other EU countries besides Britain that are not in the euro will also be keen to ensure that the euro zone does not act against their interests.

No EU country and none of the Brussels elite actively want Britain to leave

Even more important, no EU country and none of the Brussels elite actively want Britain to leave. Everybody understands that Brexit would inflict grave damage on the EU (though some reckon that the damage to Britain would be greater still). As one of Europe's most important powers in foreign policy and defence, Britain would be missed. Yet it is also clear that there are limits to the concessions other countries are willing to make to persuade it to stay. And Mr Cameron is well aware that the reforms he is looking for will need the assent not just of the governments of all 27 other EU countries but, in most cases, of the European Parliament as well.

He also knows that treaty change is unpopular, difficult to achieve and slow to implement. That means he may have to settle for a protocol or some other binding declaration that will be formally ratified only if and when a future treaty is in the



Who's for ever closer union?

works (this is sometimes called a "postdated cheque", modelled on concessions offered to Denmark and Ireland in the past and ratified only later). David Lidington, Britain's Europe

minister, says the government is insisting only that the eventual deal must be “irreversible and legally binding”.

Sensibly enough, Mr Cameron has decided not to demand things that he cannot get, such as an end to the free movement of labour, a veto for the House of Commons over all EU laws or a restoration of Britain’s opt-out from all social and employment laws. Leaving aside opposition from other countries, he realises that if he insists on big changes to social legislation he might lose the backing of Britain’s trade unions and perhaps even of the Labour Party under its new far-left leader, Jeremy Corbyn.

Even so, several of the changes on Mr Cameron’s wishlist will be tricky to secure. A recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, concluded that two-thirds of Mr Cameron’s proposals lacked sufficient support from other member governments to pass. Promises to complete the single market and cut back future regulation are vague enough to be endorsed across the EU, but any British attempts to water down existing rules will be resisted, most strongly by the French and the European Parliament. East European countries will fight restrictions on benefits for migrants within the EU, and even Spain and France are not convinced they are a good idea. Euro-enthusiasts may not want to offer a legally watertight British opt-out from ever closer union, however malleable the phrase may be in practice. And the European Parliament may oppose efforts to give national parliaments greater powers to block EU legislation.

Yet most EU experts in national capitals expect that, perhaps after some stage-managed rows at EU summits in the small hours, it should be possible to agree on a set of reforms that are reasonably close to what Mr Cameron is asking for. And most also believe that this should be enough for him to persuade Britons to vote for remaining in the EU.


1975 and all that

If that sounds optimistic, it is at least based on a clear precedent: the referendum in June 1975, when Britons voted to stay in what was then the European Economic Community (EEC). In effect, Mr Cameron is trying to repeat a trick pulled off by his Labour predecessor at the time, Harold Wilson, though the parties’ starting positions have been more or less reversed. In 1974-75 Wilson faced a deep split over EEC membership within his party, whereas the Tories were largely united in favour. Today it is the Tories that are deeply split, whereas most of Labour wants to stay in. Wilson solved his internal party problems by promising a renegotiation of Britain’s membership terms, followed by an in-out referendum. He then asked for mostly

minor concessions (on the EEC budget he got nothing of any substance, leaving it to Margaret Thatcher to secure a genuine improvement a decade later). Mr Cameron has adopted the same strategy, but is also seeking treaty change. Wilson did not, yet although the changes he secured were widely derided as “cosmetic”, he won the 1975 referendum convincingly.

Mr Cameron can take comfort not only from this precedent, but also from the fact that he is starting in an apparently stronger position. In early opinion polls after Wilson’s 1974-75 renegotiation a majority was in favour of withdrawing from the EEC, yet after a vigorous Yes campaign two-thirds voted to stay. This time round most opinion polls were strongly in favour of remaining in even before Mr Cameron had won the election (see chart), though the lead has decreased sharply in the past few weeks and some recent polls have shown majority support for leaving.

So it would be a huge mistake for the government to be complacent. There are also some big differences with 1975. One is that the Out campaign will be better run and financed than it was last time. Business for Britain, one of the best-organised groups, has already produced an impressive 1,030-page book, “Change or go: How Britain Would Gain Influence and Prosper Outside an Unreformed EU”.



Second, some of Britain’s most influential newspapers (the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Express*, the *Daily Telegraph*, perhaps even the *Sun* and the *Times*) may be campaigning to leave this time, whereas in 1975 only the *Morning Star* advocated withdrawal. In 1975 the government and the In campaign managed to present the Outs as a bunch of woolly extremists. That will be much harder now, for two additional reasons.

One is the relative economic performance of Britain and the rest of Europe. In 1975, as in the early 1960s, when a British government first applied for EEC membership, continental Europe’s economies were widely thought to be doing a lot better than Britain’s. Indeed, it was the desire to catch up with West Germany and France that lured Britain into joining the club in the first place. Now Britain is generally felt to be well ahead of the rest of the EU, especially the euro zone. The long-drawn-out euro crisis, the recent savage treatment of Greece and the continuing failure of countries like France and Italy to embrace economic reform have done much to strengthen the Out campaign, despite the fact that Britain is not in the single currency.


The second, even more important, issue is immigration, which according to opinion polls is now the biggest concern of British voters. Before the 2010 election, and then again before the 2015 one, Mr Cameron promised to reduce net migration into Britain “from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands”. Yet the latest figures, for the year to March 2015, put it at 330,000, a record high. Worse, the largest year-on-year rise was in the numbers of migrants from other EU countries, who now account for roughly half the total. The European crisis over migrants and refugees from Syria in recent months has made things harder for the In campaign, even though Mr Cameron has refused to join an EU-wide scheme to spread the load and has offered to take just 20,000 of them over five years.

Against this background, Mr Cameron’s promise merely to set limits on benefits for migrants seems tame. Eurosceptics like Mr Farage have pointed out that it is impossible to control migration from Europe so long as Britain remains in the EU. If the Out campaign can persuade voters that the referendum is not really about the EU but rather about whether they want more or less immigration, it will greatly boost its chances of winning.

The Labour Party’s new leader, Mr Corbyn, could also make life harder for Mr Cameron. He is by instinct a Eurosceptic, even if a substantial majority of his party is not. He sees the EU as a capitalist, liberal club that is too fond of austerity, and also as a possible threat to his plans to renationalise the railways and utilities. Although he has said he will campaign to remain in, he is unlikely to do much to help Mr Cameron win his referendum.

That makes it all the more pressing to understand the roots of British Euroscepticism. As many in Brussels lament, hostility to the EU and doubts about the euro have spread from Aalborg to Athens and from Paris to Prague. The drawn-out euro crisis, in particular, has sapped trust in the EU everywhere (see chart). Yet of all the EU’s 28 members, only Britain is seriously considering leaving the club altogether. Why?

From the print edition: Special report






Views on Europe Not team players

Many ordinary Britons are resigned to staying in the European Union

Oct 17th 2015 | MORLEY, PUDSEY AND NUNEATON | From the print edition

THE



Economist.com

European Union does not have many ardent fans in the Butcher's Arms pub in Pudsey, a town near Leeds. "If we had not joined, we would not know the difference," says Barry Harman, a carpet-fitter. "We all think it's basically absolute crap," says Richard Smeeton, a pensioner. Others complain of immigrants claiming benefits or of the cost of membership—which punters in the pub put at around £70m (\$107m) a day (it is actually less than half that). "What good does it do?" shrugs Tony Allen, a chef.

Britons are generally pretty Eurosceptical. They view the EU with more wariness than other Europeans. It is partly because of this scepticism that Britain has not joined the euro and is not in the Schengen passport-free area. Although support for leaving the EU is not as high as it was in the depths of the recession, over the past year the opinion polls, which had tended to show a majority for staying in, have tightened and even in one case found a small majority for "Brexit" in the government's promised referendum (see chart).

Despite this, when asked if they would actually vote to leave, locals in Pudsey, and in Morley and Nuneaton, two other marginal Conservative seats in Yorkshire and Warwickshire, are less certain. Few in the Butcher's Arms seem keen to do so—citing fears over the economy and foreign affairs. ("The Russians are sneaky buggers," says Mr Harman.) This means that the campaign to stay in the EU, "Britain Stronger in Europe", launched on October 12th under the chairmanship of Lord Rose, a former chief executive of Marks & Spencer, should have everything to play for.


When asked, many cite immigration as a reason for disliking the EU. "I'd like to tighten up our borders," says one female shopkeeper in Morley, an area where, according to the latest census, over 90% of the population are white British. Others complain about an over-burdened National Health Service or a shortage of housing. In some cases, fears over immigration reflect a general dissatisfaction over how Britain has changed, particularly among older voters. "I think this country will sink soon," says Cheri, a retired 73-year-old in Nuneaton who thinks the county is now "inundated" with people. Coventry, now a multicultural city, is unrecognisable from when she grew up there, she adds.

Supporters of Brexit also tend to imbue Britain with more economic or political clout than it really has. "All they are doing is dragging us down to their level," asserts Tony Hart, who runs a tobacco stall in Morley. "[There is] not a country in Europe that is thriving," he adds. Others argue that Britain could go it alone, trading with America and China, or evoke a sense of British exceptionalism, particularly to do with the second world war. This nostalgia also makes them more vocal about their willingness to leave.

In contrast, many who will vote to stay say they are doing so out of fear that the alternative will be worse, rather than from any particular attachment to the EU. "We are not the country that

we used to be,” sighs an elderly female shopper in Morley. Several worry about what would happen if there were another recession.

Partly because the In campaign has so far been less vocal than the Outs, many people have not given the issue much thought. “I don’t want to leave the EU. I just want to leave Nuneaton,” quips a flower-seller there. And many do not feel informed about the arguments on either side. Jessica, who works in a Tarot shop in Morley, admits that she does not know much about the EU as she does not read the newspapers. But she likes the idea of “unity” and “people standing together”.



Explore our interactive guide to Europe's troubled economies (<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/10/daily-chart-taking-europe-s-pulse>)

This presents a challenge to the In campaign, despite the natural ambivalence of voters. Those lobbying for Britain to stay in the EU face a similar problem to those who argued for Scotland to stay within the United Kingdom: that the arguments for change seem more exciting. As one Labour peer puts it, the In campaign needs a dash of romance as well as a business case. This would counter the idea that it is somehow more patriotic to vote to leave. It may also make supporters more vocal about why they want to stay in.

Some such emotional appeal is certainly needed: so far, the campaign for Brexit has been more effective at getting its points across. Although Britain is not a nation of extremes, as an island it has more sense of separateness than most of the rest of Europe. This means that the In campaign cannot be complacent. Many Britons are cautious about leaving—but few can articulate the advantages that being part of the EU brings. Until they do so, the polls will remain perilously close.

From the print edition: Britain

McDonald's Protesters Win in Court

European Panel Voids British Libel Ruling in Saga That Began in 1980s

By Glenn Frankel

Washington Post Foreign Service

Wednesday, February 16, 2005; Page A12

LONDON, Feb. 15 -- The longest-running case in English legal history neared the end of the road Tuesday when the European Court of Human Rights ruled that two environmental activists whom McDonald's successfully sued for libel 15 years ago did not receive a fair trial and had been denied freedom of expression.

A triumphant Dave Morris and Helen Steel stood outside the McDonald's in central London where the saga began two decades ago and declared total victory over the fast-food giant. They and their joyous supporters handed out copies of a scathing anti-McDonald's leaflet similar to the one that triggered the original libel suit, and they pledged to renew their campaign against McDonald's and other corporate behemoths that they claim are ruining the world's agriculture, environment and large intestines.

The McLibel Case, as it came to be known, consumed 314 days in court and cost McDonald's more than \$16 million in legal fees as well as a super-sized helping of bad publicity. Although a British judge upheld the activists' right to make some of their allegations, McDonald's won the original verdict in 1997 and a \$98,000 libel award. That sum was reduced by one-third on appeal.

On Tuesday, the rest of it went down the drain. A seven-judge panel in Strasbourg, France, threw out the original judgment, ruling unanimously that Morris and Steel should have received legal aid from the British government to defend themselves. The ruling was a blow not only to McDonald's but to Britain's libel laws, which, compared with U.S. laws, tend to favor plaintiffs.

"We won hands down on both our points -- that the libel laws in this country are oppressive and they're unfair," Morris told reporters gathered on the Strand, the central London thoroughfare where the restaurant is located. Below a full-color poster in the display window trumpeting the fast-food chain's new bacon-and-egg bagel, Morris taped up a hand-lettered sign proclaiming: "Celebrate 20 Years of Resistance to McWorld!"

McDonald's, which was not a party to the proceedings at the European court -- Morris and Steel had sued the British government there -- declined to comment on the decision. But it noted that "although the so-called 'McLibel' case came to court in 1994, the allegations related to practices in the '80s. The world has moved on since then and so has McDonald's."

It all began in September 1985 when activists for London Greenpeace -- no relation to the international Greenpeace group -- started picketing McDonald's on the Strand. The following year they handed out a five-page leaflet titled "What's wrong with McDonald's." It displayed a cartoon of a man wearing a Stetson hat and hiding behind a "Ronald McDonald" clown mask, along with the words "McDollars, McGreedy, McCancer, McMurder, McDisease . . ." superimposed over the golden arches symbol.

The leaflet accused the company of contributing to Third World poverty, destroying rain forests, exploiting cheap labor and using deceptive advertising, as well as poisoning

children with bad food.

McDonald's denied the allegations, saying it was a good corporate citizen that paid close attention to environmental and nutritional concerns.

Because London Greenpeace was not an incorporated body, the company hired seven private investigators whom it sent undercover to try to figure out who was responsible, according to court papers. The investigators obtained confidential information from police files on activists.

The company threatened legal action against a number of groups and activists, who backed down. But Morris, now 50, an unemployed former postal worker, and Steel, now 39, a part-time bar worker, decided to make a legal stand.

Transcripts of the trial took approximately 20,000 pages, and there were about 40,000 pages of documentary evidence. In addition to many written witness statements, 130 witnesses testified. Although the defendants raised and spent about \$60,000 in legal fees, they worked without lawyers, while the company fielded a full battery of libel specialists and researchers. In a 762-page judgment in 1997, a judge ruled for McDonald's on most counts.

The company never sought to collect. "We have always said it was not our intention to bankrupt the defendants," a spokeswoman said at the time. But appeals dragged on for eight more years.

In 2000, Steel and Morris went to the European court, which hears claims of violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Their action against the British government contended that its refusal to give legal aid denied them a free hearing in violation of the convention and deprived them of freedom of expression.

In its ruling, the Strasbourg court emphasized that the activists had not brought the original case but were simply seeking to protect their right of free expression against legal action by a multinational corporation.

"As a result of the law as it stood in England and Wales, the applicants had the choice either to withdraw the leaflet and apologize to McDonald's, or bear the burden of proving, without legal aid, the truth of the allegations contained in it," wrote the judges. "Given the enormity and complexity of that undertaking, the court does not consider that the correct balance was struck between the need to protect the applicants' rights to freedom of expression and the need to protect McDonald's rights and reputation."

The court ordered the British government to pay Morris and Steel the equivalent of about \$105,000 in damages and costs. The government has three months to appeal the decision.

A spokesman for the British Department for Constitutional Affairs said the government would "study the judgment very carefully." Some analysts say the decision could bring changes in British policy concerning aid to libel defendants.

Steel said she and Morris never expected the case to drag on so long, but also never intended to back down. "We would never have paid them anything," she said of McDonald's. "They're the ones with something to apologize for, not us."

The Washington Post



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French Vintners Find E.U. Concoction Unpalatable

By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, May 4, 2009

TARADEAU, France -- To the buttoned-down European Union bureaucrats in Brussels, the idea was simple: squeeze costs, conquer new markets, maximize profits. But to the vintners of Taradeau, a sun-splashed Provencal village 800 miles to the south -- and a world away, mentally -- it was an attack on their Mediterranean heritage, a crack in French civilization, a fraud against wine lovers everywhere.

Never, they cried, can you mix a bucket of red wine into a barrel of white and call it rosé. Only the age-old process in which grape skins macerate in the juice for a finely calculated moment before fermentation, they protested, can produce the seductive color, fruity aromas and delicate structure of a true rosé. Mixing red and white, they sniffed, may make something pink to drink, but it is not rosé wine.

The trouble began in January when the European Union's agriculture commission decided, as part of a broad revamping of regulations on the wine industry, that starting Aug. 1 European producers can mix red wine with white and label it "rosé." To add insult to injury, vintners in Provence complained, France's representatives voted with the majority to make the abomination possible.

"They were had," charged Marc Rolley, director of the Cotes de Provence Wine Union in Les Arcs sur Argens, 15 miles inland from Saint-Tropez on the Mediterranean Sea.

Undeterred by the outcry here, the E.U. agriculture commission had been due to finalize its decision last week. But French Agriculture Minister Michel Barnier obtained a postponement until June 19. Between now and then, rosé producers said, the French government will attempt to line up enough support among the 27 E.U. governments to cancel the rule change.

Johan Reyniers, a spokesman for the commission in Brussels, said E.U. officials meant well and had their reasons: They were seeking to arm European vintners for competition in emerging markets such as China, where producers from Australia and South Africa, for example, do not hesitate to mix red wine with white and undersell European rosé by several dollars a bottle. Anyway, he added, relaxing Europe's rosé rules was only "one little thing" in a vast program to unshackle the wine industry from outdated regulations.

The clashing perspectives -- this "one little thing" is a way of life in the hills of Provence -- have once again pitted France's tradition of good living and great gastronomy against the seemingly unstoppable march of economic imperatives. Across the country, from wine cellars to cheese vats, from sausagemakers to bakers, artisans are confronted by 21st-century demands for efficiency, cost-cutting and homogenization.

Consumers' shopping carts may be fuller and supermarket chains' profit ledgers may be

blacker as a result, but something is being lost in the process, traditional producers say.

Looking across the sloping hillsides lined with grapevines that surround Chateau de Saint Martin here, it is easy to understand their point. Ever since the Count of Rohan Chabot bought the beautiful vineyards from a group of monks in the 17th century as a dowry for his daughter, the same family has been producing a sunny line of red, white and rosé wines with a proud heritage.

When Chateau de Saint Martin marketers decided to call a premium old-vine rosé "Comtesse de Saint Martin," for instance, they had only to go to family portraits hanging in the chateau to make a historically accurate label. Strikingly, the enterprise has been in the hands of several such women through the years, the current owner and operator being Adeline de Barry.

To her, the new rule was a "stupid" decision, taken to allow merchants to dump large quantities of white wine, particularly from Spain, that have backed up in storage since rosé overtook white in recent years as the second most popular wine, after red, in France; as of last year, nearly a quarter of all the wine consumed in France was rosé. If nothing can be done to reverse the decision, she said in an e-mail, then at least some clear term must be devised to distinguish real rosé from mixes.

And, she added, the term must be "chosen not by incapable politicians but by international marketers to avoid words that have no sense except in bureaucrats' offices and outside our borders."

That was de Barry's way of dismissing a suggestion from the E.U. agriculture commission that the concerns of French rosé producers could be met simply by adding "traditional" to the label of real rosé.

"I think that the advantage of rosé is above all a delicacy," de Barry said, "and a variety of savors that one cannot obtain except, at harvest time, by judging the maturity of the grapes for a rosé, except by a learned dosage of contact between skin and juice so the color is perfect, except by precise work on the temperature according to what one is seeking in the rosé."

Gregoire de Bucy, the chief winemaker at Chateau de Saint Martin, said the several hours during which the skin remains with the juice are mainly responsible for giving rosé its personality. Losing that moment, he added, means losing the aromas, the fruity accents and the colors that, taken together, evoke the sun-baked hillsides and Mediterranean breezes of the wine's birthplace.

Adding red to white, he said, will produce nothing but white wine with a little color. Linda Schaller-Gallet, marketing manager of nearby Chateau les Crostes, said it was possible that, over a few years, the pink color of a mixed wine could fade away, leaving a clear, white drink.

"Every year is different when we make rosé," de Bucy said. "That's why we never end up with the same wine from one year to the next. With mixing, they would be making a sort of Coca-Cola, so they would standardize it completely."

François Millo, director of the Interprofessional Provence Wines Council, said it would be incongruous to allow mixes to be labeled as rosé when the World Trade Organization and individual European governments are waging war against counterfeit brands of

handbags, perfumes and clothes.

"Here we have the contrary," he added. "The European Union is legalizing fakery."

Barnier's agriculture ministry, apparently not proud of its performance so far, declined to respond to a query on the controversy. Producers said Barnier has promised to push hard for a return to rules requiring the traditional process. "But the minister's not going to be there for very long," cautioned Gerard Audibert, a winemaking consultant in the Cotes de Provence region.

The European Union's parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 4 to 7, two weeks before the vote in the agriculture commission, and President Nicolas Sarkozy has put Barnier at the top of a list of candidates from France's ruling majority. His likely victory means he would no longer be agriculture minister for the vote on rosé, raising fears among rosé producers that their concerns will be dropped again and that mixed wine will flood the market beginning this fall.

"And what if it's good?" Audibert asked, half-smiling.

